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FOREWORD
The Collapse of the National Benefit Life Insurance Company by 
James B. Mitchell is an important contribution to a broad inquiry 
of the life insurance business among Negroes. As this study and 
the author’s unpublished master’s essay, “The Investment Policy 
of the National Benefit Life Insurance Company” (1938), carry a 
step farther the investigations of the Negro as Worker and as 
Business Man initiated ten years ago by us, the publication of Mr. 
Mitchell’s research in the Social Science Studies is a source of par­
donable pride to the members of the Department of Economics. Al­
though confined to a single company, Mr. Mitchell’s study reveals 
many of the problems peculiar to Negro life insurance generally. 
But in a study limited to one company these general problems could 
receive only incidental consideration. We therefore hope that he 
will find it possible to extend his future research to the study of 
Negro insurance companies as a whole.
The Department of Economics wishes to thank the William C. 
Whitney Foundation and the Julius Rosenwald Fund for the grants- 
in-aid without which the present study could not have been made.




The study of Negro business enterprises affords us some idea 
of the extent to which Negroes participate in the economic life of 
the United States. Such a study also reveals the faith of many 
Negro leaders that through the individual accumulation of wealth 
and property and the development of Negro business the economic 
emancipation of the race can be achieved. While the attempt of 
Negro leaders to develop a business class, and, later, to erect a 
“ black economy” , ignored the facts of American economic develop­
ment, it expressed the characteristically American belief that every 
man could rise in the economic scale.
The largest business enterprises ever to be organized and 
operated by Negroes were in the field of banking and insurance. 
One of the foremost among these financial organizations was the 
National Benefit Life Insurance Company organized in 1898 at 
Washington, D. C. Because of its size and the conditions that gave 
rise to it, this company during its life was more nearly in a position 
to compete with white companies than any of the Negro financial 
institutions up to its time. The history and failure of the National 
Benefit are integrally related to the general problem of Negro busi­
ness enterprise, which in turn cannot be disassociated from the 
forces at work in the American economy as a whole. A study of 
this company, the chief cause of whose failure was the problems con­
nected with investment, throws considerable light on the limitations 
and weaknesses of Negro business in general, especially when viewed 
in the perspective of the national economy. It also affords a basis 
for determining not only the chance of success of individual Negroes 
as business men and financiers, but also the extent to which the 
success of these individual Negro business men can contribute to 
the elevation of the economic status of the race.
It was relatively late in the history of life insurance when the 
Negro entered. During slavery the Negro figured in organized 
insurance merely as the object under chattel contracts. It appears 
that during the days of slavery many slave holders for their own 
protection insured their slaves much in the same manner as horses
2and livestock are now insured. The following notice clipped from 
the Richmond Enquirer will prove interesting:
Slave Insurance
The Albermarle Insurance Company 
of
Charlottesville, Va.
Insures slaves for one or a term of years at as low 
rates as safety will permit of.
Office: 130 Main Street, Richmond, Va.
Knowles and Walford, Agents
Dr. F. W. Hancock, Medical Examiner 
Office Hours: 10 o’clock, A. M.1
However, sick-benefit and burial societies, limited, of course, by 
the Negro’s meager ability to pay, existed and provided a measure 
of health and burial insurance. “The history of the Negro in insur­
ance extends far beyond the days of his freedom in this country. 
While there are no recorded data available, yet from reliable sources 
we learn that more than seventy-five years ago there existed in every 
city of any size in Virginia organizations of Negroes having as their 
object the caring for the sick and the burying of the dead. In but 
few instances did those societies exist openly . . . Although it 
was unlawful for Negroes to assemble without the presence of a 
white man and also unlawful to allow a congregation of slaves on a 
plantation without the consent of the master, these organizations 
existed and held their meetings on the ‘lots’ of some of the lawmakers 
themselves. The general plan seems to have been to select someone 
who could ‘read and write’ and make him the secretary. The meeting 
place having been selected, the members would come by ‘ones and 
twos’, make their payments to the secretary, and quietly withdraw. 
The book of the secretary was often kept covered upon the bed. In 
many of the societies each member was known by number and in 
paying simply announced his number. The president of such a 
society was usually a privileged slave who had the confidence of his 
or her master and could go and come at will. . . In the event of 
death of a member, provision was made for a decent burial, and all 
the members as far as possible obtained permits to attend the 
funeral. . . This was the first form of insurance known to the 
Negro from which his family received a benefit. . . As soon as 
the colored man became free he formed all kinds of associations 
for material protection, many of which exist today though in some- 1
1W. P. Burrell before the 8th Hampton Negro Conference, 1904.
3what modified forms. These organizations were founded for the 
purpose of caring for the sick and furnishing decent burial at death. 
No attention was paid to difference of age and very little to health 
conditions. The same joining fee was charged regardless of age, 
and the same monthly dues paid. The usual amounts paid for initia­
tion fee in these ‘benevolent societies’ was from $2.50 to $5.00. 
Monthly dues of fifty cents were generally charged. . . The amount 
paid for sick dues was regulated by the by-lawrs of the various 
societies and ranged from $1.50 per week to $5.00. Members were 
taken in on the recommendation of friends. These organizations 
were formed by the hundreds in the cities of Virginia and many of 
them served a good purpose in that the people were brought together 
and friendly intercourse established.” 2 Such societies, of course, 
knew nothing of scientific insurance principles.
Sustained by the mutual desire of their members to provide 
some security against the hazard of sickness and to provide a “ decent 
burial” , they were similar to those societies which the poor of all 
ages have set up for mutual aid and fraternalism. The collegias of 
Rome 8 and the friendly societies of England4 5*are early examples of 
this type of friendly or “ insurance”  society. Many of the early labor 
organizations in this country and Europe began as friendly and 
fraternal societies whose function was to provide for their members 
during the periods of stress caused by sickness and death.3
About a decade after the Civil War the problem of insuring 
Negro lives arose. In 1881 the established legal reserve companies 
were still debating the rates at which Negro risks should be insured 
and whether Negro risks should be taken at all. The position taken 
by the Prudential Insurance Company on the subject of insuring 
Negro risks became typical of the large white companies. This 
company reported:
During the early part of 1881 a new problem pre­
sented itself, which the company dealt with, as in all 
other matters, solely on the basis of facts as they were 
available. . . . Thus far Negroes had not been seriously 
considered as applicants for industrial insurance, but 
with the increasing extent of business, the colored popu­
lation had become considerably interested in the sub-
2 ibid.
3 Terence O’Donnell, History of Life Insurance, Book I, Ch. I, American 
Conservation Co., Chicago, 1936.
4 O’Donnell, op. cit., Book IV, Ch. I.
5 John R. Commons and Associates, History of Labor in the United States,
Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1921, pp. 124-25.
4ject. . . . Careful investigation, including the company’s 
own experience, and data collected from a large number 
of American cities, point to excessive mortality among 
this element of the population, so much so that it became 
apparent that unless the company adopted a restrictive 
course it would soon find itself in difficulties because of 
inordinate losses experienced on this class of policy­
holders.6
Although this high mortality rate among Negroes was caused 
by ignorance, poverty, and the effects of segregation and discrimi­
nation, the adherents to the doctrine of inherent racial differences 
sought to apply it in the field of life insurance. As Statistician of 
the Prudential Life Insurance Company, Dr. Frederick L. Hoffman 
sought scientifically to establish the thesis that the Negro’s high 
mortality was due to inherited racial characteristics and traits. He 
held that “ it is a fact which can and will be demonstrated by indis­
putable evidence, that of all races for which statistics are obtainable, 
and which enter at all into the consideration of economic problems 
as factors, the Negro shows the least power of resistance in the 
struggle for life.” T While the facts of Negro mortality and health 
as reported by Hoffman were undeniable, later study of these facts 
has given little support to his racial biology. Although it is now 
generally conceded that race may have some minor influence on 
group immunity or susceptibility to certain diseases, the opinion of 
Dr. Louis I. Dublin, Statistician for the Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company, is now the generally credited view among impartial stu­
dents of the subject. According to Dr. Dublin:
It is probably that their [the Negro’s] high death rate 
is due more than anything else to ignorance, poverty, and 
the lack of proper medical care. Pulmonary tuberculosis, 
typhoid fever, pellagra, malaria, and puerperal conditions 
are examples of such diseases in which the mortality 
rates are much affected by unfavorable or insanitary en­
vironment— or by low economic status—and all of them 
have higher death rates among Negroes.8 *1
6 History of the Prudential Insurance Company, Prudential Insurance Co., 
p. 137.
1 Frederick L. Hoffman, Race Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro, 
American Economic Association, Vol. XI, 1896. In this connection it is well to 
see also Kelly Miller’s “A Review of Hoffman’s Race Traits and Tendencies of 
the American Negro” , American Negro Academy, 1897, and Samuel J. Holmes, 
The Negro’s Struggle for Survival, University of Chicago Press, 1937.
‘ Louis I. Dublin, “ The Health of the Negro” , Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Co., New York, 1938, p. 10.
5This view, however, has not uprooted the older conception that Hoff­
man’s work helped to intrench. And even if the Dublin view were 
more generally accepted by the large insurance companies, the facts, 
not racial theory, of Negro mortality and health, would force them 
to modify their policies accordingly. There is, of course, a great 
difference between the modification of policy to which Dr. Dublin’s 
appraisal of the facts would lead and that founded upon Dr. Hoff­
man’s interpretation. While recognizing that the rates of mortality 
and morbidity are higher for the Negro than for the white race, 
Dr. Dublin attributes this difference to the Negro’s inferior socio­
economic environment including income and medical care. From 
this standpoint the type of insurance policy and the rates accorded 
Negro policyholders would be based upon the company’s mortality 
experience with Negro policyholders classified according to socio­
economic groups. Thus if it is true that mortality and morbidity 
rates of the Negroes in the higher income brackets hardly differ 
from those of the white at similar income levels, there could be no 
justifiable discrimination of Negro policyholders in these categories 
of income. Dr. Hoffman attributed the difference in rates between 
whites and blacks to the latter’s biological incapacity to survive in 
the white man’s civilization. The Hoffman viewpoint leads either 
to the general exclusion of Negroes as insurance risks or to the 
insuring of selected Negro risks at higher rates than would be 
charged white policy-holders for the same type of insurance.
Although founded upon the reluctance or the refusal of white 
insurance companies to accept Negro risks, the Negro insurance 
company can ignore the facts of the Negro’s mortality and health 
only at its peril. At this point we shall refrain from discussing 
whether the Negro insurance companies simply use the rate and 
policy discrimination of white companies against Negroes as one of 
its sales arguments while at the same time following the policies of 
white underwriters. It is sufficient to say at this time that if white 
companies had followed a non-discriminating policy in insuring 
Negroes there would in all probability have been no Negro life 
insurance companies, or at least only a very few. It was but 
logical for those Negroes endowed with the capitalistic spirit to see 
the possibility of profiting from the racial policy of white companies. 
The tendency among those Negroes who thus saw the possibility of 
profit was first to set up fraternal societies of which insurance was 
the predominant feature. Under the circumstances the fraternal 
society became the first important vehicle of organized insurance 
among Negroes. They were also the means whereby the Negro
6obtained experience in the management of large enterprises and was 
able to amass capital for the financing of other enterprises.
The growth of the fraternal societies in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century and the consequent growth of Negro insurance, 
however, was due not alone to racial discrimination, but also to the 
general impetus in the insurance business as a whole. The percent 
of industrial insurance in force increased 463.4 per cent in the decade 
1885-1895. The increase is shown in the following table: 9
Table I
Percentage Increases of Insurance in Force by Decades
ORDINARY INDUSTRIAL TOTAL
1865-75 230.9% 290.9%
1875-85 12.9 1 2 .2
1885-95 128.2 462.4% 149.4
1895-1905 124.8 181.4 132.9
1905-15 6 6 .0 91.7 70.4
1915-25 220.5 189.6 195.7
This same decade saw “the extensive development of the agency 
system, the increase in the expense ratio, the liberalizing of the 
policy contract, the wide use of the dividend system, and the in­
vasion by some New York companies of foreign countries” .10 1 More 
important to the development of Negro insurance was the fact that 
this was the golden age of thrift and enterprise, and, therefore, of 
fraternal and assessment insurance. The prevalence and success 
at that time of both these types of insurance, each of which could 
be carried on by organizations easily organized and of small capital—  
was another factor which facilitated the entry of the Negro with his 
meager capital and experience into the business of life insurance. 
“ In 1880 no less than 236 of these business assessment insurance 
organizations had been chartered in Pennsylvania alone. By 1885, 
56 had been chartered in Massachusetts. By 1889, the country 
over, the business assessment associations had a billion dollars more 
insurance in force than did the old line companies” .11
The National Benefit Association was one of the Negro assess­
ment companies organized in this period of the prosperity of assess­
ment insurance. The growth and progress of this organization, like 
that of larger insurance companies among whites, is to be explained 
not simply on the basis of individual effort and ingenuity, but also
9 James S. Elston, “ The Development of Life Insurance” , Readings in Life 
Insurance, Life Office Management Association, 1936, p. 30.
”  ibid., p. 30.
11 Lester Z. Zartman, Yale Readings in Life Insurance, p. 92.
7on the basis of social and economic factors. By the time the National 
Benefit had been organized in 1898, the institution of life insurance 
had become firmly established in this country. Many of the leading 
companies of today had been organized for thirty or forty years. 
Prior to the formation of these companies, life insurance was a 
matter of self-help conducted with little regard for business and 
actuarial principles by fraternal and secret societies. Following 
the Civil War period the first great impetus was given to the ad­
vancement of life insurance as a business. Improved mortality 
tables were introduced, openly paid agents took over the solicitation 
of new business, and the public had witnessed the failure or absorp­
tion of many mushroom companies organized during the “bubble 
era” just after 1857 without condemning the institution.12 Probably 
more important was the fact that during this period in the develop­
ment of life insurance, the insurance idea was sold to the public. 
Despite failures, frauds, and mismanagement, life insurance com­
panies received much favorable publicity. Even the uneducated 
working man became acquainted with life insurance and was “ sold” 
on the advantages of it. Therefore when the National Benefit made 
its appearance the American public was already life-insurance con­
scious. And the company, like others established at the time, and 
subsequently was to some degree, relieved of the necessity and 
expense of establishing the merit of life insurance.
”  O’Donnell, op. cit., Book III, Ch. 2.

9Ch a pter  I
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
As indicated above, the history of Negro insurance enterprises 
is inextricably bound up with the history of Negro fraternal orders. 
In all societies, programmes and organizations designed to increase 
economic security, have always made a strong appeal to the poor and 
disadvantaged. Thus, it is not surprising that among Negroes 
mutual aid societies flourished and fraternals reached a point of 
advancement second only to the Negro church. W. P. Burrell, 
before the Hampton Negro Conference in 1904, said, “ Following 
closely in the wake of the ‘Benevolent Society’ came the Secret 
Societies. Of these the society called the Sons and Daughters of 
Samaria, better known as ‘The Good Samaritans’ was probably the 
most popular and widespread. This organization once numbered 
more than fifty thousand members in Virginia and did much good 
in a financial way. Its object was to take care of the sick and bury 
the dead. It also assisted its members in times when death visited 
their homes. . . . The Galilean Fisherman was another of the early 
orders that had a large membership. Following in the wake of 
these societies came others too numerous to mention, but all having 
the one object of caring for the sick and burying the dead. The 
care of the sick has always been a sacred obligation with the colored 
man and in this he has but copied after his more intelligent white 
brother. . . . From paying no attention to the laws of health and 
taking in persons without medical examination, many of these or­
ganizations found themselves loaded down with large amounts of 
money due on account of unpaid sick dues and death benefits. . . . 
Not withstanding early failures the colored man has continued to 
organize and improve his organizations. While many of the larger 
associations are running now on practically the same plan that they 
did thirty years ago, others have made changes wherever and when­
ever they have been found necessary. In Virginia the societies are 
almost too numerous to mention; but foremost among them we find 
the Grand Fountain of the United Order of True Reformers, the 
Knights of Pythias, The Independent Order of St. Luke, The Gali­
lean Fishermen, The Sons and Daughter of Samaria, The Tents, The 
Knights of Tabor, and the Grand United Order of Odd Fellows. . . . 
As has been noted, these societies have materially assisted in abol­
ishing poverty and in promoting small savings, and have formed, 
in many instances, the means by which property has been acquired.” 
As early as 1850 the Odd Fellows had admitted sixty-six lodges,
10
forty-nine of which were virile and active. In the same year the 
Masonic Order was organized. At about the turn of the century 
the True Reformers had attained such influence that they attempted 
to form a virtually independent economy. “ The True Reformers” , 
wrote William Taylor Thom, an investigator for the Department of 
Labor, in 1902, “ constitutes probably the most remarkable Negro 
organization in the country.” 13 In the first twenty years of its 
existence its membership increased from 100 to over 50,000. For 
the same period it paid over $606,000 in death claims and $1,500,000 
in sick dues. In December of 1901 it held real estate valued at 
$223,000.14 Indeed the True Reformers, through its numerous sub­
sidiary enterprises beginning with farming and ending with a bank 
foreshadowed the idea of an independent black economy and though 
it failed, it came nearer than other Negro organizations in making 
the idea a reality.
The success of Negro fratemals is attributable in large measure 
to their insurance feature. The True Reformers was primarily a 
mutual aid society. The same was true of the Odd Fellows, whose 
object was “ . . .  To provide a fund for the relief of the members 
when sick, lame or disabled, and for insuring a sum of money to 
assist in defraying the expenses of burials (to be paid to the widow, 
legal executors, administrators, or assignees of a member deceased), 
or to assist in defraying the expenses of the burial of the wife or 
child of a member; also to provide necessary funds for carrying on 
the business of the Order.” 15 The insurance and relief features of 
the Odd Fellows are again emphasized by the Grand Secretary and 
author of the early history of the society. He wrote: “The relief 
is, in the first place, restricted to members of the Order and their 
families. . . . The pecuniary contributions of the members, which 
consist of small monthly sums, constitute a fund for the exclusive 
purpose of relieving the sick, burying the dead, educating the or­
phan, and protecting and assisting the widow. In this respect our 
Order is a vast mutual aid society” .16
The appeal of fraternals to the Negro, however, was not based 
on economic considerations alone. To the Negro, the fraternal 
order was a medium through which he might obtain individual and 
group self-expression. A substitute for the social dignity and 
respect denied him in everyday life was sought in the fraternals.
”  U. S. Department of Labor, Bulletin, Vol. 41, p. 807.
14 ibid., p. 808.
16 Charles H. Brooks, A History and Manual of the Grand United Order of 
Odd Fellows, Charles H. Brooks, Philadelphia, 1893; p. 203. See also Henry M. 
Minton, “ Early History of Negroes in Business in Philadelphia” , before the 
American Historical Society, March, 1913.
18 ibid., quoted by Brooks, p. 198.
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They, or the church, were and to an extent still are, the basis of 
nearly all major group activities. For these reasons fraternalism 
became more deeply rooted among Negroes than among whites, 
although its importance to the masses of white “joiners”  grows out 
of similar socio-psychological needs.
Before the end of the nineteenth century the influence of fra­
ternalism among whites had begun to wane. Fraternal insurance 
was proving impractical. As one writer put it, “While the secret 
orders are a vast agency for good in giving aid and comfort to their 
members, in caring for the sick and ministering to the distressed 
in mind, body, and estate; while they give vast sums in beneficence 
and afford wide opportunity for developing the social side of their 
members, yet they are not an unmixed blessing.”  17
As discussed below (see The Fallacy of Fraternal Insurance), 
the lack of reserves, legal laxity and absence of scientific under­
writing were among the deficiencies of the fraternal orders which 
lead to the view that they “were not an unmixed blessing” . White 
insurance companies by this time were approaching maturity and 
were gradually taking over one of the most important functions of 
white fraternals. There were no insurance companies to take over 
the insurance feature of Negro fraternals. In addition to this, the 
fraternal orders fulfilled certain group needs, while at the same 
time, providing a measure of insurance. Hence, even after fraternal 
insurance had demonstrated its impracticality and had lost its former 
position among the whites, the fraternal orders continued to develop 
and expand as a basis of insurance among Negroes. In 1892 only 
eleven years after the organization of the True Reformers and even 
prior to the organization’s peak of success, fraternal insurance had 
caused such dissatisfaction among whites that the National Fraterha-1 
Congress met in an effort to improve the insurance plan of f£SteriM§. 
In 1897 the National Fraternal Congress urged theoM.hri^ nclihi^ Otff 
state laws to authorize fraternals to create rei^yes.%d‘:M il898 -dfte 
National Fraternal Congress Mortality Table was wideJyfihddpteA. 
Among important white fraternals this markedvihe <ehAAofvthfe old- 
type fraternal insurance. .oloH 9iriT axil aynw Ixiibyob xtl
The Fallacy of Fraternal Ir^h'anW'1^ I *> BsarrqieJirs sonsmani
Fraternal insurant !(M ^ fiaifMTlF¥i^M ffl^^ld-^pe^ff^te^M^l 
insurance in t^ a ^ ^ ^ f^ iu M ^ ftlfe Y  f l H M f f l i  
insurancef®flin^aH^^ ctA&iMte#0h
society!itseffi9^ “Fr^Mafs Wthefr flfHBSh
------------ .S<? .qAxmktoRi "Hav&a&m&ifm.'geview, 
Vol. 114, 1897, p. 621. .7061 ,8891*1 ,'J .A ,21 .oVi .BnoiJfisiidw*! ytra'iev
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plan. They accordingly ignored the necessity of building up re­
serves to pay increasing losses when the mortality of the older ages 
began to manifest itself. When a society had been in existence for 
a number of years and the average age of its members began to 
increase, the increasing death rate served notice in no uncertain 
terms that if the society was to remain solvent its rates must be 
increased. Attempts to increase the rate met with universal disap­
proval. Members were not sufficiently versed in the theory of 
insurance to understand the reason. The inevitable happened. 
Many members withdrew and new members were reluctant to join, 
with a result that the breakdown of the society almost certainly 
followed.” 18
The state laws under which fraternals have operated have not 
required actuarial solvency, the theory being that since fraternals 
made their by-laws a part of the contract and possessed authority 
to levy assessments any high mortality experience could be suc­
cessfully dealt with. Thus, legal solvency for a fraternal had been 
merely that its assets equal its liabilities, exclusive of any reserve. 
The lenient laws under which fraternals operated also enabled organi­
zations to be set up for the purpose of conducting an insurance busi­
ness at a profit to operate without a reserve and with little super­
vision by state authorities. While this situation drew unscrupulous 
persons into the field and caused many losses to the public, it did 
enable the Negro to get a start in the business. All the early Negro 
insurance enterprises were mutual aid societies operating on the 
assessment plan. The Southern Aid Society of Virginia was one 
of the Negro companies that passed through this stage, finally be­
coming a legal reserve company. The North Carolina Mutual Life 
Insurance Company and the National Benefit Life Insurance Com­
pany evolved in a similar manner. The former grew out of the 
North Carolina Mutual and Provident Association, while the latter 
was originally organized as a fraternal society, the National Benefit 
Association.
The True Reformers
In several ways the True Reformers is typical of the Negro 
insurance enterprises of its period. Its experience well illustrates 
the plight of Negro insurance enterprises up to comparatively 
recent times. While there were other important Negro insurance 
enterprises during this period, such as the Masonic Benefit Asso­
ciation whose claims amounted to over $87,000 a year,19 the Odd
“  John H. Magee, Life Insurance, Business Publications, Inc., Chicago, 1939, 
p. 92.
18 W. E. B. DuBois, “ Economic Cooperation Among Negroes” , Atlanta Uni­
versity Publications, No. 12, A. U. Press, 1907.
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Fellows who possessed approximately $2,500,000 in property, the 
Knights of Pythias, the Independent Benevolent and Protective 
Order of Elks, and the Galilean Fishermen;20 the evolution of the 
True Reformers best illustrates the trend of Negro insurance enter­
prises from the last quarter of the nineteenth century well into 
the first decade of the twentieth.
As stated by Thom, “ The Grand Fountain of the Grand United 
Order of True Reformers was organized in 1881 by Reverend Wil­
liam Washington Browne. In 1883 it was granted a charter as a 
joint stock company. The chief purpose of incorporation was to 
provide what is to be known as an endowment or mutual benefit 
fund. . . .” 21 The organization was thus started as a full-fledged 
joint-stock corporation, whose chief aim was to provide a form of 
what is known as mutual benefit insurance for its members. By 
1898 the phenomenal success of the True Reformers prompted its 
managers to secure an amendment to the charter which enabled 
them to issue certificates and hold real estate up to the value of 
$500,000. In 1907 there were 2,678 lodges and over 100,000 mem­
bers. Up to this time there had been 8,322 deaths, for which claims 
were paid amounting to $979,440.55.
The True Reformers had a juvenile department for the insuring 
of children known as the Rosebud Department. At the peak of its 
growth the organization had 30,000 children in this department. 
In order to enable members to increase their insurance upon the 
payment of a higher premium, classes were introduced in 1885. 
Rates for the “B”  class were as follows:
Table I I 22
AGES JOININGFEE
VALUE OF 
CERTIFICATE AFTER 1 YEAR
VALUE OF 
CERTIFICATE BEFORE 1 YEAR ANNUALDUES
QUAR­TERLY
DUES
18-25 2.50 200.00 100.00 4.75 1.20
25-30 2.75 200.00 100.00 4.75 1.20
30-35 3.00 200.00 100.00 4.75 1.20
35-40 3.25 200.00 100.00 5.70 1.43
40-45 3.50 140.00 70.00 5.70 1.43
45-50 3.75 115.00 58.00 6.65 1.66
50-55 4.00 90.00 45.00 6.65 1.66
55-60 4.25 65.00 33.00 7.70 1.90
20 ibid.., p. 121, et seg.
21 U. S. Department of Labor, Bulletin, op. cit., Vol. 41, p. 808.
22 DuBois, op. cit. William Trent in “ The Development or Negro Life Insur­
ance Enterprises” , included this material and much more on pp. 19-22 of his 
essay but neglected to indicate that his was a verbatim quotation of DuBois.
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In the first few years of the life of the True Reformers the effect 
of its faulty underwriting, namely the lack of an actuarial basis for 
rate computation, was not felt. This was not unusual. Young life 
insurance enterprises usually enjoy a low mortality rate.23 How­
ever, it faced another problem common to Negro insurance enter­
prises. The problem was that of securing an outlet for its funds—  
that of finding investments with a desirable combination of yield 
and security. The leaders turned to Negro business. The first mani­
festation of this investment policy was the organization of the Sav­
ings Bank of the Grand Fountain of the United Order of True 
Reformers. The organization of the bank was not a deliberate act 
resulting from a formulated investment policy. Race friction and 
the reported attempt on the part of certain white people to stifle 
the organization led to the belief that the order should have its own 
bank as a depository.24 Organized to manage the surplus funds of 
the Order, the bank was subordinated to it in fact and theory to the 
detriment of both.
The bank was organized in 1887 and chartered by the State of 
Virginia in 1889. On April 3, 1889, it opened for business, taking in 
$1,200 in deposits the first day. The capital stock was $100,000 di­
vided into shares of $5.00 each. The stock was not transferable and 
could only be bought by persons who held certificates in the Order. 
The Order promised a dividend of 20 per cent on the bank’s stock. 
This and the necessity of surrendering the stock certificate at the 
death of the holder gave the bank’s stock the nature of an annuity. 
Another peculiarity of the charter was that the directors of the Order 
were, ipso facto, directors of the bank. The bank enjoyed only fair 
success up to the time of its failure in 1910. At this time it had over a 
quarter of a million dollars in liabilities and almost the same amount 
in frozen or doubtful assets. In organization the bank’s outstanding 
weakness lay in the fact that it was controlled by the Order which 
was also a borrower. With the collapse of the bank, the Order sank 
into oblivion.
The bank was only one, although the most important, of num­
erous subsidiaries of the True Reformers. Other subordinate enter­
prises were the Reformers’ Mercantile and Industrial Association, 
which did an annual business of over $100,000 with its principal store 
at Richmond; The Reformer, a weekly newspaper combined with a 
printing office; Hotel Reformer, which had accommodations for 150
23 This is caused primarily by the low average age of the persons insured.
24 Abram L. Harris, The Negro as Capitalist, American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, Philadelphia, 1936, p. 62.
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guests; the Reformer Building and Loan Association; Westham 
° Farms, a home for old people; and the real estate department which 
Managed the Order’s more than $400,000 of real estate holdings.
The lesson that the failure of the True Reformers taught was 
that the Negro insurance enterprises would have to find new methods 
of dealing with the problems of mortality and investment. Though 
the Negro was late realizing the impracticality of fraternal insurance, 
the collapse of the True Reformers put an end to the inauguration of 
large scale ventures in fraternal insurance. Because the death of 
the founder, W. W. Browne, coincided with the decline of the Order, 
many25 have assumed a casual relation between the two events. The 
loss, of course, was felt by the organization, but was not primarily 
the cause of its collapse. First of all, the Order charged inadequate 
premiums. The premium rate was not based upon mortality tables, 
and sound actuarial reasoning. As was pointed out, white fraternals 
had resorted long before to the use of mortality tables and, in con­
sequence, were able more scientifically to compute premiums. The 
controlling influence in the fixing of the premiums for the True Re­
formers was that they be low enough to attract large numbers. More­
over this policy was actuated by the belief that the higher premiums 
charged Negroes by white insurance companies were due solely to 
racial discrimination and had no justification in facts. While perhaps 
the premiums charged Negroes by white insurance companies were 
exorbitant, it cannot be denied that the mortality of unselected groups 
of Negroes was higher than that of whites. The underwriting policy 
of the True Reformers ignored this. Thus, when the average age of 
the members of the Order appreciably increased, the premiums proved 
woefully inadequate.
But this was not the only problem of the True Reformers. The 
second was that of investment. In dealing with this, the True Re­
formers turned chiefly to real estate—the bug-bear of Negro insur­
ance enterprises—and the financing of subsidiaries. The desirability 
of real estate as a form of investment for insurance enterprises needs 
no comment at this point. With respect to its subsidiaries the True 
Reformers were in a paradoxical situation, for they were the sources 
of both its strength and its weakness. The True Reformers’ ideal of 
creating opportunities for Negroes caused it to invest large sums of 
money in the various enterprises enumerated above. With the cre-
25 Carter G. Woodson, “ The Insurance Business Among Negroes” , Journal of 
Negro History, Vol. 14, p. 209, 1929; Harry Pace, “ Contribution of Negro Insur­
ance Companies Towards Economic Status of the Negro” , p. 4, Supreme Liberty 
Life Insurance Co., Chicago; and William Trent, “ Development of Negro Insur­
ance Enterprises” , Univ. of Pa.
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ation of each new enterprise the popularity of the Order naturally 
increased. But these enterprises set up by the True Reformers were 
economically weak. They sought to exploit new and untried field ’ 
and as such were subject to the additional hazards of new business. 
Instead, therefore, of- becoming a source of revenue to the Order* 
these enterprises were a constant drain upon its finances.
“ The contribution of the True Reformers Order to the establish­
ment of Negro insurance companies cannot be underestimated, (sic. 
Cannot be overestimated). Many of the men who subsequently went 
out and organized either fraternal organizations or mutual benefit 
societies or life insurance companies got their first inspiration and 
frequently their first training in anything pertaining to insurance 
from some connection, either directly or indirectly, with the Grand 
Fountain of the United Order of True Reformers of America.”  26 
Samuel W. Rutherford, founder of the National Benefit Association 
was one of these men- At one time he was an agent for the True 
Reformers.
Samuel W. Rutherford.
Rutherford was born in 1866, near Atlanta, Georgia. He at­
tended school only about twelve months. He learned to read in a 
Baptist Sunday School. The early part of his life was spent on a 
farm and in selling cord wood in Rome, Georgia. His rise began 
when he got a job in that city as janitor for the Singer Sewing 
Machine Agency. Later he was promoted to machinist. Soon after 
that he founded the weekly newspaper called the Peoples Journal, 
which later was called the Baptist Banner. While working as a 
traveling salesman for the Singer Sewing Machine Company, he came 
in contact with W. W. Browne, the founder of the True Reformers, 
for whom he later worked.27
Rutherford started the National Benefit Association in an old 
building where he rented a room for six dollars a month.28 For more 
than a quarter of a century he dominated the company. That he was 
a man with a dynamic personality can scarcely be doubted. He was 
a combination of the old-type Baptist preacher and the shrewd bus­
iness man. Although his educational equipment was limited, his 
experience was wide. But he seemed never to realize the need of 
informing himself on the principles of insurance. Laying great store
“ Pace, op. cit., p. 4.
ST Woodson, op. eit.
”  George W. Lee, “ Insurance—Its Necessity and Value” , The Messenger, 
April 1927.
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in his own judgment and organizing ability, he cared little for pro­
fessional or technical training even among his employees. He was 
stubborn in yielding to the opinions of others even when supported 
by well founded evidence. For years he insisted upon policies which 
were causing the company serious losses. For an example, he insisted 
upon keeping in force certain business, which some officials and em­
ployees of the company had asked his permission to allow lapse at 
the first opportunity, merely because he had written the business. 
Alfred B. Dawson, the company’s actuary, wrote, “ . . . Indeed I do 
know that for years, S. W. Rutherford carried the company in his 
vest pocket, but it was only a vest pocket edition then, and of recent 
years the main burden has fallen on R. H. Rutherford and Mortimer 
Smith, with the General Secretary [S. W. Rutherford] taking a hand 
in the more important problems only now and then, although he has 
been and is even now the dominating factor in the company’s manage­
ment. We have all seen programs as to company procedure which 
have been agreed upon between Insurance Departments, R. H. Ruth­
erford, Mortimer Smith and myself, knocked into a cocked hat, and 
the only explanation offered by the President [R. H. Rutherford] or 
Mr. Smith for the company’s failure to proceed as agreed upon has 
been that the General Secretary [S. W. Rutherford] now thinks so 
and so.” 29 In his relations with the employees of the company, he 
was dominating and exacting, especially about some small matters 
such as checking up on pens and pencils. Nevertheless, he once hired 
a young woman to head the premium note department solely on the 
basis of her handwriting ability. In the later years it seemed that the 
problems of the company were far beyond his comprehension. Upon 
being told that the company had a large deficit, which, if not at­
tended, would show in the annual statement, he replied that he was 
busy with his correspondence and should not be disturbed with such 
matters which the bookkeeping department should take care of.
Despite Rutherford’s shortcomings, he was a leader and did 
much to build up the National Benefit. Rutherford was among those 
leaders, John R. Hawkins, Heman E. Perry, etc., described by Carter
G. Woodson as “ captains of industry thus pressing forward” .30 All 
of these leaders started organizations which are now defunct. To 
these could be added a host of others whose organizations failed not 
because of leadership—for in some cases the leadership was excep­
tional—but because of insurmountable obstacles.
29 Verbatim quotation from letter of Alfred B. Dawson to Voting Trustees 
of the National Benefit Life Insurance Company dated February 20, 1931.
20 Carter G. Woodson, The Negro in Our History, 5th ed., p. 295.
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Ch a pt e r  II
THE ORGANIZATION AND EXPANSION OF THE 
NATIONAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION
In 1898 when the True Reformers were well upon the way to 
what at that time appeared to be success, the National Benefit Associ­
ation was incorporated. Rutherford modeled it after the True Re­
formers, which was natural, for as Mr. Carter G. Woodson said, from 
W. W. Browne, Rutherford “ learned the secret of insurance and its 
possibilities among Negroes” .1 The association did a negligible 
amount of business in the first few years. It was not listed in the 
Insurance Yearbook until 1904, and no statistics on it appear in either 
the 1904 or 1905 editions.
The original capital of the association was $2,000. This soon 
proved inadequate and on August 1, 1905, authority was received to 
amend the charter, increasing the authorized capital to $5,000. On 
August 15,1916, the capital was again increased. This latter increase 
to $100,000 was not fully paid until June 1, 1918. On August 11, 
1922, the authorized capital was increased to $250,000.
The capital was raised largely by an appeal to race pride. The 
organization was to be entirely a race institution. Provisions were 
made in its constitution to keep control of the organization within 
the race through restrictions on the sale of stock. The constitution 
as amended in 1918 reads:
Stock of the existing capital of one hundred thousand dol­
lars may be transferred only on the books of the company 
to some person1 2 who is already a stockholder therein, or 
to the company itself, who shall reissue the same to an 
existing stockholder.3
In 1924 when the company was faced with the tremendous job 
of disposing of $150,000 of new capital stock this provision was 
changed by an amendment to the constitution. The following state­
ment was added:
After the sale and original issue of the stock representing 
the increased capital stock of $150,000, par value, said 
stock shall thereafter be transferred only on the books of
1 Carter G. Woodson, “The Insurance Business Among Negroes” , Journal of
Negro History, Vol. 14, January 1929.
3 The wording here excludes corporations though this was evidently not the 
intent.
3 Quoted by Fackler and Brieby, Report No. 1, Fackler and Brieby, Consulting 
Actuaries, New York, 1932.
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the company to some person who, at the time of said trans­
fer, is a then existing stockholder in this company, or to 
the company itself, who shall reissue the same only to a 
then existing stockholder.4
In 1929 when a new constitution was adopted this provision was 
eliminated.
At the time of organization, The National Benefit Association 
was in the eyes of the law an association similar to a fraternal— an 
association legally and actually controlled by its members on the basis 
of membership rather than ownership for the purpose among other 
things of providing mutual insurance on the assessment plan. Ac­
tually, however, the National Benefit Association was a proprietary 
business. The liberal legislation authorizing fraternals to collect pre­
miums or “dues” and pay benefits enabled other organizations to 
operate without regulation much in the manner of an insurance com­
pany. This fact was quite evident to the actuaries who made the last 
examination of the company. In regard to this they said:
The company was incorporated under, and by virtue of the 
revised statutes of the United States, with a capital of 
$2,000 and under the name of The National Benefit Associ­
ation. Although chartered as an association for the pur­
pose of providing certain benefits to members and their 
dependents by means of dues or assessments collected from 
such members, it has always been a proprietary institu­
tion.5
Not only was The National Benefit Association a proprietary 
business, but it approached a sole proprietorship. S. W. Rutherford 
ran the business much in the manner of a sole owner. From its 
beginning until long after it had become a legal reserve company The 
National Benefit was a one-man organization. Even up until near the 
collapse, Rutherford held an impregnable position in control of the 
company. Rutherford’s position—since he had no great amount of 
capital to invest at the beginning—was due to the almost total lack 
of governmental supervision exercised over such associations and to 
the docility and ignorance of the directors with whom he surrounded 
himself.
As has been indicated, associations operating on an assessment 
plan did not fall within the purview of state insurance departments. 
Moreover, they did not make reports of any consequence to any gov­
ernmental authority. The membership had the final authority. To *
* ibid.
5 Fackler and Brieby, Report No. 2, Appendix B, p. 2.
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control the membership was to control the organization absolutely. 
This was exceptionally easy in cases in which the membership was 
composed of people unfamiliar with insurance and business generally. 
One can see that such a situation lent itself easily to fraud and mis­
management. However, in the control of a benevolent dictator such 
associations often prospered. Miles M. Dawson, actuary for the 
Hughes investigation committee, said in regard to assessment insur­
ance: “ The subject of assessment life insurance represents the patho­
logical side, if I may express it, of life insurance” .6
In the early days of the National Benefit Association it was prob­
ably difficult to get a Negro board of directors conversant with the 
subjects of underwriting, investment, and business management. The 
early boards of directors were composed of domestics and wage- 
earners who had neither experience nor knowledge of the business 
and who had little understanding of what was going on. They had 
implicit faith in the word of Rutherford and merely sanctioned his 
acts. Indeed, virtually the same thing was said of the late boards of 
directors after the association became The National Benefit Life 
Insurance Co. According to Fackler and Brieby:
The incompetency, ignorance, carelessness, or culpability 
of the several members of the Board is indicated by the 
irregularities in the composition of the Board from time 
to time, inconsistencies and inadequacies of recorded 
actions, failure to require and record reports from the offi­
cers on their many involved activities, as well as by their 
sanctioning tacitly, if not directly, the improper and irreg­
ular transactions which took place.7
When the organization was in its infancy, lack of understanding 
of the principles of insurance was not confined to the board of direc­
tors alone. Rutherford prided himself upon being a self-made man 
and had little respect for formal training. The persons employed 
were often not chosen on the basis of qualifications. The employees 
were on a whole conscientious and hard workers, but with little un­
derstanding of the business or of their function in it. The National 
Benefit was never well departmentalized and never had an adequate 
accounting system. It is questionable if Rutherford ever understood 
the legal significance of insurance accounting. *
* Quoted by John H. Mager, Life Insurance, Business Publications, Inc., Chi­
cago, 1939, p. 90. Miles M. Dawson was senior member of the firm of Miles M. 
Dawson and Son, Consulting Actuaries, whose junior member was Alfred B. 
Dawson, Actuary and financial advisor to the National Benefit Life Insurance 
Company.
’  FacHer and Brieby, op. cit., Report No. 1, p. 31.
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The policies of management responsible for the growth of the 
National Benefit Association were those such as the proprietor of a 
small trading business might find advantageous. There were num­
erous small economies coupled, doubtless, with certain shrewd prac­
tices. Rigid economy was practiced in the payment of salaries and 
wages and management expenses such as stationery and supplies, 
office rent, actuarial and legal services. Moreover, in addition to the 
economies effected the association most likely followed the practice 
of such associations at that time of paying as few claims as legally 
expedient. These policies of management together with the retention 
of all earning within the association resulted in the accumulation of 
a large surplus on the basis of which the stock was increased by 
$95,000 in 1916-1918. As long as the business was of such a size that 
all of its activities could be grasped by the limited capacity of one 
man, Samuel W. Rutherford proved to be a competent manager. On 
August 16, 1916, authority was obtained to increase the capital stock. 
The capital was raised to $100,000. The additional capital, however, 
was not fully paid until June 1,1918. Meanwhile, in 1917, by author­
ity of a court order the name was changed to The National Benefit 
Life Insurance Company.8
The reason for the increase in capital was to achieve the mini­
mum legal paid-in capital requirement of $100,000 for insurance com­
panies in the District of Columbia. The National Benefit accomp­
lished the increase in the following manner. A stock dividend of 
$40,000 was declared, $5,000 of stock was sold to old stockholders, 
and $50,000 of stock was sold to the public.9 It is reported that at 
this point water seeped into the stock of the National Benefit and 
that it was not squeezed out before the next capital stock increase of 
$150,000 in 1923.
The year of 1923 was the beginning of the period of expansion 
of the National Benefit. On November 30, 1923, it absorbed the 
Standard Benefit Society of Maryland.10 The charter of the National 
Benefit, however, remained in effect. The only changes ever to be 
made in the charter were as to name and authorized capital. The 
beginning of the expansion period marked a change in the manage­
ment policies of the National Benefit. This change in policy was 
characterized by: (1) increasing the agency force, (2) entering new 
territory, (3) entering the ordinary insurance field, and (4), reinsur­
ing the business of other companies.
8 This change in name was not ratified by the stockholders until January, 
1924. The reported reason is that the legal sufficiency of the court order was 
doubted and an act of Congress was thought necessary.
9 Woodson, op. cit., “ Insurance Business Among Negroes” , p. 215.
“ Best’s Life Reports, 1930, p. 247, Alfred Best and Co., New York.
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Another change to be noted was that of the character of the 
agents employed after the beginning of this. This change was to be 
seen in the type of business solicited. An investigation of the ordi­
nary business in the Shreveport District of Louisiana indicates some 
of the problems with which the National Benefit had to contend. It 
also gives some idea of the nature of the business in this district. The 
failure of the company to act on the findings of the investigation 
would indicate that the problems were not peculiar to the Shreveport 
District.
The investigation covered the period from November 4, 1930, to 
November 28, 1930, inclusive. The investigators worked from ten to 
eighteen hours a day including Sundays. They covered an area con­
taining 67 towns in which there were 15 county or parish seats. Fifty- 
seven of these towns were “touched directly or indirectly” , said the 
report. One hundred and fifty-three cases were reviewed. Discrep­
ancies in age were found in over one hundred cases. Collusion be­
tween agents, doctors, and managers was common. The report was 
made directly to S. W. Rutherford. As the report covers 51 single­
spaced typewritten pages only a few of the cases selected at random 
can be presented here. In a letter to S. W. Rutherford, dated at 
Greenwood, Miss., December 6, 1930, the investigators commented as 
follows on the business of the ordinary department of the Shreveport 
District: “ In keeping with your letter of October 23, 1930, we have 
made a partial investigation of the ordinary business written in the 
Shreveport half of the state of Louisiana and beg to submit a report 
as follows”  [cases quoted verbatim].11
Case I
Eugene Kensey, age 35, Policy No. 807946. Discrepancy of about 4 
years in age. Was discharged from the World’s War on account of 
having had “bloody piles”  of which he has been suffering ever since. 
He is a barber by trade, and, on account of “ bloody piles” , he has not 
been able to stand up and work all day Saturdays during 1930, and 
is now planning to go to the Veterans’ Hospital for treatment. Any­
one with common sense can look at him and tell he is sick. He was 
written by J. McWashington. His policy was on the verge of lapsing. 
If it has lapsed, stop the hole and chink it, so that it cannot be revived.
Case II
Lottie Smith, 815 Lawrence St., age 44. There is about 10 years dis­
crepancy in her age. Policy No. 811320. Everybody calls her “ Mother 
Smith” . Her sign on her cafe is : “Mother Smith’s Home Cooking” . 1
11 Taken from report of field investigation made in 1930 by a company 
investigator.
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Written by J. McWashington. I tried to catch the discrepancy at 
Ruston where she is supposed to have married, but the records failed 
to reveal that she ever married. Whereas, her supposed to be husband 
is one S. W. Smith.
Case III
Peter Ernest Porter, age 50. Application rejected. Peter Ernest 
Porter is between 65 and 70 years old. He is teaching Agriculture 
at the High School out from DeRidder, La., however, and is very 
active. He is gray all over. A portion of his head is so slick and 
shiny that it appears that a fly would slip down if he tried to walk on 
it. The other portion that has hair on it, is all gray, the kind of gray 
that looks like ram’s wool. His eyebrows are even gray. The hair 
on his arms is gray. This case was written by Abney and Harris, and 
perhaps, would have passed the examination, had it been submitted 
to Dr. M. Haddox, or Dr. Leroy A. Jackson, or Dr. Prince 0. Wailes. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the case was rejected, we have been 
shooting at long range to determine Mr. Porter’s age, so as to estab­
lish the intent of the agents who wrote it. We are still watching our 
hooks which have been set in Nacodoches, Texas, with good bait, and 
may land him yet, or ere this report is closed.
Case IV
Thomas Davis, Policy No. 1028737. Thomas Davis married, accord­
ing to Book 1, Page 485, Desoto Parish, La., April 1st, 1870, or 60 
years ago, which when added to 21 years, will make him 81 years old, 
instead of 55 years old, a discrepancy of 26 years in age, and, also 
making him 21 years beyond the insurable age. We did not get a 
chance to see Thomas Davis, whereas, we went to his house, he was 
supposed to have been out in the woods, but we could not hear the 
sound of his ax. According to the record as cited above, Thomas 
Davis married five years before he was born, taking into consideration 
the allegations made by the agent, A. T. Creswell, who took the appli­
cation. Thomas Davis was examined by Dr. Prince O. Wailes, of 
Mansfield, La. We would like to know what Dr. Wailes said in his 
confidential Medical Report.
Case V
Dr. Prince O. Wailes, Mansfield, La., is a sure-enough old man. He 
appears to be between 70 and 90 years old, and is more than 75% 
Caucasian. Were he to go to a strange town or city and walk thru 
the streets, the children would think of him as the real “ Santa Claus” . 
His face is covered with long gray hair, which has been gray so long 
that it has turned yellowish-brownish and his beard drags his chest 
and when he bows his head, his beard brushes his abdomen. Dr.
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Wailes is old. He is too old to urinate off of his pants, which are 
scorched in front with urine. Some pick for a Medical Examiner!
Case VI
Ellen Bush, May 6th, 1930— “ Rejected” . Local transcript reveals 
the fact that Ellen Bush died October 25, 1930, exactly five months 
from the date an attempt was made to dump her off on the Company. 
Investigation was made simply to establish the agent’s intent in the 
case. Dr. W. A. Anderson said that she died of “Acute Nephritis” 
and “Acute Gastritis” . Ellen Bush’s nieces said that Ellen Bush had 
been sick two years and that she had not been able to do any work of 
any kind and character for more than a year, and that she stayed 
about from one to the other down on their hands, and that they were 
glad for “ God to take her out of her misery” . The writer said: “Well, 
she lived to a ripe old age, that shows she was a good woman” . One 
of the women said, “Yes, she was about 65 years old” . I supposed 
the agent, J. M. Caradine, was influenced because Ellen Bush’s 
brother, Reverend William Grimble, is a great gospel preacher, and 
that he would probably reap the benefits at an early date, since he 
was proposed as the beneficiary in the application. The two-story 
house might have gotten him mesmerized, in which Rev. Grimble 
lives, if he wrote the application there. Written by J. M. Caradine.
Case VII
Carrie Muldrow, June 28th, 1930, Policy No. 809980. We went to 
DeRidder, La., to see Carrie Muldrow, but did not have an oppor­
tunity to see her. However, we found out that her daughter was 
teaching in the public school and went out to see said daughter, one 
Mrs. Jessie Brown, who is a nice, neat looking chocolate, high brown 
widow. Her husband, Mr. J. H. Brown, passed away several months 
ago. Having been favorably impressed with the writer, Mrs. Brown 
answered freely and favorably all questions which were propounded 
to her relative to the history of her family, before she realized what 
she was doing or saying, until the writer had gone down to see Prof. 
P. E. Porter. She said, “ My mother’s maiden name was Carrie 
Sloane. My father was named Ed. Richardson. They married at 
New Smyrna, Florida. I am 35 years old. I had been married 12 
years when my husband died. I would not mind marrying again if I 
could get someone who looks like you. I have a sister older than I 
am and she teaches at Minden, La. Her name is Olethra Jones and 
she is the wife of Prof. Joseph Luther Jones, Principal of the City 
School at Minden. Alethra is older than I am, but I married first, 
etc. . . . ”  She got scared, however, and while the writer was on 
another part of the school ground, she ran out to the automobile and
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asked the driver several dozen questions and told him that the writer 
must have had a rabbit’s foot to have made her act like she did and 
talk as much as she talked. However, her information was correct, 
as we found the following: [A copy of the marriage certificate was 
included.]
It will be noted that, according to the Marriage Record “ 6” page 200, 
Carrie Muldrow married the first time in Volusia County, Florida, 
Sept. 5th, 1893, or 37 years ago, which when added to 21, will make 
her 58 years old now, instead of 50, a discrepancy of 8 years in age. 
Written by W. L. G. Abney.
Case VIII
Peter Ernest Porter, April 8th, 1930. “Rejected” . Reference is 
hereby made to page 5 of this report, last paragraph thereof [Case 
III] relative to the above Peter E. Porter. This investigation was 
pursued to Nacodoches, Texas, for completion with a view of arriving 
at the intent and purpose of the agent, to determine whether or not 
he is dependable, trustworthy and has the Company at heart and the 
preservation thereof, or whether or not he is betraying his trust, 
stabbing it in the back, cutting its throat, riding it with Texas Saddle, 
U. S. Bits, switch and spur or whether or not he is killing the hen 
which is laying the golden eggs. Investigation reveals the following:
,[Marriage certificate was included.]
From the above certificate, Peter E. Porter was married 40 years ago 
the first time, which, when added to 21 will make him according to 
said record 61 years old instead of the purported age of 50, which 
■fvould have made a discrepancy of 10 years in his age and made him 
1 year beyond the insurable age and a “ tomb-stone” on the Company, 
had he fallen into the hands of Dr. Leroy A. Jackson, Dr. M. Haddox 
or Dr. Prince O. Wailes. Written by W. L. G. Abney and Hardy D. 
Harris.
Case IX
Tom Bailey, Policy No. 809054. It appears that Tom Bailey married 
1909, which was 21 years ago and which, when added to 21 years, 
will make him 42, instead of 26 years old, a discrepancy of 16 years 
in his age. However, we are not satisfied that this is the correct 
marriage certificate on Tom Bailey. Our investigation does not reveal 
that he is that old, or not older than 31 or 32 years. The clerk of 
Webster Parish in the meantime stated that this is the only Tom 
Bailey on record and there is not another Tom Bailey around Minden 
and that this must have been his first marriage and he must have 
married his wife Parthenia in another parish. We had to leave requi­
sition with deposit for the certified copies with the County Clerk, and
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when we returned to Minden, received them and checked them up 
and attempted to make further investigations, we found that Mr. 
Abney had trailed us, and the parties who had talked to us freely 
before, refused to talk at all. We would suggest that this certificate 
be placed with the original application and with a question mark, 
pending further investigation. Written by W. L. G. Abney.
Case X
John Richard Toliver, Deceased, Policy No. 808597, Shreveport Dis­
trict (Pineville, La.). Investigation revealed that John Richard Tol­
iver was a teacher and was principal of the Public School at Chaney 
ville, La. He was a specie of the “ Night Hawk” element and “Jellj 
Bean” type, attended parties, dances, etc., and kept the night candle 
burning all night at times; but that he was not ill before his last sick­
ness until death. He taught school one day, came home in the eve­
ning, went out to a party that same night, stayed out until the roos­
ters had ceased to crow for midnight, started home with some more 
young men, took a chill on his way home, went to bed and did not 
get up any more. He had not been treated by a doctor prior to his 
last illness and never missed a day from his school before. However, 
he did not conserve his health and energy and the loss of sleep had 
underminded the fabric and foundation of his health and he appeared 
healthy and strong, but was a walking shadow, without physical 
strength and energy to fight off or combat pneumonia, to which he 
fell a victim. Investigation further revealed that no one had died in 
the family of any contagious disease like tuberculosis, etc., and that 
no doctor had visited him nor any one else in the family to have 
aroused any suspicion and no one even knew of John R. Toliver’s ever 
having had a doctor to treat him this year nor last and no one had 
even seen him drooping around, nor laying off from work—they oni'y 
knew that he was a lover of and engaged in “ night follies” . It ap­
peared that he took deathly sick, apparently without warning before 
having started home that night, and that he was at death’s door before 
the neighbors knew that he was sick. In a case like the John R. Toli­
ver case, even if it is not tubercular, it appears that if a person has 
lost a lot of sleep, or is undernourished, or is just a bloater or shell 
going along doing light work every day, if a doctor was any count at 
all, it should crop out in the examination—the heart would murmur, 
the pulse would be accelerated, or intermitting temperature would 
exist and the blood pressure would be low. Inasmuch as there was 
no history of tuberculosis having existed in the family and John R. 
Toliver had never been on the sick list, since the doctor—William A. 
Anderson— plastered and then put up a good white-washed job on the
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case, left it and covered up his tracks completely, there is nothing left 
for the company to do but pay the claim.
Case XI
Cornelius C. Cook, Deceased, Policy No. 81258-C. This case was 
written, or the application taken by Mr. W. L. G. Abney October 27, 
1925. Investigation revealed that Cornelius C. Cook was sick before 
the application was written. The disease or trouble of which he died 
antedated the issuance of said policy. He had an attack of appendi­
citis and the attending physician advised him to go to the hospital 
and take an operation, but he refused to go, having decided to die 
with everything in him with which he was born. Having stubbornly 
made up his mind not to go under the knife, ice bags—the freezing 
process— and olive oil were recommended as the only panaceas which 
would mitigate and prolong his life, but that he was positively warned 
that “ some day, those remedies would fail, his appendix would rup­
ture and he would surely die” . This information, or news spread over 
not only Shreveport, but over several Parishes adjacent to Caddo 
Parish, due to Cook’s prominence in the undertaking world. Before 
the date of issuance of the above numbered policy and up to the time 
of Cook’s death, when attacks were eminent, hundreds of pounds of 
ice and gallons of olive oil were used, until, as was predicted by the 
attending physician, said remedies failed and Cook’s appendix burst- 
ed. I presume that we will have to give Dr. William Wallace a little 
credit for trembling in his boots as his conscience must have lashed 
him, because I note where Dr. C- C. Carter, Jr., Medical Director, had 
to feed him with a long handled spoon and coax him along to com­
plete the examination as follows: [See Appendix B for correspondence 
in connection with this case.] “Castilla Cook, Cornelius C. Cook’s 
nephew gave me the information of or as to Cornelius Cook’s illness, 
the duration thereof, the treatment, ice bags, etc., and, when he found 
out that I represented the company, he got angry with me and 
would not speak to me any more . . . ”  They got him thru notwith­
standing the fact that he had appendicitis before he considered taking 
the insurance, and the fact was known throughout the county. After 
having received the jacket, and noted the date of the policy, we did 
not go to any expenses, nor lose any more time on the case.
Case XII
John McCrory, Deceased, Bastrop, La. Investigation revealed that 
John McCrory died March 6, 1930, and was buried March 7, 1930, 
and that Hardy D. Harris was in Bastrop at the time and attended 
the funeral. Hardy D. Harris made a big speech, after having eulo­
gized on the funeral occasion, in an effort to boost the business. On
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March 8th, Hardy D. Harris collected a semi-annual premium, somt 
twenty or more dollars. After the death papers had been signed and 
submitted, a check for $1,000.00 came down and was given to Hardy 
D. Harris by W. L. G. Abney to be delivered. Hardy D. Harris car­
ried the check out to James McCrory, beneficiary’s home, got the said 
McCrory to endorse the said check, after which Hardy D. Harris gave 
James McCrory $500.00, explaining that the Claims Adjuster from 
the Home Office had been down and investigated the claim and found 
out the disease of which John McCrory died antedated the issuance 
of the policy and that he, James McCrory, was only entitled to a 
refund of premiums, but that the Home Office was paying him $500.00 
as a compromise. The matter was taken up with the Home Office. 
Then, W. L. G. Abney went out to see James McCrory and told him 
that the reason the Company did not pay but the $500.00, was that 
the disease of which John McCrory died antedated the issuance of the 
policy and that he, James McCrory, was entitled to a refund of pre­
miums but the $500.00 was paid as compromise upon the advice and 
requisition of the Claims Adjuster. James McCrory wanted to know 
why was it, that if he was only entitled to $500.00, the Company or 
Home Office would send down a check for $1,000.00 for him to en­
dorse. McCrory said that he had Abney to understand “ that a dead 
cat was on the line” . Abney then told him that if the Company sent 
down a check for $1,000.00, he was entitled to $1,000.00 and that he 
would take the matter up with the Company or Home Office, and, if 
that was true, he would see to it that McCrory got the other $500.00. 
The last $500.00 was paid some time in July, by Hardy D. Harris in 
cash. Investigation further revealed that John McCrory was a car­
penter by trade, but that his health had not permitted him to pick up 
his square, hammer, and saw in more than a year prior to his death. 
Aside from having been a carpenter, using that as a side line, his 
principal occupation was a professional gambler. He operated mostly 
between Monroe, Bastrop and Sterlington, except when the gamblers’ 
convention was called, when the most skillful and high-handed gam­
blers served as delegates, having gone to Shreveport, Alexandria, 
Baton Rouge, New Orleans, Pine Bluff, and Little Rock, Arkansas 
and to points in Texas, when and where the best skill and talent in 
the profession were exhibited in poker, coonkant, etc. . . . James 
McCrory stated that he had tried for many years to get John McCrory 
to take some insurance, because he had expected him to get killed at 
the gambling table at any time, as John was very notorious and a 
great winner. He let it slip out that John was sick in the fall of 1929, 
had no place to stay, as the woman with whom he had been staying 
put him out at Monroe and the other one at Bastrop would not take
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him in sick and he had to come over in the country and stay with 
him—James. It was generally known throughout that section of 
— Louisiana that John McCrory was a high-handed gambler, even as far 
as New Orleans, Arkansas, and Texas.
Case XIII
Josephine Epps, Deceased, Policy No. 1029475-C. As to Josephine 
Epps, W. L. G. Abney wrote Mrs. E. E. Christopher as follows:
Shreveport, La.
November 15th, 1930
Mrs. C. E. Christopher 
Claims Department,
National Benefit Life Insurance Co.
Washington, D. C.
Dear Madam:
We are enclosing herewith, death proof papers in connection 
with claim for Mrs. Josephine Epps. As you will note, this claim 
comes up during the first year of the policy and for this reason we 
decided to check up very carefully before making recommendation 
with reference to paying this claim.
We were pleased to have had Mr. Ralph Harper, Assistant 
Agency Director, with us at this time. On a very careful checkup, 
we find Mrs. Epps to have been a perfect risk, no previous record of 
any previous illness and apparently in perfect health. We found 
upon investigation that she died from a very acute attack of indi­
gestion or gas, which of course, affected the heart. I have been 
there and stayed there for two or three days and I am sure that the 
facts given in the case are correct. If there is any other information 
-  you would like, I would ask that you take the matter up with Mr. 
Harper, who happened to be in the office and accompanied me on my 
trip of inspection.
Very truly yours,









I thought it necessary to write you again in connection with the 
recent claim for Josephine Epps which probably reached your office
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a few days ago. The letter which accompanied this claim was dic­
tated by me, but not signed. Consequently, I did not have the oppor­
tunity to read it before it was mailed. It does not carry one import­
ant fact which I wanted the Claims Department to know, and I am 
herein reporting this situation.
Although Mrs. Epps was reputed to be a married woman, we 
found on investigation that she was never legally married, but had 
been the common law wife of a prominent white man of that section 
who had lived in the home with her and reared a family and had 
always her and her children as his own.
Of course, I knew nothing of this condition until the death arose 
and it became my duty to investigate every phase of her life. We do 
not approve of accepting a risk of this kind and have severely repri­
manded our agent, Mr. Crowell, for having accepted the application 
and submitting it without bringing this fact out clearly. However, 
since it is an established fact that from every other angle, she was an 
apparently pretty good risk, I don’t know what effect this might have 
on the settlement of the claim. However, I felt that the Claims 
Department should have this angle and we are glad to send it along.
I might add that with reference to our agent, Mr. Crowell, it 
was among our plans to discontinue his services at the end of the year 
anyway and of course, this will naturally mean that his termination 
will be asked immediately.
Very truly yours,
W. L. G. Abney, Mgr., P.
Ordinary Dept.
WLGA :P
Investigation revealed that Josephine Epps lived and died back of 
the woods in a field between twelve and fifteen miles from Benson, La. 
We tried to go out there in a Chevrolet coach and erosion had cut the 
roads so deep in the old wagon tracks that the axles dragged on the 
ground, as well as the battery, we could not go any further and had 
to abandon the trip, as far as going out to where she died. Having 
had information that Josephine Epps had never been married and 
that her father was na^ned Tobe Epps and that Josephine Epps was 
her maiden name and that she had not been dead very long, we went 
out to the graveyard in an effort to establish her age from the head 
board, if it had been thereon, but we could not find a single grave 
with her epitaph, nor her name and age on it . . . Josephine 
Epps was a white man’s woman and had been all of her life, or since 
she was in her teens. She has a half-white son about twenty years 
old and we understand that she has four or five more children, all 
half-white. Mr. Abney said that she “was the common law wife of a
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prominent white man” but our information was that he was a “ red 
neck” of the lowest type and did not even class with nor go with the 
white folks. However, he guarded Josephine Epps and did not allow 
her to associate with the colored people. The people in that neigh­
borhood call the man with whom Josephine Epps stayed, or lived, Tom 
Morris. However, Mr. T. J. Williams, a colored man who lives at 
Benson said that he worked for him two years and his correct name 
is Tom Marsh. Tom Marsh, or Tom Morris, died several years ago. 
Mr. Abney said in paragraph two, “ I have been there and stayed 
there for two or three days, and I am sure that the facts given in the 
case are correct” . We are of the opinion that he did not go out there 
and stay a minute while Tom Marsh was living, because we under­
stand that he did not allow Josephine Epps to hardly look at a col­
ored man. While he had to stay one or two nights, we are wondering 
why it was he did not see those half-white children and find out some­
thing about them. If he went out there in any part of the year of 
1930, we are at a loss to know why he could not tell when it was gen­
erally known throughout that country that it was an established fact 
that Josephine Epps had tuberculosis. It might have been possible 
for her to have muffled her coughs for a short while, but she could not 
have muffled them two or three days. Tom Marsh had a case of this 
old-fashioned “ consumption” and said information was known 
throughout the entire Parish. It lasted nearly three years, and it is 
generally known in that community that for at least two years he 
lived on soda crackers, raw eggs, and sweetmilk and that he ate noth­
ing else. It is known throughout the county that Josephine Epps 
was pregnant with a tubercular child when Tom Marsh died and that 
the child never did fully develop so as to be born alive, but was mis­
carried and it was said at the time that she had tuberculosis of the 
womb. Mr. T. J. Williams of Benson, La., said that Josephine Epps 
had told him many a time since Tom Marsh died and since her last 
miscarriage in 1928, “ Mr. Williams, I am sick—in bad shape—giving 
down” , in contrast to her previous and former high-headed manner 
and disposition, when well and her man was living . . .
In addition to the difficulties illustrated by the cases above, with 
which the National Benefit had to contend, other weaknesses in its 
policy of expansion made further drains upon its resources. The ex­
pense connected with developing a new territory is a large and heavy 
drain upon the resources of a comparatively small company. There 
are the expenses of establishing new branch offices, increasing the 
salaried field force, together with increased expenses at the home 
office. Further, new districts must be supported for a long time be­
cause of the small amount of business written in the early years. In
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regal’d to the policy of expansion of the National Benefit, M. S. Stuart, 
a Negro insurance executive of considerable experience, stated:
In 1923 the officers were induced to sponsor an authoriza­
tion to increase the capital stock of the company to $250,- 
000 so that nine or ten new states might simultaneously 
be entered, and, incidentally, to provide a big office for a 
southern supervisor, and numerous lavish sub-offices in 
the several states. Pause here to ask yourself what com­
pany among us— indeed, except the largest of the white 
companies, what company in America— could survive the 
expense of developing to a point of profit, this vast ter­
ritory at one and the same time. Except in the case of the 
great white companies, heavily capitalized and just start­
ing business, there is no record of any company ever qual­
ifying for business in so many states at the same time . . .
So much of the policyholders’ money was invested in an 
effort to buy business in this vast territory that anyone 
with common sense would have known that there wasn’t 
a chance to make a profit of it back into the company in 
time to save it from ruin. It takes years even with cau­
tious procedure to get money back from new states . . .  In 
an effort to sell this large issue of stock, in order to enter 
these states, loans were made which were ridiculously 
under-secured. Prospective stock buyers were granted 
loans far in excess of the value of their real esatte holdings 
to induce them to buy stock.12
As the business went into large scale operations, S. W. Ruther­
ford gradually relinquished his dictatorial position. The influence 
upon management policies of R. H. Rutherford, the son of S. W. Ruth­
erford, and Mortimer F. Smith began to be felt after this time.
The West Virginia District
The manner in which the program of expansion was carried out 
is best to be seen in the organization and operation of the so-called 
West Virginia District. This district covered a section of the south­
ern West Virginia coal area with a Negro population of 6,500. It was 
composed of Portsmouth, Ohio; Huntington, Wevaco, Cabin Creek, 
Logan, St. Albans, Montgomery, Ganley Bridge, Peach Creek and 
other small mining towns. The branch office site was a four-room 
suite on the second floor in Jacob Street, Charleston, W. Va., in a res-
12 M. S. Stuart, “ Investment Lessons to Be Learned from Mistakes of Com­
panies That Have Failed” , 14th Annua! Session N. N. I. A., Richmond, July
1934, p. 6.
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idential section. It was leased at $50 a month for two years. The 
investigator strongly recommended the removal of the office to the 
business section stating that “business must be where business is in 
spite of the often repeated Home Office dogma that the office site 
makes no difference.” The personnel consisted of a manager, a sec­
retary-cashier, and six agents.
The expenses of the branch office were as follows: manager’s 
salary, $110, increasing monthly for six months, and secretary-cash­
ier’s salary, $60; general expenses, averaging $94.75 a month, con­
sisted of rent, $50, janitorial services, $10, telephone, $6.75, and 
postage and incidentals, $28. Because of the wide territory over 
which collections had to be made, Portsmouth 98 miles away and 
Charleston, 70 miles away, agents were allowed traveling expenses 
amounting to $29.36 a month. Such were the expenses paid by the 
company to maintain and, of course, to increase, if possible, $302,064 
of insurance in force on its books in 1931.
The $302,064 of insurance in force represented $237,064 of in­
dustrial insurance and $65,000 of ordinary insurance. On the health 
insurance in force, for the first six months of 1931, $626.50 were paid 
in claims. The health collections amounted to $1,555.12 and com­
missions $310.02, leaving a balance of $618.60 after deducting claims.
For the same period industrial collections amounted to $6,068.28 
and ordinary collections $1,485.67, making a total of $7,553.95. Dur­
ing this time the industrial debit decreased from $232.76 to $217.34. 
The paid claims were $551.00; claims pending, $1,415.00.
It is evident on the above showing that the West Virginia dis­
trict was a loss to the company. In the first place, a district in which 
the total number of possible prospects is only 6,500 can hardly sup­
port a branch office. And it is a foolish optimism indeed that leads 
one to assume that one insurance company can write 50% of the total 
possible prospects. In this case even if such had been done only 3,700 
persons would have become policyholders. When one considers the 
high lapse rate of industrial business one is extremely doubtful that 
this number of policyholders could have supported a branch office.
The total collections of this district for six months amounted to 
$7,553.95. Deducting from this branch office expense of $1,764.66, 
health claims paid of $625.50, death claims of $451.00 and pending 
claims of $1,415.00, a balance of $3,196.79 is left. Out of this the 
company had to pay state taxes, agents’ commissions, a part of home 
office salaries and expenses and establish reserves. This was simply 
impossible. The office was a loss though the industrial collections 
amounted to over 96% of the debit of $6,310.04 charged to the district 
on industrial policies.
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The Standard Life Transaction
Another manifestation of the policy of expansion was the re­
insuring of the business of other companies. The absorption of the 
Standard Benefit Society of Maryland was the first venture of the 
National Benefit along this line. The society was a small one and 
because of the scarcity of comment and data upon the transaction, the 
absorption was evidently of little consequence. However, the con­
trary is true concerning the reinsuring of the Standard Life business. 
A knowledge of the history of this company is necessary properly to 
evaluate the action of the National Benefit in reinsuring its business.
The Standard Life Insurance Co. of Atlanta, Ga., was incorpor­
ated under the laws of Georgia, June 24, 1911, and business began 
two years later. Like the National Benefit it was to be a company 
controlled by colored interests for the insuring of colored people. Its 
difficulties began early and continued throughout its existence. As in 
the case of the National Benefit, the Standard Life was built upon an 
insecure economic foundation and was involved in a perpetual but 
futile struggle to avoid failure. The Standard Life falls in the cate­
gory of small companies described by Dr. Donald H. Davenport, 
special economic consultant to the insurance section of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. “The companies that have failed, the 
small companies,” he stated, “were companies that were young com­
panies and were not companies that were organized and doing busi­
ness where the great bulk of life insurance is done.” 13 Moreover, 
failure could not have been forestalled as long as it was or incorpora­
tion could not have been accomplished if it had been domiciled in New 
York, New Jersey, or any of the New England states. Testimony at 
the monopoly hearings implied that in these states, where the largest 
proportion of insurance companies are incorporated, the laws are 
better calculated to protect the interest of the policyholders.14
The insolvent condition of the Standard Life is reputed to have 
been of long standing. A Negro life insurance man of long experience 
stated:
I have long entertained the idea that the worm of insolv­
ency got in at the placing of the organization stock. At 
least, I have had the word of one of the early actuaries of 
the Standard that, at one of the first, probably the first,
State Examinations, a deficit of about $60,000 was shown,
13 Testimony before the Temporary National Economic Committee from “ Ver­
batim Record of the Proceedings of the Temporary National Economic Com­
mittee” , Vol. 2, p. 13. Bureau of National Aifairs, Inc., 1939, Washington, D. C.
u ibid., p. 13. These hearings also revealed that companies domiciled in 
New York, New Jersey, and the New England states controlled 74.1% of the 
total assets of all legal reserve companies in the United States.
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and that this was made up by placing on the field non­
participating in the place of participating policies issued 
up to that time; and that, had appraisals been made and 
titles investigated on the First Mortgage Real Estate 
Loans, the deficit would have been even larger.15 6
In 1922, just prior to the time when the difficulties of the com­
pany came to public notice the statement of the Standard Life showed 
assets totalling $2,042,439.18. Of this amount $936,268.85, or ap­
proximately 40%, was in Mortgage loans on Real Estate; $305,172.35, 
or approximately 17%, was reported as being in cash; interest and 
rents due or accrued of $65,371.55; due and deferred premiums of 
$236,977.71; policy loans of $274,377.55; and collateral loans of $21,- 
488.29. There were reported bonds of only $299,664.49, or 14%. 
The large holdings in mortgages and cash, the value of both of which 
was open to question, were a direct result of the company’s affiliation 
with its subsidiaries. The subsidiaries of the company were the 
Service Company, the Service Realty Company, Citizens Trust Com­
pany, Service Engineering and Construction Company, Service Print­
ing Company and Service Pharmacies, Incorporated. The company 
iad made large deposits in the Citizens Trust Company which it dared 
not draw upon. The reason for this is explained below. The com­
pany had also invested heavily in financing the operations of the 
Service Realty Company. The liabilities of the company including a 
reserve of $1,646,310.64 were $1,837,992.17. The capital stock was 
$125,000 and surplus $79,447.51. There was $28,881,575 of insurance 
in force at the close of 1922.16
According to the statement of December 31,1923, mortgage loans 
amounted to $840,845.43; cash, $880,977.83; and bonds, only $215,- 
043.02. Over $700,000 of cash was deposited in the Citizens Trust 
Company, the subsidiary. The $700,000 in cash “had been largely 
loaned by the bank to the Service Realty Company [another subsid­
iary] which had invested the money in real estate being largely 
vacant property in the part of Atlanta where colored people are liv­
ing. This property was encumbered for part of the purchase price 
amounting to $160,000 at that time. This real estate was also encum­
bered in favor of the Donald Holding Company and Katz and Levy 
to the extent of $105,000. . . It is true that the Citizens Trust Com­
pany about this time, that is to say, during 1923, having loaned its 
money out to said subsidiary companies was short of cash to meet its
15 M. S. Stuart, op. cit., p. 4.
“ Affidavit of J. B. Blayton filed in the suit of Charles H. Brown, et al vs. 
Standard Life Insurance Company of Arkansas, No. 68732, Fulton Superior 
Court, Fulton County, Georgia.
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clearings. This created a serious condition which called for financial 
assistance. . . Having funds ready to pay the bank clearings was a 
very serious matter, for, unless the clearings were promptly met, the 
bank would have immediately been closed. The existence of the bank 
depended upon meeting the clearings.” 17 Thus, it behooved the insur­
ance company which was in dire straits itself to keep the bank open 
in order to show on its statement a doubtful and completely frozen 
asset of $700,000. Just prior to this time the stock had been increased 
from $125,000 to $250,000. This new issue was financed in the fol­
lowing way. “ The Service Company agreed to underwrite, or take, 
the whole issue of 1,250 shares of par value $100 each at the sum of 
$335,000 and to undertake to sell out the stock to individual pur­
chasers at a price of $300 per share, thus giving the Service Company 
a profit or commission of $40,000. The Service Company gave its 
check on the Citizens Trust Company to the order of Standard Life 
Insurance Company, and deposited with the said bank a stock cer­
tificate for 965 shares (285 shares having already been disposed of as 
explained hereafter). On receipt of said stock attached as collateral 
to the note of the Service Company of $335,000 with personal endorse­
ment of its officers, the check of the Service Company was deposited 
to the credit of the Standard Life Insurance Company of Georgia. Of 
the 285 shares above mentioned, 265 shares had been issued pre­
viously to the Service and by that company placed with S. A. Lynch 
as part of security given for a loan of $80,000, net, for which the 
Service Company gave a note of $107,500.00. The other security for 
said loan was equity in the Wesley Memorial property. Twenty 
shares of this stock had been sold to various individuals.” 18 The 
result of this was that the bank loaned another subsidiary money to 
buy Standard Life stock on security of the same stock and credited 
the account of the Standard Life for the purchase price of the stock. 
The Standard Life could not draw on its account for fear of closing 
the bank and the bank could not collect on the note of the Service 
Company until the stock had been sold. The whole affair was a paper 
transaction, made possible by interlocking directorates, which served 
only to inflate the fictitious assets of the Standard Life.
In 1923, the real and practical control of the company “which so 
far had been administered by .colored interest, passed to white interest 
by virtue of mortgages and/or other liens against the voting stock 
and/or assets of the said Standard . . . ” 19 The change in control was
17 ibid.
18 ibid.
18 ibid., Decree, Exhibit A. “ Contract of Reinsurance Between Standard Life 
and National Benefit” , p. 7.
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lescribed in the affidavit of J. B. Blayton, auditor for the Standard 
!nfe and its several subsidiaries. Mr. Blayton stated:
At the time I came to the Standard Life Insurance Com­
pany, August 1, 1922, Heman E. Perry was president, J.
A. Robinson was Secretary, T. J. Ferguson, Cashier and 
Acting Treasurer. These were the active officers and the 
company was dominated almost exclusively by Heman E. 
Perry.
sj« j j :  s|c *
The officers of the Standard Life Insurance Company, part 
of whom were named above, were also officers of the Citi­
zens Trust Company, the Service Company and other com­
panies mentioned, that is to say, the directors in one, were 
directors in the others, the executive heads, however, being 
different.
ij: s|s ijs
During the latter part of 1928, there was complaint as to 
handling of funds of the Standard Life Insurance Com­
pany by General Wright, Insurance Commissioner of 
Georgia. As a result he had a careful investigation made 
by Haight and Haight, actuaries and accountants, who 
made their report to the commissioner.20
The control of the Standard Life passed into the hands of two execu­
tive managers, Silas W. Davis and Arthur G. Powell, both white. The 
manner in which the executive managers gained control is shrouded 
in mystery. Mr. Blayton said in his affidavit:
____ Lhave examined the minutes of the Standard Life Insur­
ance Company kept during said period, which include the 
minutes of the stockholders’ meeting and the minutes of 
all directors’ meetings, and no resolution has been passed 
or otherwise shown by such minutes whereby the right to 
act as executive managers was ever taken. There is an 
absence of any record on the subject.21
He further stated that the executive managers




was spent under their supervision or direction. They never 
were at the office of the company, and they took no part 
in the management, nor concerned themselves as to the 
handling of any of the business. During this time each of 
the executive managers were paid the sum of $500.00 per 
month by the Standard Life Insurance Company of 
Georgia. They also were named as executive managers 
of the following named companies: Service Company, 
Service Realty Company, Citizens Trust Company, Citi­
zens Company, Service Engineering and Construction 
Company, Service Printing Company and Service Pharm­
acies, Inc. During this time, the business of the Standard 
Life Insurance Company was conducted by the same em­
ployees, that is, by the same clerks, bookkeepers, auditors, 
solicitors, and the force generally which was composed of 
colored people. The executive managers did nothing ex­
cept sign all checks, as already explained, and they did this 
through agents, those acting in the capacity being Joseph 
Calus and M. A. Cason. They did not change the policy of 
the company or give any constructive suggestion except 
they cut down the salaries of some of the employees and 
discouraged the solicitors from writing new business.22
The executive managers appear to be responsible for the second 
shift in the control of the company. It has already been stated how 
important it was to the insurance company to keep the bank open. 
The bank was in such a condition that it could not obtain money at 
anything approaching the usual rates. Accordingly, if any money 
was to be raised, it was to be raised only at unusually high rates and 
from persons who specialized in placing “pawn-broker’s loans.” Dur­
ing this period Silas W. Davis negotiated a contract between himself, 
the Southern Trust Company, the Service Realty Company and the 
Citizens Trust Company, which was for the ostensible purpose of 
raising funds for the bank.
Executive manager, Silas W. Davis, offered to remedy this 
condition [of the bank] and furnish the financial assist­
ance necessary and required. As a result, a contract 
whereby the Southern Trust Company was to loan $125,- 
000 to the Service Realty Company, was entered into, 
dated July 24, 1924. This contract was entered into dur­
ing the period when the executive managers were in con--
25 ibid.
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trol of all the companies named in the contract outside of 
the Southeastern Trust Company. . . In said contract of 
July 24, 1924, in paragraph 4, it was provided that the 
Citizens Trust Company should release 1,251 shares of 
stock in the Standard Life Insurance Company to the 
Southeastern Trust Company, which stock was released 
by the Citizens Trust Company. . . The 1,251 shares con­
stituted a majority of one share of all the stock of the 
Standard Life Insurance Company. The Citizens Trust 
Company, as a bank, had put up with it, as collateral, to 
secure loans made to various colored business men, stock 
aggregating about 900 shares. This stock had merely been 
Teft with the bank without endorsement in most cases.
The stock had been pledged to the bank, and the bank had 
never foreclosed under the pledge and the bank never ob­
tained title to the stock by any process. Some 265 shares 
had been placed up as collateral with a loan with S. A. 
Lynch, and about eighty-six shares with other parties. The 
Southeastern Trust Company in some way got hold of this 
stock which was added to the amount they got from the 
Citizens Trust Company and thereby made 1,251 shares 
. . . Pursuant to the verbal agreement that the Southeast­
ern Trust Company should furnish funds to the Citizens 
Trust Company in order to meet its clearings, from day to 
day, and pursuant to the written agreement dated July 24,
1924, referred to, the Southeastern Trust Company . . .  nor 
anyone else for them, loaned any money whatever to the 
Citizens Trust Company except comparatively small 
amounts, ranging from two to five thousand dollars at a 
time in order to meet the bank clearings, which sums were 
repaid from day to day. This money was advanced by the 
executive managers out of funds belonging to the Standard 
Life Insurance Company. Due to my position as auditor 
for all of the companies, as outlined herein, I was in a 
position to know and do know that the Southeastern Trust 
Company did not lend any money to them. . .  In December,
1923, the Service Company and the Service Realty Com­
pany borrowed from the Southeastern Trust Company 
$20,000 for a period of five days, at the end of which time 
they paid back the sum of $25,000.23
The stockholders meeting at which the second change in control
ibid.
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of the Standard Life took place was described as follows:
The meeting was held about 2 o’clock p.m. on January 15, 
1925, at the office of the Company, 200 Auburn Avenue, 
Atlanta, Ga. I was a stockholder and was present at the 
meeting and knew what took place. Heman E. Perry 
called the meeting to order. A committee on proxies was 
appointed. This committee reported that there was a 
majority of the stock represented by proxies or present in 
person. William Matthews of the law firm of Little, Pow­
ell, Smith, and Goldstein was present and announced that 
he had 1,251 shares by proxy, which were the shares which 
had been acquired by the Southeastern Trust Company. 
Heman E. Perry announced that an offer to ‘merge’ the 
Standard Life Insurance Company with the Southern In­
surance Company under the name of the Southern-Stand­
ard Life Insurance Co. was to be considered and voted 
upon. No news of this proposal had been given to the 
employees or stockholders generally, except the morning 
before the meeting there was some rumor to this effect 
which caused considerable excitement. There was some 
discussion in the meeting by various stockholders present. 
One remarked that Mr. Matthews sat over there with 1,251 
shares and that there was no use to have further discus­
sion. About this time, Will G. Harris appeared and made 
a speech and stated, ‘you boys might as well line up with 
this proposition, we want your cooperation, but if you do 
not line up, we will go on without you.’ A vote was taken, 
but very few, outside of Mr. Matthews, voted. . .  It should 
be stated that Mr. Harris made the proposition that stock­
holders of the Standard Life Insurance Company would 
exchange one share of their stock for four shares in the' 
Southern Insurance Company, the par value of the South­
ern Insurance Company stock being $5.50 per share. . . 
He also represented that the stockholders of the Standard 
Life Insurance Company would immediately receive a div­
idend of $2.00 per share on the stock in the Southern In­
surance Company, the result being that the stockholders of 
the Standard Life received four shares and $8.00 in cash 
for each share in the exchange of their stock. Mr. Harris 
also stated in the meeting that this company, the Southern 
Insurance Company, then had a surplus of over $200,000 
and that the stock was selling for $20.00 per share. . . Two 
of the officers of the Standard Life Insurance Company
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resigned at the meeting. One was David J. Jones, secre­
tary, and the other John R. Pinkett, director of agencies.24
In spite of the illegal implications in this transaction, the contract 
of reinsurance was approved by the insurance departments of Georgia 
and Tennessee, home states of the companies concerned.
The Southern Insurance Company had not had the business of 
the Standard Life a year when it consummated plans for the reinsur­
ing of the business in the Standard Life Insurance Company of 
Arkansas. This contract of reinsurance went into effect December 
28, 1925. At this time, according to Mr. Blayton’s affidavit, the busi­
ness had assets of $1,729,067 to meet a reserve of $3,200,000. This 
left a deficit in the reserve of $1,470,933 exclusive of capital stock. 
Moreover, the reserve requirements were increasing at the rate of 
approximately $400,000 a year. “ These figures represent the con­
dition of the company at the end of 1925, and do not include losses 
during the year 1926, which would not be less than $150,000. These 
losses come about by increases on the reserve which arises as policies 
become older, and from lack of receiving normal interest from the 
investments, most of the capital being invested in non-income pro­
ducing assets.” 25
The control of the Standard Life changed at least four times. 
From June 24, 1911 to 1923, the company was controlled by Negroes, 
Heman Perry, etc., as the Standard Life of Georgia. From June, 
1923, to January 15, 1925, the control vested in white executive man­
agers, Silas W. Davis and Arthur G. Powell. From January 15, 1925, 
to December 28, 1925, the Standard was controlled by the white 
Southern Insurance Company, which transferred the business to the 
Standard Life of Arkansas (A Negro company). Control rested here 
from December 28, 1925 to 1927. In 1927 the National Benefit Life 
Insurance Company took over what was left of the Standard Life’s 
business. It is reasonable to assume that the officers of the National 
Benefit knew the history of the Standard Life much of which was a 
matter of public record. Although the ostensible purpose of the an­
nexation of the Standard Life was to increase the volume and invest­
ment fund of the National Benefit, there can be little doubt that other 
motives were also responsible for the transaction. This idea is 
strengthened by the fact that the National Benefit was already writ­
ing too much business for its surplus and that traces of financial dif­
ficulties and insolvency were becoming more evident and acute. In 




senting the District of Columbia, Alabama, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and 
Missouri insurance departments the following statement was made: 
“This insolvent condition of the company on December 31, 1926, was 
caused principally by their writing too much business for their sur­
plus. In the company’s annual statement for the year 1926, to the 
insurance departments, the market value of real estate owned was 
increased arbitrarily and various liabilities not included.” 26 This 
statement was deleted from the filed and approved report with the 
knowledge of, at least, some of the insurance commissioners. One is 
led to believe that there was some basis to the allegation that the 
officers of the National Benefit hoped to use the Standard Life merger 
to camouflage the true condition of the National Benefit. It was 
stated that “ in 1918, the National Benefit would not have considered 
taking over the Standard Life or any other business in such condition 
as it was. It only went into taking it over in 1927, because it had 
gotten into deep water via the stock and real estate deals and the 
new territory entered, all having their inception in 1923. Why did 
the National Benefit accept from the Standard Life of Arkansas real 
estate at a book value of $1,865,530 without appraisal then, why did 
the same property appraise for more than a million dollars under 
book value just a few months later. Evidently, somebody was eager 
to consummate the deal, perhaps to throw more mud into waters 
already muddy.” 27
The business of the Standard Life had been refused by several 
white companies, and it was a well-known fact in insurance circles 
that the Standard Life had been “milked” on the three successive oc­
casions when control had been shifted. The futile attempt to secure 
financial aid through Dr. R. R. Moton, former president of the Nation­
al Negro Business League, suggests the degree of the company’s des­
peration at this time. This attempt was described in the Negro 
weekly, The Afro-American, on May 7, 1932. In an article captioned, 
“ Philanthropists’ $550,00 Couldn’t Save Standard Life,”  this paper 
reported: “ The truth about the offer of a loan of $550,000 from Julius 
Rosenwald and John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to the Standard Life Insur­
ance Company of Atlanta, Ga., when it was in difficulty five or six 
years ago, was told for the first time today by Dr. R. R. Moton, prin­
cipal of Tuskegee Institute, at a recent Rosenwald memorial meeting 
here. . . According to Dr. Moton, the Standard Life made appeals in 
all directions for help, but finally a committee came to him to see if 
he could interest Mr. Rockefeller or Mr. Rosenwald in the situation. 
. . ‘The company wanted $200,00 to tide them over,’ he said . . . ‘they
88 Fackler and Brieby, op. cit., Supplemental Report No. 2.
27 M. S. Stuart, op. cit., p. 10.
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were in the hands of lenders who had advanced them $200,000 and 
insisted upon foreclosing and taking something like three million dol­
lars of good assets to satisfy their claims. I was presiding at the 
National Negro Business League in Chicago at the time—the twenty- 
fifth anniversary of the league. I asked the vice president to take the 
chair. I called Mr. Rosenwald over the phone and made an appoint­
ment. Jumping into a taxicab, I went over to see him—a long dis­
tance—and told him the story. But I didn’t ask for $200,000; I want­
ed to be on the safe side. I told him we needed $400,000. Colored 
people in business don’t always tell all the truth. I thought it better 
to put up $400,000 and be safe than try $200,000 and lose it. I told 
Mr. Rosenwald just that. He thought it over a minute and then said, 
‘I think I could get the money for you. Would you handle it yourself 
at Tuskegee?’ ‘No, sir,’ I said. He asked m e,‘How would you handle 
it?’ I said, I would handle it through New York, through the Title 
Guaranty and Trust Company; I would get the best actuary to make 
an investigation and get some certified accountants, Wall Street men, 
to come down and check up, before I would spend a cent. He said, 
‘All right, I will see that you get the money.’ I went back to New 
York and set things going. The money was deposited with the Title 
Guaranty and Trust Company. We got $550,000 to be on the safe 
side, Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. Peabody, Mr. Kelsey, and others co-operat­
ing. We looked into the situation and on the 23rd of December, after 
an all day conference, I wired Mr. Kelsey and Mr. Rosenwald, we 
would have to send the money back. We didn’t think it a safe invest­
ment from all information at hand; and we didn’t do it.’ ”
The philanthropy of Messrs. Rosenwald, et al, was apparently 
directed to the preservation of the faith of Negroes in Negro-con­
trolled business. This motive was likewise responsible in part for the 
National Benefit’s acquisition of the Standard Life. Whether con­
sidered on the ground of maintaining the race’s faith in their own 
business men or on that of plain business efficiency the taking over of 
the Standard Life by the National Benefit was an unsound trans­
action. It could not have been otherwise. As has been indicated, the 
business of the Standard Life consisted of a number of old-time con­
tracts, on which the principle of adverse selection had been operating 
for a number of years, offset by frozen and doubtful assets, chief of 
which was non-income producing real estate.
The merger caused the company to increase its field of operation 
without a proportionate or compensating increase in income. As a 
result of the expansion policy begun in 1923, and given new impetus 
in 1926 and 1927, the company now operated in 24 states. The result­
ant increases in administrative costs moved the National Benefit closer
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to receivership. Despite numerous ruses, these costs shortened the 
time in which it was possible to keep the condition of the company 
from public notice.
The Standard Life Reinsurance Contract
The contract of reinsurance under which the National Benefit 
reinsured the business of the Standard Life grew out of litigation 
almost as intricate as that in which the National Benefit later became 
involved. In the cases concerned with the business of the Standard 
Life a large number of persons and corporations were involved as 
plaintiffs, defendants, or intervenors. In the case of Charles H. 
Brown, et al, versus the Standard Life Insurance Company,28 the 
court sought to put an end to the litigation as well as to provide for 
the administering of the affairs of the Standard Life. The decree of 
the court is worth liberal quotation because of the light it throws on 
the condition of the Standard Life at the time the National Benefit 
acquired it. In the words of the court:
The life insurance business formerly belonging to the 
Standard Life Insurance Company of Georgia, which by 
successive transfers came into the possession of the Stand­
ard Life Insurance Company of Arkansas, has sustained 
losses of property and funds, to such an extent that it does 
not now have the amount of assets which the law requires 
as a reserve for the protection of the policyholders and the 
amount of said impairment is so great that it is impracti­
cal for the business to be continued on the present basis 
with justice to the policyholders.
It is further found that the deficiency in the legal reserve 
required far exceeds the amount of the capital stock of 
the Standard Life Insurance Company of Georgia and that 
such a deficiency existed at the time the business was 
transferred from the Southern Insurance Company to the 
Standard Life of Arkansas, and had not since been materi­
ally diminished by the operations of the latter company, 
and it being shown by the evidence that there is no possi­
bility of recovering enough in value of the assets which 
the plaintiffs claim have been dissipated by certain of the 
defendants in this case to restore the reserve, it is ad­
judged and decreed that the stockholders of the Standard
No. 68732, Fulton Superior Court, Fulton County, Ga.
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Life Insurance Company of Georgia as represented by 
petitions in this case, have no claim upon the assets which 
formerly were possessed and owned by the Standard Life 
Insurance Company of Georgia and that such assets must 
be used and administered for the benefit of the policy 
holders, together with such assets as the Standard Life of 
Arkansas furnished towards reducing the impairment to 
the reserve, and to this end, there being no other adequate 
remedy, the court must and does hereby take charge of all 
said assets, to be disposed of in such manner as is best 
calculated to save the assets from further losses and secure 
the interest of the policyholders whose rights are found to 
be superior to those of the stockholders of the Standard 
Life Insurance Company of Georgia. In dealing with such 
insolvent condition, the court recognizes that a very valu­
able asset of the company is the premium account as paid 
by policyholders, which would be greatly impaired and 
damaged should the business be continued in charge of the 
court by the appointment of receivers or otherwise. . .
With regard to the claims of the policyholders as afore­
said, the court has had presented to it in the evidence in 
the case a contract of reinsurance, copy of which is hereto 
attached . . . whereby the National Benefit Life Insurance 
Company of the District of Columbia has agreed, upon the 
terms and conditions in said contract specified, to reinsure 
the said policies, which contract has been approved by the 
Commissioners of Arkansas and the District of Columbia, 
the domiciles of the respective companies. . . It is there­
upon further decreed by the court that the said proposed 
contract of reinsurance adequately protects and preserves 
all rights of the policyholders of the said Standard Life 
Insurance Company and protects the said policyholders 
more adequately and completely than they could possibly 
be protected by the court liquidating the business or keep­
ing it in charge of the court by receivers or otherwise.
It is ordered and decreed that said contract or reinsur­
ance be and the same is hereby approved . . . and the said 
contract is to take effect on the date of this decree.
In the preamble to the contract of reinsurance the National Benefit
expressed its intent as follows:
Whereas, it appears from the considerations herein 
stated and from the history of the Standard Life Insur­
ance Company of Atlanta, Georgia, the reinsurance of
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that business with the Southern Insurance Company of 
Nashville, Tennessee, and the later reinsurance of the 
same business with the Standard Life Insurance Company 
of Eureka Springs, Arkansas, that the subject matters 
involved are complex to such a degree, that the National 
Benefit Insurance Company of Washington, D. C., acting 
on the advice of Miles M. Dawson and Son, consulting 
actuaries, of New York City is willing to enter into this 
contract of reinsurance as the best possible solution of 
these complex affairs, for the sole purpose of furnishing 
the utmost protection that can be given with competent 
management to the policyholders of the Standard Life, 
with safety to the policyholders of the National Bene­
fit. . .  .
Article one of the contract provided that the Standard Life 
policies would be taken over, subject to individually established liens 
bearing four per cent. The liens were to be calculated on the basis 
of the impairment in the reserve on December 31, 1926. The liens 
were to be changed from time to time in accordance with changes 
in the reserve deficiency. At the time the policies were taken 
over the lien on each policy amounted to 66.043% of its reserve. 
By other terms of the contract, which was in effect of the nature of 
a trusteeship, the National Benefit was to segregate the assets 
of the Standard Life. They were to furnish separate statements 
to the insurance departments showing disposition of assets and 
profits and losses on that division of their business. Direct expenses 
were to be charged directly to the Standard Life Division and indirect 
expenses were to be apportioned so as “ not to exceed the reinsured 
Standard Life policies’ pro rata share for each one thousand dollars 
of insurance of the total home office administration expenses of the 
Ordinary Department of the National Benefit.”
The National Benefit received all assets of the Standard Life in 
consideration for which it was to assume all the liabilities of the 
Standard Life and make certain payments to the Standard Life 
Division for a period of years after the effective date of the contract. 
These payments were to be made out of the premiums collected on 
Standard Life policies. The contract read: . . The Standard
Life shall be paid a first commission out of the premiums collected 
the first year after the effective date of this reinsurance contract 
on the policies of the Standard Life by the National Benefit not 
to exceed in total amount of fifty thousand ($50,000) dollars 
which said commission will be due and payable to the Standard
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Life on the date this contract becomes effective” .29 For six years
such payments were to be made, reduced each time by five thousand
dollars. Each payment was to bear six per cent interest accu-
mulated annualy from the effective date of the contract. The sched-
ule of payments was:
1927.................... .... $50,000 plus interest
1928.................... .... 45,000 ( (  u
1929.................... .... 40,000 (( u
1930..................... .... 35,000 i t  a
1931.................... .... 30,000 a  u
1932.................... .... 25,000 t i  U
1933.................... .... 20,000 a  it
$245,000
In compliance with this and other provisions of the contract the 
Standard Life Division was to be charged and credited as follows:
CREDITS
1. Profits on Standard Life investments.
2. Appreciation on Standard Life assets.
3. Seven annual payments totaling $245,000 plus in­
terest.
CHARGES
1. Four per cent interest on liens.
2. Direct investment expense.
3. Other direct expenses.
4. Losses on Standard Life investments.
5. Depreciation on Standard Life assets.
6. Pro rata share of home office expenses.
Soon after the contract became effective, the National Benefit 
was called upon to pay large sums for loans, surrender values, and 
death claims on Standard Life policies. Thus a large indebtedness 
was shifted from the Standard Life Division to the National Benefit 
Division. Shortly afterwards, the policy of encouraging Standard 
Life policyholders to drop their Standard Life policies and take out 
new ones in the National Benefit was adopted. This was designed 
to increase the indebtedness of the Standard Life Division since 
the latter would have to pay surrender values to the National Benefit 
Division. The net effect, however, was to draw off the cash and 
liquid assets of the National Benefit for which the National Benefit
25 ibid., Decree, Exhibit A., Art X.
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Division received in return equity in the non-income producing assets 
of the Standard Life. On or about April 7, 1928, the balance due 
the Standard Life Division appeared on the books as $135,165.30 But, 
“ there was much confusion as to the balance due on the books of the 
two divisions. Moreover, in making the record of the transactions 
the equity between the two divisions was frequently violated.” 31
Despite the fact that the insolvent condition of the National 
Benefit was aggravated by the burden of the Standard Life, the 
public got a different idea of the facts. In an article appearing in 
April, 1927, it was stated with much pride that the National Benefit 
was operating in twenty-four states, employing 2,000 people, had 
$50,000,000 of insurance in force and had never failed to declare a 
dividend.32
30 Fackler and Breiby, “ Report of Condition as of Sept. 9, 1931” , op. cit., 
Appendix B, p. 3.
“  ibid., p. 6.
3S George W. Lee, “ Insurance—Its Necessity and Value” , The Messenger, 
April 1927.
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Ch a pt e r  III
THE UNDERWRITING POLICY OF THE COMPANY
Not least among the difficulties which beset the National Benefit 
were those connected with underwriting. However, the attention 
of the management was concentrated upon keeping the company 
operating so that little or no notice was given to some of the basic 
problems of an insurance company. The improvement of the com­
pany’s mortality and lapse experience never received the attention 
it should have. No studies of the company’s experience were made, 
and risks, even in the Ordinary Department, were underwritten indis­
criminately.
All indications pointed to a bad mortality experince for the 
company. In the face of this, the managers sought to conceal the 
company’s insolvency by whittling reserves. They changed the basis 
of reserve computation without justification. Of course the new 
method of calculating the reserve resulted in a smaller amount as 
the required reserve. Ordinarily such a change is made only when 
the mortality experience of a company unquestionably warrants it. 
At the end of 1930 the reserve according to the company’s filed state­
ment amounted to $4,752,132.1 Yet only nine months later, on 
September 9, 1931, the reserve as computed by actuaries employed 
by the receivers was $5,852,772.
This change in the basis of the reserve was not only unwise, 
but a deliberate breach of contract on the part of the company. 
By the terms of certain contracts issued by the company, the com­
pany obligated itself to accumulate the reserve on a specified basis. 
The reserve accumulated on the basis specified in these contracts 
was greater than on the basis of the new method adopted by the 
company. In like manner the rate books showed a surrender 
value in excess of surrender values, computed on the new method. 
The situation was disclosed in a conference examination at which 
the company was warned to remedy these defects as quickly as 
possible. The action taken by the company is shown in the minutes 
of the Board of Directors meeting of January 7, 1928:
The Secretary stated that Mr. Frank Speakman, actuary 
and chief examiner for the six insurance departments 
engaged upon the examination of the company had called 
attention to the fact that the Ordinary Department sur- 1
1 See Table X, p. 67.
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render values given in the rate book at various ages and 
various end of years are in a great many instances in 
excess of the reserve bases used by the company, and also 
that the management had been advised by Mr. Speakman 
and Mr. Alfred Dawson that a number of various policy 
forms used by the company should be revised. . . . The 
president stated that it was the opinion and also the desire 
of the management that the rate book and policy forms, 
which policy forms and rate books he advised had been 
prepared for the company by actuaries other than Miles 
M. Dawson and Son, should be made to conform to the 
Illinois Standard Method of Valuation, American Experi­
ence Table of Mortality and 3y%% interest, adopted by 
the company as a basis of valuation for the Ordinary 
Department.2
At this meeting of the Board, the following motion was unanimously
carried:
Resolved, that Miles M. Dawson and Son, our consulting 
actuaries, hereby are instructed to redraft and amend, as 
soon as practicable and as deemed requisite by them and 
Actuary Speakman, all our policy forms, and also to com­
pute new tables of premiums and surrender values to 
bring our rate book values and our policy forms in con­
formity with the reserve basis used by the company for 
valuation in respect to the intermediate and industrial 
departments as well as the ordinary department.2
Later Alfred Dawson, the company’s actuary, in a letter to the
managing officers of the company, had this to say concerning the
company’s method of reserve calculation:
As a matter of fact, if the company policies had been 
valued in accordance with the options contained in old 
policies, which options should never have been granted, 
the company, at the time of the examination of December 
31, 1927, was and had been for years previous hopelessly 
insolvent, but on my personal assurance that these old 
policies would be taken up and policy contracts, in accord­
ance with the basis of valuation adopted, issued in lieu 
thereof, the Department Examiners let the matter of 
ascertaining the additional reserve liability on these old
'Quoted by Fackler and Brieby, Report No. 2, p. 11.
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contracts go over until the next examination, which is now 
past due.3
Reserves, of course, are dependent upon the mortality table 
used. If a table with a too long expectancy of life is used, the 
company will suffer losses. On the other hand, if a table with a too 
short expectancy of life is used, the premium will be very high— 
out of proportion to the cost of insurance. Another important fac­
tor in calculating the reserve is the assumed rate of interest used 
in connection with the mortality table. If the assumed interest 
rate is too low more of the funds collected as premiums will have 
to be held in trust as the reserve than should be the case. For 
additions to the reserve due to interest will be less when a low rate 
is used, thereby necessitating the segregation in the reserve of larger 
amounts of the premiums. As stated by John H. Magee, one of 
the authorities cited in the hearings of the Temporary National 
Economic Committee: 4 ‘The vital factor in computing life insur­
ance premiums [and reserve] is the mortality table. Since the 
obligations of the life insurance company to pay benefits is de­
pendent upon the happening of a life contingency, it is important 
that life insurance actuaries know the expected life span of a group 
of policyholders.”5 Thus the mortality table has a double signifi­
cance. It is the basis upon which premiums are calculated, on the 
one hand, and the basis on which the reserve is determined, on the 
other. “The ability of the company to meet all claims as they mature 
is dependent upon the adequacy of the reserve account. The reserve 
should never be regarded as an extra fund to meet contingencies 
or a profit above mortality experience. On the contrary, on the 
basis of the calculated experience [mortality table] the mortality 
costs will ultimately absorb the entire reserve. Only to the extent 
that actual experience is more favorable than the calculations would 
indicate will there be any excess over claims in the reserve fund.”  6 
If the actual experience is more severe than the calculated experience 
the reserve will prove inadequate. And, it should be noted in this 
connection that the legal reserve requirement is not necessarily the 
actual reserve demanded by sound economic policy in particular 
cases.
The legal requirements specify only the minimum reserve that
3 Letter of Alfred B. Dawson to the Voting Trustees: S. W. Rutherford,
C. B. Lee, R. H. Rutherford, and M. F. Smith, dated February 20, 1931.
‘ Verbatim Record of the Proceedings of The Temporary National Economic 
Committee, Bureau of National Alfairs, Inc., Washington, D. C., 1939, p. 4.
“ John H. Magee, Life Insurance, Business Publications, Inc., Chicago, 1939, 
p. 199.
' ibid., p. 268.
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a company must set up. They are the requirements for all insur­
ance companies operating within the state concerned. They set 
forth the minimum reserve requirements for both companies that 
underwrite preferred risks and for those that cater to a lower type 
of business. State statutes also specify the mortality table to be 
used as a basis, the assumed rate of interest, and the plan of valua­
tion. In calculating its reserve on the basis specified in the state 
statutes, a company fulfills its legal obligation. However, this legal 
reserve may be inadequate from the standpoint of the type of risks 
the said company underwrites and of its mortality experience. As 
put by Magee:
The reserve requirements of any particular state are set 
up to safeguard the policyholders. They are of necessity 
made as conservative as circumstances seem to warrant.
It is to be remembered, however, that reserves are com­
puted upon the basis of a mortality table which may rep­
resent a death rate not actually in accordance with the 
facts. Likewise, the rate of interest used in making the 
calculations may not actually represent the real interest 
rate earned by the company. To secure a real picture of 
the company’s condition, it will be necessary to make the 
calculations on the basis of the gross premiums received 
less actual expenses, using the actual mortality experi­
ence and actual interest earned rather than an assumed 
interest rate and a tabular mortality rate. From the 
viewpoint of the state, it may be assumed that the stand­
ards set up for measuring reserves are sufficiently con­
servative to guarantee the solvency of the company for 
all practical purposes.7
The adoption of the Illinois Standard method of valuation at 
3% %  interest would produce the lowest reserve within the law. In 
regard to the legal reserve and adequate reserve requirements the 
actuaries who made the last examination reported:
There might, of course, be a difference among actuaries as 
to the most applicable mortality table and interest rates 
on which to base the premiums, reserve, and non-forfei­
ture values for the several classes of risks which this 
company would insure. It might also be a matter of 
opinion as to whether particular options should have 
been granted. However, the fact of the matter is that 
the policies provided that their reserves and non-forfeiture
'ibid., p. 277.
values were to be based on specified standards, which 
fixed the liability thereunder, regardless of any pro­
visions, or lack of provisions, in the laws of the District 
of Columbia, so long as the reserves fixed by the policies 
were at least as great as the minimum reserves required 
by law. . . . The principle underlying level premium in­
surance is that of providing reserves which will meet the 
increasing cost of mortality as the policyholder grows 
older. The mortality reserve standard provided in those 
policies were such as to meet the probable mortality trend 
of this company’s risks, judging by available experience 
among similar risks. The reason ‘the Ordinary Depart­
ment surrender values given in the rate book at various 
ages and various end of years are in a great many in­
stances in excess of the reserve bases used by the Com­
pany’ was that the reserve bases used in valuing the 
policy reserves and certified to the Superintendent of In­
surance of the District of Columbia were not those pro­
vided for in the policies, but such as produced lower and 
inadequate reserves. . . . The adoption of some other 
standard of evaluation for policies to be issued in the 
future could not affect the liability under the policies 
then in force. The liability under those policies was not 
reduced by the ‘assurance’ of an individual that several 
thousand policyholders would agree to relinquish their 
equities and right in contracts which they held for some­
thing of less value. Until those contracts were actually 
relinquished the liability remained as set in those con­
tracts. Campaigns to make such transfers were begun 
in 1930, new policy forms having been brought out in 
1929, but without much success. The effort did have the 
effect of throwing the insurance records into considerable 
confusion and the loss or destruction of the records as to 
paid up and extended insurances. . . . The annual state­
ments of the Company, on file in the office of the Super­
intendent of Insurance of the District of Columbia, 
showed the reserve standards which had been employed. 
There was thus official and public notice that adequate 
reserve standards had been adopted by the Company, 
and the implication was that adequate standards thereon 
would be continued.8 *
* Fackler and Breiby, op. tit., Report No. 2, pp. 13-14.
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That the change in reserve basis was not the result of a delib­
erate policy based upon a favorable mortality experience is evident 
from the resolution passed by the Board of Directors at the Janu­
ary, 1928, meeting to which reference has twice been made. The 
resolution read:
Resolved, that our actuaries are hereby directed to make 
an investigation of the lapse experience of the Company 
and particularly an adequate investigation of the mor­
tality experience of the Company for the purpose of 
ascertaining how closely our actual experience is approxi­
mating the mortality to be expected on the reserve bases 
used by the Company for valuation.9
Of course, such an investigation should have been made long before 
this time. Even if the investigation had been made as ordered by 
the Board, and there is nothing to indicate it was ever begun, it 
was too late to profit by it. That this type of information was lack­
ing, although mortality experience is a matter of supreme im­
portance to an insurance company, is a sad commentary on the 
management policies of the National Benefit. Such studies should 
have been constantly going on to guide the administration of the 
company.
In formulating an adequate reserve and underwriting policy 
an insurance company catering to Negroes should, in addition to the 
adoption of, let us say, the American Experience Table of Mortality, 
possess a thorough knowledge of the mortality of its policyholders 
and that of Negroes generally. In regard to Negro mortality the 
most important studies have been made by Dr. Louis I. Dublin, 
Statistician for the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. His 
studies have been based on the experience for twenty-five years of 
the Metropolitan which insures about two million Negroes, or almost 
one-fifth of the entire Negro population of the United States. In 
this two million are included men, women, and children of all ages, 
occupations, and economic status. It is, however, composed pre­
dominantly of urban Negroes. A complete comparison of the mor­
tality rate of two million Negro and fourteen million white policy­
holders in the industrial department of the company is given in 
Table III below.
8 ibid., p. 12.
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Table III
DEATH RATES PER 100,000 FROM ALL CAUSES 
EXPERIENCE OF METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, INDUSTRIAL WEEKLY PREMIUM-PAYING 
BUSINESS, 1935 10
Males Females
Per cent Per cent
Negro of Negro of
Age White Negro White White Negro White
Ages 1-74 838.6 1,273.9 152 517.7 1,090.9 177
Under 1 2,144.7 3,725.7 174 1,638.6 3,019.6 184
1-4 353.1 532.6 151 323.2 520.5 161
5-14 152.8 234.8 154 121.2 197.9 163
15-24 223.9 540.4 241 183.0 595.5 325
25-44 552.6 1,143.8 207 400.6 941.1 235
45-64 2,203.4 2,972.7 135 1,487.9 2,442.8 164
65-74 6,620.3 7,717.7 117 5,280.3 6,499.4 123
This comparison covers industrial policyholders only. The Metro­
politan insures Negroes only on an industrial, intermediate, or en­
dowment basis. But one would not be far wrong in estimating that 
over 85 per cent of Negroes insured with the Metropolitan are 
covered by industrial insurance.
The table indicates that for every age group the death rate for 
Negroes is higher than that for whites. In the case of females the 
difference between Negro and white is even greater. The greatest 
difference is for Negro women between the ages of 15 and 24 for whom 
the death rate is three and one-fourth times that for white women in 
the same age group. The greatest differences between the death 
rates for Negro and white men is also between the ages of 15 and 24. 
And for both Negro men and women the most dangerous years are 
between 15 and 44, after which the death rates for Negroes more 
nearly approximate that for whites. The full consequence of the 
excess infant mortality for Negroes is not revealed by the table. 
While the tables gives the per cent of Negro infant mortality to 
white infant mortality as 174 for males and 184 for females, it does
10 Louis I. Dublin, “ The Problem of Negro Health as Revealed by Vital 
Statistics” , Journal of Negro Education, July 1937. See also: “ Statistical Bulle­
tin” , North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Co., Durham, N. C., 1923.
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not indicate the effect of mortality in the early ages on the expectancy 
of life. At the death of a Negro infant, 48 years of life expectancy 
is lost. Although the expectancy of life for Negroes has constantly 
increased over the years, it is still less than the white. In 1929-31 
on the basis of general population figures, it stood at 47.5 years for 
Negro men and 49.5 years for Negro women, as compared with 59.3 
years for white men and 62.8 years for white women.
In comparing the experience of the Metropolitan with a smaller, 
but more general sample, for instance, the population of the city 
of New York, it is found that the excess in the mortality rate for 
Negroes is less for the city of New York than for Metropolitan 
policyholders. While the excess is less, the rates for both are 
higher. The population of New York City for 1936 was estimated 
at 7,363,624 persons, 412,053 of whom composed the Negro popula­
tion. The total number of deaths for the same year was 77,432. 
The number of Negro deaths was 6,092. Thus, while Negroes com­
prised only 5.60 per cent of the total population, Negro deaths 
accounted for 7.87 per cent of the total deaths. These figures show 
a death rate for that year in New York City of 14.8 per thousand for 
Negroes and 10.3 for white persons. This indicated an excess in 
the Negro death rate over the death rate for whites of nearly 50 
per cent.
Table IV
NEGRO AND WHITE MORTALITY IN THE CITY OF 
NEW YORK, 1936 * 11
POPULATION DEATHS
Per cent Per cent Per
Number of Total Number of Total 1000
N egro.................  512,053 5.6 6,092 7.87 14.8
White ...............  6,951,571 94.4 71,340 92.13 10-3
Total .................  7,363,624 100.0 77,432 100.00
In the case of the Metropolitan policyholders the excess of the Negro 
death rate over that for white persons was 52 per cent for males and 
77 per cent for females. The death rate for Negroes in the regis­
tration states of the country at large on the basis of the 1930 census
11 Based on New York City Health Department figures as cited by Haw­
thorne E. Lee, “A Comparative Study of the Mortality of Colored People in the 
City of New York” , United Mutual Benefit Association, New York City, 1939.
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was 18.0 per thousand and 9.9 per thousand for whites, an excess of 
81 per cent.™
In analyzing the problem of the excessive mortality of Negroes 
the first step is a consideration of the causes of deaths among them. 
The principal causes of deaths among Negroes have been fairly 
definitely established. Various studies have all given practically 
the same diseases as the principal causes of death. Statistics of the 
Health Department of New York City reveal that of deaths of 
Negroes in New York City, 19.7 per cent are due to heart and cir­
culatory diseases; 17.8 per cent to tuberculosis; 12.3 per cent to 
respiratory diseases; 7.5 per cent to cancer and other tumors; 7 per 
cent to unnatural causes; and 6.9 per cent to rheumatic and nutri­
tional diseases.1 *3 These six causes of death accounted for 71.2 per 
cent of Negro deaths in New York City in 1935 and 1936.
Table V
CAUSES OF DEATHS FOR NEGROES AND WHITE PERSONS 
IN THE-CITY OF NEW YORK FOR THE YEARS OF 
1935 AND 1936 14
NEGRO WHITE
Order Percent Order Percent
Heart and Circulatory Diseases.......... . 1 19.7 1 32.0
Tuberculosis .......................................... . 2 17.8 9 4.8
Respiratory Diseases .......................... .. 3 12.3 3 8.9
Cancer and other Tumors .................. . 4 7.5 2 14.8
Unnatural Causes ................................ . 5 7.0 8 5.9
Rheumatic and Nutritional Diseases... . 6 6.9 10 4.1
Miscellaneous ........................................ . 7 6.7 4 8.4
Diseases of the Nervous System........ . 8 6.4 5 7.1
Genito-Urinary Diseases ...................... 9 6.1 6 6.7
Diseases of Digestive System ............ .. 10 4.9 7 6.6
Syphilis .................................................. 11 4.5 11 0.7
Gonorrhoea ............................................ 12 0.2 12 0.0*
100.0 100.0
* Less than .1%
11 Louis I. Dublin, “ The Problem of Negro Health as Revealed by Statistics” ,
and “ Life, Death, and the Negro” , American Mercury, Vol. XII, No. 45, pp. 37-45;
13 Based on New York City Health Department figures as cited by Haw­
thorne E. Lee, “A Comparative Study of the Mortality of Colored People in the 
City of New York” , United Mutual Benefit Association, New York City, 1939.
14 ibid.
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The Metropolitan has had virtually the same experience with 
its Negro policyholders.
In 1935 organic heart disease was the leading cause of 
death among colored industrial policyholders of the Metro­
politan Life Insurance Company. Their death rate was 
208.1 per 100,000, or a little more than l 1/^  times that for 
whites.
Tuberuclosis is followed very closely with a rate of 152.4, 
or more than 3 times that for whites. Third in numeri­
cal importance was pneumonia, with a rate of 104.3, 
double that for whites. Chronic nephritis and cerebreal 
hemorrhage, important “ degenerative diseases” , take 
double the toll of life among Negroes that they do among 
whites. These five diseases, together with fatal acci­
dents, which also run higher for the colored, account for 
60 per cent of the Negro mortality.15
There can be little doubt that the cause of the Negro’s high 
mortality is his low economic status. In metropolitan centers the 
areas in which the low-income groups live have the highest death 
rate. In Washington, D. C., the area bounded by New York Ave­
nue, Florida Avenue, and Seventh Street in which the largest per­
centage of Negroes live, has a death rate much in excess of any other 
section of the city.16 Not only is its death rate higher, but for the 
city of Washington it ranks first in number of arrests, second in 
illegitimate births, and second in deaths from tuberculosis.
The problem of Negro health and mortality is a socio-economic 
one. It arises from the low economic status of the Negro. And 
it is the low socio-economic position of the Negro that complicates 
the formulation of a sound underwriting policy by Negro insurance 
companies. One Negro mutual benefit association has as the first 
tenet of its underwriting policy the use of extreme care in the 
selection of risks. In pursuing this policy it experienced over a 
five-year period on the lives of 30,971 Negroes, 85 per cent of whom 
were unskilled workers, 14.5 per cent skilled workers, and .5 per 
cent professional persons, a mortality rate of only 59.22 per cent 
of its expected mortality as computed on the basis of the American 
Experience Table of Mortality. This, however, could not be a 
long-run policy for a Negro insurance company because: (1) the 
cost of selecting good risks is high and, therefore, could not be borne 
by industrial policies, the type of insurance predominantly pur-
”  Dublin, op. tit.
15 Washington Daily News, May 4, 1939, “X-Ray and Venereal Disease Clinic
Opens at Peoples’ Church” .
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chased by Negroes; and, (2) the market for ordinary insurance 
among Negroes is limited to the relatively few Negroes of higher 
income.
The policy of the National Benefit was to insure as large a 
number as possible regardless of the desirability of the risk. Such 
a policy is not in itself unsound. In fact, it is the basis of industrial 
insurance. It entails, however, an accurate knowledge of actual and 
expected mortality. It has often been said by lecturers on insurance 
that if an insurance company could insure all the people who passed 
a busy intersection in the course of a few days it could do so profit­
ably and with the minimum risk. The reasoning is based on the 
law of probability. By random selection a large enough number 
of persons would be insured to assure a close approximation to cal­
culations. Furthermore, the mortality of the general population 
would have been fairly definitely established. The National Benefit 
did not enjoy the benefit of random selection even within the Negro 
portion of the population. Officials of the company were acquainted 
with the agents’ practice of “writing tombstones” . Moreover, the 
National Benefit had no data" or knowledge of the mortality of the 
Negro in the various sections in which the company did business. 
Indeed, in some of the rural sections into which it had been forced 
by competition, this information was positively unavailable. Yet 
the company made no studies of its experience to determine how 
closely the actual mortality of its policyholders approximated its 
expected mortality. If a company made no study of its experience, 
an involved actuarial problem, it could not wisely set the terms of 
its contracts. A mistake once made in underwriting policy is not 
easily rectified but likely to continue for many years and spread its 
malignant influence throughout the company.
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C h a pter  IV
THE INVESTMENT POLICY OF THE COMPANY
From the time that the National Benefit Life Insurance Com­
pany became a legal reserve company it operated on a “shoestring” . 
This was true despite its periodic increases in authorized capital and 
its showing of a surplus in its annual statements. The pressure for 
funds was the dominating factor in its investment policy. The many 
dubious transactions to which it was a party were the outgrowth 
of this policy which in turn expressed the attempt of the officers to 
keep the company operating in the face of impending disaster. 
While it can be said that not all the questionable deals entered into 
by the officers were directed towards this objective, the larger and, 
perhaps, the majority of these transactions aimed to relieve the eco­
nomic sickness of the company. The troubles of the National Benefit 
date back to 1918 when its capital stock was increased for a second 
time, not to 1923 as some observers say. As early as 1918 its stock 
was watered and all further expansion was built upon this water­
logged foundation. The subsequent expansion increased the water 
in the stock. It appears that originally its policy of expansion was 
prompted by the idea that a larger premium income would facilitate 
the squeezing of the water from the stock and the creation of a 
real surplus. The'objective of placing the company on a solid finan­
cial basis proved impossible of attainment because of the manner 
in which it was pursued. All attempts to achieve the objective were 
abandoned during waves of temporary prosperity. Some of the 
officers did not appreciate the company’s financial plight. Others 
saw no hope of restoring the company whatever policy was inaug­
urated. This and the false hopes together with the personal ambi­
tion of some of the executives led the National Benefit to its fatal 
end.
The National Benefit was declared insolvent as of September 9, 
1931. Daniel C. Roper, former Secretary of Commerce, was the 
first receiver appointed. The court authorized the receiver to ap­
point competent parties to “ ascertain the value of the policyholders’ 
equity as of September 9, 1931” . Clifford M. Stoy, an accountant 
of Washington, D. C., was employed by Mr. Roper for this purpose. 
His report fixed the deficit at $2,828,380.35. Shortly after this 
report was submitted to the court, Roper, objecting to the appoint­
ment of a co-receiver, resigned. The court evidently recognized 
that the report was unsatisfactory for it authorized the new receivers
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to have another examination made. For this examination Fackler 
and Breiby, Consulting Actuaries, of New York City, were appointed.
The reports of Fackler and Brieby and the court records are 
the two most authoritative sources of information on the operation 
of the National Benefit in its later years. The records of the District 
of Columbia Insurance Department were “not available”  to us. The 
Insurance Department disclaims responsibility for the misplacement 
of the records. We were informed that during the litigation the 
records were turned over to the Department of Justice and then to 
the Court House. In these transfers, the records, it seems, dis­
appeared.
The reports of Fackler and Breiby are comprehensive and de­
tailed. They treat every phase of the company’s activity. One 
might take exception, however, to the conservative valuations in the 
reports. It is quite evident that in questions of valuation the lowest 
figure was used almost consistently. This resulted in an overstate­
ment of the deficit—a not uncommon circumstance in such proceed­
ings. Examiners are frequently prone to follow the implicit wishes 
of the receivers and veer a bit to the conservative side in order to 
place all responsibility for loss on the poor management of those who 
have preceded the receivers. The status of the company on Septem­
ber 9, 1931, as determined by Fackler and Breiby is shown below in 
Table VI.
Table VI
Condensed Statement of the Condition of the National Benefit 








Real Estate..................... $ 63,995.11 $333,519.50 $397,514.61
Leaseholds ..................... None No value No value
Mortgage Loans............. 287,264.13 None 287,264.13
Collateral Loans ........... No value No value No value
Bonds ............................. 197,458.46 None 197,458.46
Stocks ............................. 675.00 27,700.00 28,375.00
Cash ............................... 87,021.99 8,001.57 95,023.56
Accounts Receivable ..... No value No value No value
Bills Receivable ........... No value No value No value
Agents Debit Balances.. No value No value No value










Furniture and Fixtures.. 15,000.00 5,000.00 20,000.00
Automobiles and Eqpt.... 250.00 None 250.00
Mules (on farms owned) None 1,140.00 1,140.00
Checks returned, later 
collected ....................... 679.28 None 679.28
Meter Deposits............... 719.00 20.00 739.00
Charged to Hon. Lewis A. 
Irons, Ga. receiver..... 6,882.18 2,913.90 9,796.08
Loans on Crop Liens....... 200.00 None 200.00
Due National Benefit from 
Standard Life Div...... 686,115.88 -686,115.88
Interest and Rents 
due and accrued......... 18,034.89 346.05 18,380.94
Cash Surrender values 
of Policies Owned on 
Officer’s Lives ............. 3,942.00 None 3,942.00








Net Reserve (deducting 
indebtedness under life 
policies) ..................... $3,986,071.53 $667,714.19 $4,653,845.72
Net Reserve for claims 
of disabled policy hold­
ers & Permanent Dis­
ability Benefits........... 1,705.00 10,676.00 12,381.00
Net Due Beneficiaries of 
Deceased Policyholders 207,173.00 34,336.00 241,509.00
Net Due under Endow­
ment Policies ............. 4,592.00 4,592.00
Salaries, Commissions, 
etc. preferred by pay­
ment subsequent to 




Liabilities and Claims Division Division Combined
Rents, office expenses, 
etc. Not preferred by
subsequent payment .....  15,630-00 993.00 16,623.00
Unimproved Miscellane­
ous Claims against Co....  37,500.00 2,500.00 40,000.00
State Premium Taxes.... 60,140.00 4,658.00 64,798.00
Miscellaneous Deposit &
Suspense Items .............  25,589.27 1,005.71 26,594.98
T o t a l  Liabilities and 
Claims Excluding Capi­
tal ...................................  4,349,906.80 726,534.90 5,076,441.70
Deficit after Excluding
Capital Stock Liability.. 2,981,668.88 1,034,009-76 4,015,678.64
1,368,237.92 -307,474.86 1,060,736.06
The above statement shows that the percentage of assets to 
liabilities, excluding the capital stock liability, was 20.9. But while 
certain of the assets listed may have had some cash value, they were 
not admitted by insurance departments as means of offsetting liabili­
ties of the company. These non-admitted assets amounted to $21,390 
including furniture and fixtures, $20,000; automobile and equipment, 
$250; and mules on farms owned, $1,140. The inclusion of these 
items would not have inflated the statement, on the one hand, because 
cash could have been realized from them and, on the other, the value 
of certain other assets had been deflated in the statement. The con­
servative policy followed by Fackler and Breiby in preparing their 
statement was perhaps justified on the grounds that in many cases 
they were not using going-concern values but realizable values. This 
would make a greater difference than usual in the case of the National 
Benefit because of the nature and location of its assets.
The statement of Fackler and Breiby shows a decrease of 82.47 
per cent from assets reported at the close of 1930. In this year the 
assets of the company when calculated on the basis of its annual 
statements had increased 1318.40 per cent since 1918. Yet only nine 
months later the increase shown by Fackler and Breiby’s statement 
was 248.69 per cent. In 1924, a year after the inauguration of the 
expansion policy the company’s statements indicated an increase of
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32.67 per cent over the previous year. The largest single increase in 
assets of course resulted from the absorption of the Standard Life. 
In 1927 the assets increased 259.71 per cent over 1926 and 1268.98 
per cent over 1918. A large part of these were book-value increases, 
inflated values resulting from the stock and assets manipulations. 
Table VII gives the reported increases in the company’s assets.
Table VII
Changes in the Total Assets of The National Benefit 
Life Insurance Company 1918-19312 *VI.
Year Amount
Per cent of Annual 
Increase
(non-cumulative)
Per cent of Increase 
(cumulative)
1918 $ 426,538
1919 513,503 20.39 20.39
1920 580,655 13.08 36.13
1921 630,339 8.56 47.78
1922 700,425 11.12 64.21
1923 859,885 22.75 101.59
1924 1,140,789 32.67 174.53
1925 1,229,703 7.36 187.13
1926 1,623,316 32.55 280.57
1927 5,839,199 259.71 1,268.98
1928 6,463,971 10.69 1,415.50
1929 6,641,278 2.74 1,457.02
1930 6,050,033 8.91 1,318.40
1931 1,060,763 82.47 248.69
1 The data used here are from the official statements of the company as 
published by Alfred Best and Co., New York, Life Insurance Reports, except for 
the years of 1924, 1929, and 1930, for which they were taken from The Com­
pendium of Official Life Insurance Reports, published by the Spectator Company, 
New York. The figures for 1931 are from the report of Fackler and Breiby and 
are as of September 9th, rather than December 31st as in the other cases. The 
deficit in this year amounted to $4,015,678.64.
The amounts of insurance written and the amounts of insurance 
in force at the close of each year from 1918 are to be found in Table
VIII.
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INSURANCE WRITTEN AND IN FORCE FOR THE NATIONAL 
BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 1918-1931
Table VIII
Year Insurance Written Insurance in Force
1918 $5,579,406*














When Tables VII and VIII are studied together, they will show the 
futile and inflationary character of the company’s expansion program. 
Although the company wrote $30,381,832 of insurance in 1924, the 
increase of insurance in force was just $7,000,000. (See Table VIII), 
while the total assets increased less than $300,000 and the capital 
and surplus decreased (See Tables VII and IX). In 1925 the insur­
ance in force increased by nearly $15,000,000 but assets increased 
less than $100,000 while capital and surplus decreased more than 
$20,000. With the taking over of the Standard Life and the intensifi­
cation of the policy of expansion in 1927 the assets jumped to $5,839,- 
199 and the insurance in force increased about $30,000,000 but the 
capital and surplus stood at only $423,419, just 7.25 per cent of total 
liabilities. From this time on the capital and surplus decreased ab­
solutely and relatively and, except for the following year, the insur­
3 The insurance in force of the Standard Life appears to have been reported 
as part of the business of the National Benefit slightly prior to the time it was 
actually taken over.
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ance in force also decreased. The capital and surplus did scarcely 
more than double since 1918, though the assets as reported increased 
fourteen times. The changes in capital and surplus are given below 
in Table IX.
Table IX
CAPITAL AND SURPLUS OF THE NATIONAL BENEFIT 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 1918-1931
Year Amount
















It was stated that the company’s insolvent condition in 1926 was 
caused by writing too great a quantity of insurance relative to its 
surplus. In 1926, a reserve of $1,024,049 (See Table X) was required 
by the insurance in force. It represented 70.28 per cent of the com­
pany’s liabilities. In this year the company’s reported capital and 
surplus amounted to $325,000 or 22.30 per cent of liabilities. All other 
liabilities including reserve for taxes, contingency reserve (which, 
incidentally, was on $2,359 on $43,320,277 of insurance in force), 
prepaid premiums and unearned interest, claims resisted and claims 
unpaid, unpaid dividends, and agents’ security deposits amounted to 
7.42 per cent of total liabilities. In subsequent years the condition 
was even more unfavorable. In 1927, the reserve was 77.51 per cent
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of total liabilities and the capital and surplus only 7.25 per cent. In 
1927 the percentages were 79.25 and 6.39 respectively; and in 1929, 
79.58 and 5.42 respectively. The absolute and relative changes in 
reserve from 1918 to 1931 are given in Table X.
Table X





Per cent of Total 
Liabilities














Even when the company’s inflated figures are taken as the basis 
of analysis, it is evident that its survival depended upon an exception- 
aly favorable mortality experience and a careful investment policy. 
The peculiar situation of the National Benefit prevented it from as­
sembling a well diversified portfolio. It is interesting to note in this 
connection, without at this point going into the reasons for it, the 
degree to which the investments of the National Benefit differed from 
the normal investments a life insurance company is expected to make. 
The Temporary National Economic Committee in its investigations 
compiled data on the investments of all the legal reserve life insur­
ance companies in the United States. The number of such companies 
was 308. The following table based upon the data collected by the 
committee shows the relative proportions in which the assets of these 
308 companies were invested from 1916 to 1938.
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INVESTMENTS OF LEGAL RESERVE LIFE INSURANCE 














1916 1 .8% 45.3% 33.4% 2 .7% 14.0% 2 .8%
1921 1.2 46.2 34.4 2.0 13.0 3.2
1924 1.1 41.3 39.6 1.8 12.3 3.9
1925 .9 40.1 41.1 1.8 12.1 4.0
1926 .8 38.1 43.0 1.8 12.0 4.3
1927 .8 37.8 43.1 1.9 12.1 4.3
1928 .8 37.8 42.5 2.1 12.2 4.6
1929 .8 37.2 42.0 2.2 13.3 4.5
1930 .7 37.1 40.5 2.4 14.0 4.3
1931 .8 37.5 38.4 2.8 16.4 4.1
19385 3.0 56.3 19.4 7.8 12.1 1.4
The ratios given here do not necessarily represent the ideal distribu­
tion, but they do provide a standard by which the portfolios of life 
insurance companies may be judged. Minor differences between them 
and the portfolio of a particular company may not be indicative of 
faulty distribution of the portfolio of the company in question, but 
where the difference is great it would seem definitely to indicate a 
weakness ki the investment policy of the company concerned.
Beginning with cash holdings, let us compare the distribution of 
the assets of the National Benefit with that of the 308 companies 
given in Table XI above. The cash holdings of the company from 
1918 to 1931 are given in Table XII below.
Table XII
CASH OF THE NATIONAL BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY 1918-19312
Year Amount Per cent of Total Assets





‘ Verbatim Reports of the Temporary National Economic Committee, op. tit., 
pp. 36-37.
5 Estimated by the Association of Life Insurance Presidents.
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Table XII (Continued)










The cash held by the 308 companies in Table XI never rose higher 
than 3 per cent in the period from 1916 to 1938. The cash held by 
the National Benefit was consistently high varying from a low of .8 
per cent to a high of 11.2 per cent. Now, of course, the fact that a 
company’s idle cash is consistently high, although uneconomic on 
certain general grounds, need not of itself indicate weakness. Usually 
the cash holdings of small companies are relatively high because of 
the lack of uniformity in the presentation of claims and because of 
the difficulty of investing small sums satisfactorily. On the other 
hand, the necessity of carrying large amounts of idle funds may in­
dicate internal disorders whatever the company’s size. In the case 
of the National Benefit the cash account after 1926, was inflated—on 
one occasion to more than $250,000. Moreover, during this period 
heavy demands for policy loans were made upon the company. On 
September 9, 1931, the cash account showed deposits for the National 
Benefit Division of the company in fifty operating banks and twenty- 
five closed banks. For the Standard Life Division there were deposits 
in eighteen operating banks and seven closed banks. There was also 
an overdraft at the Citizens Trust Company in Atlanta, of about 
$20,000 and a deposit at the Guardian Trust Company of Cleveland, 
held as collateral for a loan. The security holdings of the National 
Benefit were even further from standard than cash While the secur­
ity holdings of all insurance companies stayed rather close to 40 per 
cent, the holdings of the National Benefit decreased from around 75 
per cent prior to 1923, to 17 per cent in 1930.
Around 1923, when the policy of expansion began there was a 
change from what evidently had been a “buy bonds” investment pol­
icy. Money was shifted from securities to real estate, policy loans, 
"other assets” , and to a small degree, mortgages. Liquid securities
'A t  the close of 1923 an examination was in process and no annual state­
ment was released. Estimates for some items, however, were given by the 
examiners.
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were used to finance the expansion. Furthermore, securities were 
sold whenever the company found itself in need of liquid funds.
Table XIII
BONDS AND STOCKS OF THE NATIONAL BENEFIT LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY 1918-1931
Year Amount Per cent of Total Assets














In 1927, the company owed $592,650 on securities purchased on 
margin. There is no justification whatever for an insurance com­
pany’s trading on margin. In this case it was exceptionally disas­
trous. According to press reports the company lost over $500,000. 
Stein Brothers and Boyce, the brokers with whom the company did 
its marginal trading, at one period held in the company’s name secur­
ities with a book value of $113,648.60, and a market value of $54,875 
against a debit balance of $15,221.68. To restore the margin the 
receivers later allowed some Joint Stock Land Bank bonds with an 
amortized value of $32,063 to be sold for $14,150.
The company’s dealings in securities was one of the sources of 
inflation of its balance sheet. For example, certain stock with a par 
value of $112,800 and a market value of $28,200 were carried on the 
book at $252,000. Moreover, included among this was 20 shares of 
stock of the Citizens Trust Company of Atlanta; held by the com­
pany but not in its name. Of the bonds, several, with par values 
amounting to $530,120, were in default. The total investment in 
bonds was carried on the books at $642,747.62 but the market value 
was $175,296.50. The company’s investment in stocks amounted to 
$265,180, book value; $1.37,500, par value; and $28,875, market value.
Of these stocks only $640, market value, worth of them were paying 
dividends.
Table XIV
SECURITY HOLDINGS OF THE NATIONAL BENEFIT LIFE 








U. S. Government................. ....$ 10,100 $ 10,100.00 $ 10,312.75
State, County & Municipal ....... 112,000 115,963.17 72,150.00
Miscellaneous ....................... .... 79,520 81,248.60 38,715.00
201,620 207,311.77 121,177.75
Bonds in Default 
Foreign Governments and
Subdivisions ..................... .... 15,000 14,025.00 2,700.00
State, County & Municipal ....... 2,000 1,935.10 480.00
Railroad ................................. .... 59,500 45,930.00 9,096.25









Miscellaneous ....................... 265,180.00 28,875.00
137,500 265,180.00 28,875.00
Total .......................................... 530,120 642,747.62 175,296.50
Reference to the appendix will indicate to some extent the char­
acter of the security holdings of the company. The South American 
mining stocks held by the company were of extremely doubtful value. 
The same is true of the stocks of bridge companies- It is reported that 
the National Benefit purchased some stock in a bridge company 
after the company’s bridge had been closed to traffic and its revenue 
from tolls entirely cut off. Likewise, it is reported that the National 
Benefit purchased some stock of a toll bridge company after a free 
state bridge had been erected beside the toll bridge.
The greatest defects in the portfolio of the National Benefit, how­
ever, were the real estate and mortgage investments. As shown by 
Table XI the proportion of real estate held by the 308 legal reserve 1
1 Fackler and Breiby, Report of Condition, Schedule D, p. 1.
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companies went as high as 7.8 per cent in 1938.® In the period of 
1916 to 1937, it never exceeded 2.8 per cent. In 1931, the National 
Benefit’s real estate investment was 37.46 per cent of its assets. From 
1919 to 1923 the real estate holdings fluctuated between 13.09 and 
15.96 per cent of assets.
Table XV
REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS OF THE NATIONAL BENEFIT 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 1918-1931
Year Amount Per cent of Total Assets
1918............... .............  68,071 15.96
1919............... .............  81,221 15.82
1920............... .............  90,150 15.53
1921............... .............  90,150 15.08
1922............... .............  90,150 13.09
1923...............
1924............... .............  162,628 14.60
1925............... .............  212,776 17.37
1926............... .............  283,050 17.44
1927............... .............  1,138,273 19.49
1928............... .............  1,125,884 17.42
1929............... .............  1,142,261 17.80
1930............... .............  1,610,574 26.62
1931............... .............  397,515 37.46
The relatively large amount of real estate owned by the National 
Benefit was not the result of a deliberate investment policy. It was 
rather the by-product of other policies. Like the True Reformers 
the National Benefit to some extent was looked upon by fraternal or­
ganizations and a large number of race conscious Negroes as a reser­
voir of credit for Negro enterprises. The officers, no doubt in re­
sponse to pressure and in order to keep the goodwill of the race, often 
came to the rescue of the Negro fraternals and banks. The company’s 
actuary, Alfred B. Dawson, once stated: “ I know that the mass of 
colored people throughout the United States look at the statement 
of the assets of the National Benefit, which figures are all set up 
behind a dollar sign and consequently assume the National Benefit 
has unlimited cash which has been collected from the colored people 
and therefore should be available for worthy colored enterprises, 
and you [the voting trustees] are continually confronted with this 
obsession. . . . All of you admit that at times you have fallen for 
this mesmerism, namely, the obsession that the National Benefit *
* This was the estimated percentage o f real estate holdings seven years after 
the beginning o f the National Benefit receivership.
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policyholders’ funds can be used for the benefit of the colored race, 
by financing some colored business enterprise, whereas the greatest 
usefulness any of you, can be to the colored race, the greatest monu­
ment you can build either for yourselves or as a shining example 
of colored endeavor, is a successful, prosperous life insurance com­
pany, sound to the core, giving the best of returns by way of equit­
able treatment to policyholders and their beneficiaries, and last 
but not least, a fair return on their investment to stockholders” . 9
Under the guise of assisting fratemals and other Negro enter­
prises the National Benefit was often able to acquire sizeable blocks 
of real estate which could be carried at a high book value but in 
reality had a small market value and were more or less “ white ele­
phants” . The largest single items of real estate held by the com­
pany are given in Table XVI.
Table XVI
SOME REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS OF THE NATIONAL 
BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, SEPTEMBER 9 ,193110
Appraised
Amount of Book Value Less Value Less 
Description Encumbrances Encumbrances Encumbrances
Odd Fellows Bldg.
250 Auburn Ave.
Atlanta, Ga................... . 30,000.00 328,000.00 150,000.00
Unimproved Property 
Georgia ........................ None 23,000.00 1,250.00
1333-41 U St., N. W. 
Washington, D. C......... . 50,000.00 50,000.00 20,000.00
The Balfour Apts.
2000 16th St., N. W. 
Washington, D. C......... 137,500.00 79,511.61 57,500.00
Masonic Temple 
Washington, D. C........ , 205,000.00 422,007.69 20,000.00
Solvent Bank Bldg.
196 S. 32nd St. 
Memphis, Tenn............... 21,750.00 1,750.00
* Letter to voting trustees, op. cit.




Amount of Book Value Less Value Less 




Memphis, Tenn..............  18,030.39 25,719.61
Willowdale Plantation
Wash. County, Miss......  None 103,900.00 26,800.00
Copeland Plantation
Wash. County, Miss......  None 16,221.74 5,000.00
On September 9, 1931 the company’s total real estate holdings 
comprised 91 pieces of property of which the book value was $2,150,- 
906.56 and the encumbrances, $497,280.39. The appraised value 
minus encumbrances was only $397,515.00.
In its real estate dealings the company engaged in the develop­
ment of Hunter Terrace Subdivision in Atlanta, Georgia. It lost 
heavily in this venture. The unsold portion, listed as “ Unimproved 
Property” in Table XVI, was appraised in 1923 at about one-twen­
tieth of its book value. The company also bought a leasehold for 
$65,000 on the property in which its subsidiary, the Citizens Trust 
Company, was situated. Despite the fact that National Benefit 
funds were used to purchase the leasehold, the trust company was 
charged no rent by the National Benefit. The leasehold was ap­
praised as being of no value.
Real estate is well-known as a poor investment for insurance 
companies. As shown by the investigation of the Temporary Na­
tional Economic Committee, real estate of all classes of assets held 
by insurance companies in 1937 had by far the lowest net yield. 
According to this investigation the yield on the various classes of 
assets was as follows: policy loans, 5.9%; stocks, 5.9%; farm 
mortgages, 5% ; Canadian government bonds, 4.5%; United 
States, state, county and municipal bonds, 4.1%; industrial bonds, 
3.6%; U. S. government bonds, 1.95%; and the gross real estate 
(10 per cent), minus expenses and taxes (8-7 per cent) gave a net 
of 1.3%. The return on real estate was too low even to maintain a 
reserve, but the National Benefit had more than one-sixth of its 
investments in real estate. The National Benefit had few mortgage 
holdings, although mortgages are rated highly as investments for
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insurance companies and savings banks. Table XVII contains the 
ratio of mortgages held by the company relative to its assets. The 
mortgages as shown were negligible except in 1931 when they were 
27 per cent of assets. Yet the ratio of mortgages held by the 308 
legal reserve companies [See Table XI] was never below 19 per 
cent of assets (1938) varying from a high of 43.1 per cent (1927) 
to a low of 33.4 per cent (1916) in the period of 1916 to 1931.
Table XVII
MORTGAGE HOLDINGS OF
THE NATIONAL BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
1918-1931
Year Amount Per cent of Total Assets
1918 ..........................  27 .......
1919 ..........................  None .......
1920 ..........................  None .......
1921 ..........................  None .......
1922 ..........................  None .......
1923 .........................................  .......
1924 ..........................  None .......
1925 ..........................  11,010 .90
1926.............................  30,570 1.88
1927 ..........................  217,778 3.73
1928 ..........................  364,525 5.64
1929 ..........................  482,381 7.26
1930 ..........................  549,561 9.08
1931 ..........................  287,264 27.08
The National Benefit did not enter the mortgage market until 
1925. In 1927 it acquired a number of mortgages when it took over 
the Standard Life business. By 1931 it had 120 mortgages on urban 
and farm property in fourteen states, including a mortgage with a 
book value of $75,134.19 on the Pythian Temple in Wheeling, West 
Virginia. This mortgage was later sold for $20,000.
The investment possibilities of mortgages was apparently never 
realized by the officers of the National Benefit. Scant attention was 
paid to the mortgage lending activities of the company. There was 
no systematized method of handling these activities of the business. 
Payments made to the company on interest and principal were con­
fused. Parcels foreclosed were, in some cases, carried in the Mort­
gage Ledger instead of being transferred to the Real Estate Ledger. 
Some mortgages were not included in the Detail Ledger at all. Sup­
porting documents were misplaced. The practice of proper investi­
76
gation and the searching of titles was not invariably followed, nor 
was legal advice secured in doubtful cases. Lack of attention was 
undoubtedly partly responsible for the status of the mortgages in 
1931 as shown in Table XVIII.
Table XVIII
Status of Mortgages, Sept. 9, 1931 
National Benefit Life Insurance Company11
Face Interest
Mortgage No. of or Book Receivers Due and Unearned
Loans Mtgs. Value Valuation Accrued Interest
In Default...........  43 270,846.97 184,887.88 2,502.50 1,378.00
Not in Default .... 77 131,651.99 151,766.25 11,485.40 7,239.00
Total ....................  120 402,498.96 336,654.13 13,987.90 8,617.00
The degree to which the investment policy of the company was 
influenced by individuals is, of course, impossible of determination. 
However, one person who exerted an important influence upon the 
investment as well as underwriting activities of the company was 
Alfred B. Dawson, financial advisor and actuary for the company.
Alfred B. Dawson
Alfred B. Dawson was a member of the firm of Miles M. Dawson 
and Son. The firm rose to popularity and influence as a result of the 
senior Dawson’s work on the Hughes Committee in 1906. In addi­
tion to being official actuary for the Hughes Committee, Miles M. 
Dawson was an important writer on actuarial matters. The influ­
ence of the firm was further heightened by the fact that prior to the 
time that colleges offered courses in actuarial science the firm trained 
many of the actuaries in state insurance departments. Thus, the 
firm was known and respected throughout the East. In the early 
twenties it appears that the son, Alfred B. Dawson, exerted more 
influence in the firm than formerly. It appears, further, that he 
personally, rather than the firm, handled many of the affairs of the 
National Benefit.
For several years, the firm of Fackler and Breiby were actuaries 
for the National Benefit. It appears, however, that with the be­
ginning of serious difficulties the company engaged Miles M. Dawson 
and Son. In connection with its services to the company Fackler 
and Breiby say: “ For several years we had calculated and reported 
annually to the National Benefit on its policy reserve liabilities as of 
December 31st of each year, based on schedules of insurance in
11 ibid., Schedule B, p. 1.
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force sent us by the company, and for the correctness of which we 
had no responsibility. Our reports to which we made affidavit, 
stated that the calculations were based upon enumerated schedules 
of insurance supplied by the company. . . . The last of such policy 
reserve calculations, or valuation, requested by, and made for, the 
company was that for December 31, 1926, which we reported to the 
company under date of March 28, 1927” .12 During the latter part 
of this period in which Fackler and Breiby were making calculations 
for the company the firm of Miles M. Dawson and Son were en­
gaged to do the same work without the knowledge of Fackler and 
Breiby. The calculations of reserve as made by Miles M. Dawson 
were on a different basis from those made by Fackler and Breiby and 
for this reason were lower. “ In these valuations Miles M. Dawson 
and Son employed reserve bases which produced reserves less than 
those provided for by the terms of the policies. In fact in the val­
uations for the years subsequent to 1926, the reserve standards were 
lowered still further. The inclusion in the company’s annual state­
ment of policy reserve calculated on such low reserve standards, 
produced an apparent surplus in each year which would not have 
been the case had the reserve been set up on the bases required by 
the policies” .13 For only two years did the company report a 
reserve as high as that calculated by Fackler and Breiby. Thus, in 
the very beginning Dawson was engaged because he was willing to 
strain ethics in order to give the National Benefit the appearance 
of a more favorable financial position. Table XIX gives a comparison 
of the reserve as calculated by Miles M. Dawson and Son and by 
Fackler and Breiby.
Table XIX
Summary of Reports on Policy Reserve Calculations for the 




Reserve By Fackler By Miles M. Co.’s Annual Reported 
Dec. 31st and Breiby Dawson & Son Statement by Co.
1921 ............. $377,034 (Not available) $377,034 $175,749
1922 ................ 461,592 438,840 461,592 160,202
1923 ................ 662,545 573,028 558,560 202,624
1924 ...............  873,898 (Not available) 676,008 196,782
12 Fackler and Breiby, Report No. 2, op. eit., p. 7.
Mibid., p. 8.





Reserve By Fackler By Miles M. Co.’s Annual Reported 
Dec. 31st and Breiby Dawson & Son Statement by Co.
1925 ...............  935,004 746,484 813,546 176,589
1926 ...............  1,351,664 1,024,409 1,024,409 325,000
1927 ...............(Not valued) (Not available) 4,526,132 423,419
1928 ............... (After 1926) (Not available) 4,841,605 390,438
1929 ...............  (Not available) 5,285,844 360,531
1930 ...............  (Not available) 4,768,222 386,939
Three major transactions in which the National Benefit engaged 
are generally credited to Dawson. The ingeniousness of the trans­
actions would indicate that they were the ideas of one of Dawson’s 
training and experience. Moreover, any one of the three transactions 
would have successfully achieved its purpose if the National Benefit 
had been sound and had had a steady flow of business on which to 
depend. They were essentially temporary measures. The three 
transactions referred to were the underwriting of 9,000 shares of 
stock by the Rutherfords and Smith, the creation of the voting 
trust, and the issuing of interim certificates.
The 9,000 share deal grew out of the need of increasing the 
capital and surplus of the company. This need was recognized and 
discussed as early as 1917, for in the directors’ meeting of Decem­
ber 29, 1917, there was discussed the “need of increasing capital and 
surplus; issue of 9,000 shares to Rutherford, Smith, and Rutherford 
and financing thereof” . However, no action was taken until after 
Dawson had become the company’s financial advisor. In October, 
1927, R. H. Rutherford wrote Dawson: “ It is our desire that you 
personally step out of your shoes as consulting actuary for the time 
being and act as our fiscal agent. . . .”  In December of the same 
year action was taken towards underwriting the 9,000 shares of 
stock. The minutes of the directors’ meeting of December 30, 
1927, state: “ The President stated that, due to the absorption of 
the Standard Life Insurance Company during the present year, it 
appeared not only highly desirable, but imperative, that the financial 
statement of this company which is to be issued at the close of 
business December 31, 1927, show an increase of capital and surplus 
* accounts of this company, and this opinion being heartily concurred 
in by the other Directors, was also advised by Mr. Alfred B. Dawson, 
the actuary and financial advisor of this company. . . After a
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thorough discussion of the matter and it appearing that there is 
authorized 9,000 shares of the capital stock remaining in the treasury, 
and the time within which this stock must be sold, if the proceeds 
are to go into the treasury and be shown in the company’s state­
ment as of December 31, 1927, is extremely limited; and R .H. 
Rutherford, Mortimer F. Smith, and S. W. Rutherford expressing 
their willingness to purchase the said 9,000 shares of treasury 
stock at the price of $50 per share, less selling expenses, but at this 
time not sufficient funds [being] in hand to pay the company the pur­
chase price in cash, the following solution is duly made, seconded 
and adopted. . . . ” 15 The minutes continued with details of 
the plan. The officers were to borrow money to purchase the stock 
and in turn sell the stock for $50 a share cash or $55 a share on 
time. As the deal actually went through, the stock was issued to 
the Rutherfords and Smith at $50 a share, or $450,000, less a selling 
expense allowance of 15 per cent, or $67,500, $22,500 of which was 
paid to the officers concerned in cash shortly after the issue of the 
stock prior to the “ re-sale” of any of the stock. Meanwhile, the 
officers had paid nothing for the 9,000 shares which stood in their 
names. What they had done was to make a loan in their names at 
the National Park Bank of New York City for $382,500 ($450,000 
less $67,500) and pledged the 9,000 shares as collateral. In addi­
tion, 4,078 shares in the names of Rutherford, Smith, and Ruther­
ford, a guarantee of payment in the name of the National Benefit, 
as well as the certificate of deposit in the name of the National 
Benefit for the $382,500 were held as collateral. Thus, though the 
officers paid nothing and no cash was made available to the com­
pany, the company carried among its assets the pledged certificate, 
listing it as cash, and increased its capital accordingly. The books 
were made to appear as if an outright sale of stock had been made 
and $382,500 in cash realized by the company.
Dawson’s part in the above transaction is indicated in a letter 
which he wrote on March 2, 1929, to Daniel C. Boney, Insurance 
Commissioner of North Carolina. The letter indicates that if Daw­
son did not engineer the entire transaction, it was done with his full 
knowledge and consent. The letter stated the following: “ On the 
occasion of my calling Superintendent of Insurance Baldwin on 
the long distance telephone today in regard to another matter, he 
tells me that you have been worried about the financial condition 
of The National Benefit Life Insurance Company of Washington, 
D. C. . . . I well recall receiving a letter from you some time 
last summer in which you indicated that you thought the loan obtained
15 Quoted from Fackler and Breiby, op. cit., Report No. 1, p. 12.
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by Rutherford, Smith and Rutherford from the National Park Bank 
as of December 31st, to underwrite the heavy subscription of stock 
prior to distribution of same in small lots, was a liability to the 
National Benefit and should so be set up in the statement. I did not at 
the time burden you with a lengthy explanation and point out the 
error of your reasoning from an accounting standpoint, because I ex­
pected to see you shortly and preferred to wait until then and give 
you complete details of the whole transaction and I will not now 
so burden you with a long letter other than to tell you that any 
liability on the National Benefit’s part as of December 31st was 
only after all other manner of payment had failed. The liability 
to the company was so contingent and remote as a liability on the 
part of the company that the examiners could not even set it up as a 
liability. In fact it was too contingent to even call for a footnote 
on the statement; and as evidence and proof in regard thereto, 
permit me to state that $103,500 was paid off on the note by the 
borrowers, Rutherford, Smith and Rutherford, on December 27,
1928. . . . The net sale value of the collateral deposited by the 
borrowers and their friends with the National Park Bank on their 
loan of $382,500 was $588,123, and in addition thereto life insur­
ance policies on the lives of borrowers amounting approximately 
to $120,000. For your advance information (I mention as advance 
for the reason that the Annual Statement at December 31st being 
verified by the Insurance Department examiners is not yet out nor 
will it be for a while) upon payment of $103,500 to the National 
Park Bank, the borrowers obtained a loan on December 27, 1928 
from the Central National Bank of Cleveland, Ohio, of $279,000 
depositing as collateral securities having a net value of $588,123, 
the proceeds of which loan with the Central National is invested 
in a certificate of deposit of $279,000 payable to the order of the 
National Benefit Life Insurance Company on 30 days’ notice and 
bearing 31/£% interest. . . . The renewal of the balance due the 
National Park Bank was switched to the Central for the reason that 
the Central National would allow 31/ 2 % interest on the certificate of 
deposit and I anticipate that with the subscriptions to voting trust 
certificates already in hand at December 27, 1928, and the installment 
payments which they will collect in 1929 on such 1928 subscriptions, 
together with the subscriptions to voting trust certificates received in 
the first six months of this year, there will be a very small balance, if 
any, outstanding as of December 27, 1 9 2 9 .... As a matter of fact the 
underwriting syndicate, Rutherford, Smith and Rutherford, could 
have still further reduced the amount of their loan at December 27, 
1928, but inasmuch as the original certificates of deposit at the
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National Park were for $103,000 and $279,000, it appeared to me, in 
order to make a cleanout record of the same, advisable to substitute or 
exchange as of a given date the higher interest bearing certificate of 
deposit of the Central National for the certificate of deposit of the 
National Park for a like amount. . . .  If you so wish, I will obtain 
either photostatic records or have copies made of all of the various 
resolutions, letters, etc. in connection with this transaction, as well as 
the closing out of the National Park transaction, but wish to assure 
you, Commissioner Boney, that while the National Benefit Life Insur­
ance Company has its problems concerned with the Standard Life 
Division Policyholders’ account, its own assets will liquidate at a profit 
and it had no liabilities other than as set forth in its statement. I 
have been accused of unduly marking down assets and also of setting 
up unnecessary reserves, but in twenty years’ experience in dealing 
with large and small companies, as well as fraternals, I have never 
been accused of—nor have I—underestimated liabilities” .16
Dawson was also active in effecting the voting trust agreement 
by which the National Benefit was controlled. The voting trust 
agreement that he drew up was read at the directors’ meeting of 
January 7, 1928. In it he named the Rutherfords and Smith as 
trustees. The final voting trust agreement was dated March 21, 1928 
and named the Rutherfords and Smith, as well as Charles B. Lee, 
treasurer, as trustees. The voting trust controlled 13,484 shares 
of the company’s stock. Of this 13,078 shares, including the 9,000 
shares discussed above, stood in the name of the Rutherfords and 
Smith; 328 shares in the name of Charles B. Lee; and 74 shares in 
the names of employees. The stock was deposited with the Guaranty 
Trust Company of New York City which by the terms of agreement 
was appointed registrar and transfer agent. In place of the stock 
deposited with it the Guaranty Trust Company issued voting trust 
certificates. The 13,078 shares of stock held as collateral for the 
loan by which the 9,000 shares were “sold”  was exchanged for 
voting trust certificates.
The plan apparently was to sell the voting trust certificates of 
the Rutherfords and Smith and apply the proceeds to paying off 
the loan at the bank. The voting trust agreement was entered into 
because the sale of 9,000 shares of stock, when the Rutherfords and 
Smith together held only 4,078, might cause the Rutherfords and 
Smith to lose control of the company. However, as arrangements 
for sale of voting trust certificates were made, the underwriting 
syndicate (Rutherfords and Smith) was unable to withdraw certifi­
cates for delivery. To circumvent this, the syndicate issued and
16 Report No. 2, op. cit., Appendix D.
82
sold, in lieu of voting trust certificates, interim certificates. These 
were merely promises of the syndicate to make future delivery of 
voting trust certificates.
In these and other financial arrangements Dawson made for 
the company, all of which were, on the whole, quite ingenious and 
might have achieved their purposes under different circumstances, 
the fact that the National Benefit was a small company and that it 
did not have a steady, dependable flow of revenue, sources of credit, 
and a market for stock, was lost sight of. However, it was prin­
cipally, due to Dawson’s skill in financial techniques, that receivership 
or dissolution was not forced upon the company sooner. But in 
accomplishing this, which later proved not to have been the wisest 
procedure, it appears that he had violated the ethics of his pro­
fession. On June 21, 1981, Dawson committed suicide. The tragedy 
occurred four days after the downfall of the Rutherfords and the 
election of John Risher as president of the company.
A Maze of Manipulation
Investigations of the books of the National Benefit revealed a 
maze of manipulation. The omissions and doubtful classifications 
found in the books “were not usually the fault or error of the ac­
counting department, but arose from the practice of the executive 
officers (especially the two Rutherfords and Smith) of carrying out 
transactions which were never entered on the books at all, delayed in 
entry for a long period, or wholly misstated when entered” .17 The 
equities were confused between the Standard Life Division and the 
National Benefit Division. There were irregularities in transactions 
with the subsidiary, the Citizens’ Trust Company of Atlanta. For 
the period between January 1st and July 30th, 1931, according to 
the bank’s statements, $31,980.70 of checks were paid that did not 
appear on the company’s books. The books were so out of line with 
actual facts that frequent “correcting” or “ adjusting” entries were 
necessary. One such entry dated December 31, 1930 and made by 
P. J. McDermott, then assistant to Dawson, filled several pages and 
affected nearly every account of the general ledger.
These attempts of the officers to maintain solvency “ on the 
books” and thereby forestall legal bankruptcy only delayed the inevi­
table failure. For several years prior to its failure the National 
Benefit had been nothing more than a living corpse. In the later 
years investment principles were disregarded and many of the com­
pany’s transactions, its speculation in stocks and bonds, for example, 
were simply the frantic efforts of the doomed to grasp anything that 
offered a semblance of hope.
17 Fackler and Breiby, op. cit., Report of Condition, Appendix B, p. 3.
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C h a pt e r  V
THE COMPANY AND STATE EXAMINATIONS
As in the ease of other Negro financial institutions, state author­
ities appeared to be extremely lax in forcing a strict observance of 
the law by the National Benefit. As stated by Fackler and Breiby: 
“ The eventual loss to the policyholders was increased by the reinsur­
ance of the Standard Life business, and still further increased by the 
subsequent manipulation and transactions, which took place during 
the several postponements, or continuances, of official examinations.” 1 
These conditions which aggravated the loss to policyholders came 
about with the knowledge, and in one instance, the consent of insur­
ance departments. Why the state insurance departments concerned 
approved the reinsurance of the Standard Life business or why some 
action was not taken by the insurance examiners when it was al­
legedly known by six of them that the National Benefit had a deficit 
of $228,724.26 in 1926, has never been explained. Still more puzzling 
is why several state insurance departments consented to the suppres­
sion of a report of an examination which disclosed irregular trans­
actions and a deficit. Other questions have arisen concerning the 
integrity and efficiency of the state insurance departments, under 
whose jurisdiction the National Benefit operated, and particularly 
the District of Columbia Insurance Department which had direct 
regulatory powers over the home office. A typical instance of the 
regulation of the National Benefit by state insurance departments 
may be seen in the minutes of a hearing on the National Benefit Life 
Insurance Company by Arkansas, Alabama, Oklahoma, Missouri, Ken­
tucky, and the District of Columbia at the Gibson Hotel in Cincin­
nati, Ohio, on September 26, 1927. According to the minutes of the 
meeting:
A full and complete discussion was had of the National 
Benefit Insurance Company and a complete review of the 
situation having to do with the reinsurance of the Stand­
ard Life of Arkansas by Hon. Frank N. Julian [Supt. Ins.,
Ala.] . . . Actuary Speakman discussed the various mat­
ters relative to the affairs of the National Benefit Life In­
surance Company, and in view of the conditions as re­
ported, it was agreed by all present that the examination 
now being conducted should be continued [postponed] and 
a report prepared as of December 31, 1927; this continu-
1 Fackler and Breiby, Report No. 2, op. cit., p. 23.
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ance being granted in order to enable the company to ad­
just a number of its affairs, with advice to the examiners 
that if matters complained of were not adjusted by Nov­
ember 1, 1927, another conference was to be called at the 
discretion of the examiners.2
The minutes continue:
After considerable discussion concerning the examination 
generally, the following motion was duly made, seconded 
and carried unanimously:
Whereas, in the fall of 1926, the insurance de­
partments of Alabama, Arkansas, and Okla­
homa demanded an examination of the Stand­
ard Life Insurance Company of Arkansas and 
the transactions leading up to the formation 
of the Standard Life Insurance Company of 
Arkansas; and
Whereas, on or about December, 1926, an ex­
amination of the Standard Life Insurance Com­
pany of Arkansas was arranged with the 
states of Alabama, Arkansas and Oklahoma; 
and
Whereas, upon starting the examination, it was 
learned that the Standard Life Insurance Com­
pany of Arkansas had entered into negotiations 
with the National Benefit Life Insurance Com­
pany of Washington, D. C., and had in January,
1927, consummated a reinsurance contract, the 
Department of Insurance of the District of 
Columbia was invited to join with Alabama, 
Arkansas and Oklahoma in making said exam­
ination. The examination progressed and the 
reinsurance agreement with the National Bene­
fit Life Insurance Company was consummated. 
Following the examination, a hearing was held 
in the city of Washington, during the month 
of June 1927. At said meeting, Arkansas, Ala­
bama and Oklahoma instructed the examiners 
to proceed with an examination of the National 
Benefit Life Insurance Company at the earliest 
possible date, and request the District of Col­
umbia and Kentucky to join therein.
’ ibid., pp. 18-19.
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The examinations referred to seem to have been conducted by F. 
M. Speakman, representing Arkansas, Alabama and Oklahoma, and 
P. J. McDermott representing the District of Columbia. A report 
of this examination is not available. However, there are two reports, 
both dated May 1, 1928, of another examination conducted by F. M. 
Speakman. The examination was made for the states of Alabama, 
Arkansas, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Missouri, and the District of Colum­
bia. One copy of each report was allegedly sent to the following six 
state insurance officials:
1. T. M. Baldwin, Superintendent of Insurance, D. C.
2. Geo. H. Thigpen, Superintendent of Insurance, Alabama.
3. J. S. Maloney, Insurance Commissioner, Arkansas.
4. S. M. Soufley, Insurance Commissioner, Kentucky.
5. J. G. Read, Insurance Commissioner, Oklahoma.
6. Ben C. Hyde, Superintendent of Insurance, Missouri.
One report revealed the deficit and the other damaging facts about 
the National Benefit. Another report concealed them. The latter 
was accepted and approved by the following:
1. J. M. Baldwin, Superintendent of Insurance, D. C.
2. Geo. H. Thigpen, Superintendent of Insurance, Alabama.
3. S. M. Soufley, Insurance Commissioner, Kentucky.
4. Robert E. Daly, Actuary, Insurance Department, Missouri.
5. J. G. Read, Insurance Commissioner, Oklahoma.
This latter report was filed and became the official report for the 
company as of December 31, 1927. In this “ official” report certain 
facts revealing the condition of the company were omitted. The fol­
lowing statement appeared in the suppressed report:
The annual statements for the years under examination 
were verified and found to agree insofar as the company’s 
books were concerned, the differences, consisting prin­
cipally of various liabilities not reported in their annual 
statements.8
In the “ official” report the same statement read as follows:
The annual statements submitted to the insurance depart­
ments for the years under consideration were verified, 
and the figures therein found to be in accordance with 
the company’s books.4
Similarly, the suppressed report carried the following two para­
graphs which were entirely deleted from the “ official” report:
We are attaching to this report “ Exhibits #2 and #3” 
Comparative Financial Statements of the National Bene-
' i b i d Appendix.
‘ ibid.
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fit Life Insurance Company as of December 31, 1926, 
showing the differences between the assets and liabilities 
as reported by the company and as determined by your 
examiners.
You will note that the company reported a surplus of 
$150,000 and a Special Contingent Reserve of $2,359.44, 
whereas we show a deficit, including capital stocks, of 
$228,724.26. We have commented on the differences under 
their respective headings.5
The following paragraphs concerning stock transactions were also
omitted from the filed report:
On December 31, 1926, the Company increased its capital 
stock account the sum of $14,550.00 and its surplus ac­
count the sum of $135,450.00 through money borrowed 
from the Delta Penny Savings Bank of Indianola, Miss., 
and the Solvent Savings Bank of Memphis, Tenn., in the 
names of M. F. Smith, C. B. King, and T. W. Johnson, the 
banks crediting the account of the company the amount so 
borrowed. According to the books of the company, the 
stock was sold to R. H. Rutherford, President; S. W. Ruth­
erford, Secretary and M. F. Smith, Assistant Secretary,
King and Johnson, totalling $150,000.00 was repaid by the 
company during the year 1927 and charged to the follow­
ing accounts:
1. H. I. Brown, Collateral Loan....$ 75,000.00
2. M. F. Smith, Loan.......................  4,000.00
3. Commissions to Officers.............  13,675.00
4. Cash rec’d on sale of stock......... 31,575.58
5. Cash deficit in Liberty
National Bank.............................  32,185.75
Total...........$156,436.33
In May, 1927, the Company sent $90,000.00 to the Solvent 
Savings Bank to pay off some of the notes of Smith, King, 
and Johnson, and put the expenditure on their books in 
the form of a collateral loan to C. B. Rollins, and made it 
appear that C. B. Rollins paid off his loan on June 30, 
1927, when in reality the $90,000.00 was repaid in the form 
of a collateral loan to H. I. Brown, an employee of the 
company, amounting to $75,000.00 and the balance of 
$15,000.00 from funds received through the sale of their 
stock and not entered on the Company’s books. The H. I.
* ibid.
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Brown loan was put on the books of the Company as of 
July 5,1927, and when questioned, Brown admitted that he 
merely acted as a straw man in the transaction and did not 
receive the money or put up any collateral.
The M. F. Smith loan, amounting to $4,000.00, was used 
to help pay off the notes and was charged on the company’s 
books to an account called Miscellaneous.
Commissions were paid to the officers of the company 
amounting to $13,675.00 on account of the stock which 
was sold them, according to the books, and this amount 
was used to apply on the notes.
The Company received cash in the amount of $31,575.58 
through sales of their Capital Stock, and this amount 
was not entered on their books, but was used to pay off 
the notes of Smith, King and Johnson.
The Company transferred cash from time to time to the 
Liberty National Bank, and according to the Company’s 
books, had a balance in that bank of $32,185.75, when in 
reality the account had been closed and the funds used 
to pay off the notes.
The Company in addition to paying off the notes of Smith, 
King and Johnson in full, paid interest on them, amount­
ing to $6,436.33.
The officers of the Company state that they consummated 
the above transaction to show a large surplus in their 
Financial Statement as of December 31, 1926, so that 
there would be no question as to their financial condi­
tion in acquiring the Standard Life Insurance Company, 
which Company was acquired in January 1927. It ap­
pears to have been the intention of the officers to sell 
the stock to the public and pay off the notes with the pro­
ceeds, but the bank called for payment before they had a 
chance to dispose of the stock.
Your examiners, in eliminating the above transaction in 
its entirety, and recalculating the Company’s non-ledger 
assets and liabilities as of December 31, 1926, showed the 
Company to be insolvent by the amount of $68,274.26, 
and at a meeting of the Insurance Commissioners held 
at Cincinnati on September 26, 1927, [hearing mentioned 
above] at which a representative of the company was 
present, it was agreed to allow the company a limited 
time in which to make good the amount required, and 
it was finally decided to bring the report down to De-
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cember 31, 1927, in order to give the company sufficient 
time to make good this amount.
This insolvent condition of the company on December 
31, 1926, was caused principally by their writing entirely 
too much business for their surplus. In the company’s 
annual statement for the year 1926 to the insurance 
departments, the market value of real estate owned was 
increased arbitrarily and various liabilities not included.
Your examiners, in arriving at the above insolvency, 
secured appraisals during the course of the examination 
on the company’s real estate, allowing them the values 
secured, and set up all liabilities of the company.
With respect to the reserve it was stated in the suppressed report 
that:
On December 31, 1926, the Company arbitrarily reduced 
its industrial insurance in force by the sum of $300,000 
to take care of probable lapses. Your examiners do not 
approve of this method, and would recommend that the 
company report all business in force in the future and 
value the policies accordingly.
In the suppressed report it was noted that although insolvent, “ In 
May, 1927, the company declared a dividend of six per cent on the 
shares outstanding” .8
It appears that another examination was made as of December 
31, 1928. Such an examination was referred to in a letter by 
T. M. Baldwin, then Superintendent of Insurance of the District of 
Columbia, to the executive officers of the Company advising them 
of the action taken at a hearing on the National Benefit Life Insur­
ance Company at Chicago, on June 4, 1929. Mr. Baldwin stated:
At the hearing held at the Edgewater Beach Hotel, Chi­
cago, on June 4, 1929, for the purpose of considering the 
financial condition of your company at December 31, 1928, 
as found by the examiners representing the Insurance 
Departments of Alabama, Arkansas, District of Colum­
bia, Kentucky, Missouri, and Oklahoma, set forth in the 
annual statement as submitted, I was instructed to ac­
quaint you with the various matters under consideration 
and advise you directly concerning certain resolutions 
unanimously adopted.
For your information, the Insurance Department of 
North Carolina was invited to participate in the hearing 
. . . After a general discussion of the Company’s
•ibid.
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affairs the financial statement at December 31, 1928 was 
approved as set up by the examiners, but no formal 
written report was requested covering transactions for 
the year of 1928.
It was unanimously agreed by all those present that, 
pending the outcome of the transactions of the Company 
for the year 1929, consideration be deferred in the matter 
of a further examination and final report.
On motion made, duly seconded and unanimously carried, 
it was Resolved, that Superintendent of Insurance Bald­
win be and hereby is requested to inform the Company’s 
chief executive officers of the exceptions taken by the 
insurance departments in regard to certain real estate 
holdings and bond investments of the company, and fur­
ther instruct the Company that all investments shall here­
after be subject to the approval of Mr. Alfred B. Dawson.
Mr. Dawson promised on behalf of the Company to advise 
the insurance departments represented at this hearing in 
regard to the status of the investments in bonds and real 
estate as of June 30, 1929, and what transactions have 
taken place in the interim to carry out the Department’s 
recommendations, and to also advise as to what program 
had been agreed upon to bring about an early improve­
ment in the present investment situation.7
These hearings and examinations were a source of considerable 
expense to the Company. For example, the expenses of the insur­
ance commissioners of Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Oklahoma, 
Missouri, and South Carolina for attendance at a hearing on De­
cember 5, 1927 amounted to $1,468.80. Similar expenses for a 
hearing on May 14, 1928, amounted to $1,950.67 and on May 28, 
1929, $500,00. This, of course, was in addition to the direct work 
on examinations. F. M. Speakman and his associate, E. P. Higgins, 
actuaries for several state insurance departments on examinations of 
the National Benefit, made charges as follows for actuarial services in 
connection with official examinations: $42,973.25 for 1927; $24,783.51 
for 1928; $9,726.30 for 1929; and $630 for 1930— a total of $78,113.06.
P. J. McDermott, Special Examiner for the District of Columbia, 
drew the following sums for actuarial services in connection with 
official examinations and reports: $11,390.00 in 1927; $10,352.84 in 
1928; $10,551.65 in 1929; $15,376.29 in 1930; and $8,684.17 in 1931— 
a total of $56,354.95.
Payments to Miles M. Dawson and Son, the Company’s actuaries,
'ibid.
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were far in excess of those already cited. For the same years they 
received the following: $30,647.81 in 1927; $52,054.47 in 1928; $46,- 
874.24 in 1929; $66,833.46 in 1930; and $44,661.64 in the first six 
months of 1931— a total of $241,071.62. For the same period there 
was paid to the legal firm of Dawson and Dawson, of which A. B. 
Dawson was a member, the sum of $7,354.20. In addition to the fore­
going, payments amounting to $2,975.10 in 1927 and $772.00 in 1928 
were made to Fackler and Breiby, another firm of actuaries. Thus, in 
a period of approximately four and one-half years the National Bene­
fit paid $392,534.40 for examinations and actuarial services.
Though large sums were paid for actuarial services the efforts 
of the actuaries were not directed primarily towards the formulation 
of a sound underwriting policy. While the actuaries did realize the 
uniqueness and difficulties of the underwriting problem of the Na­
tional Benefit, investment problems because of their critical char­
acter monopolized most of their time and attention.
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Chapter VI
COLLAPSE STUDIED FROM COURT RECORDS
The receivership of the National Benefit was the result of the 
petition of an officer of the company rather than the action of the 
District of Columbia Insurance Department. John R. Pinkett, for­
mer vice-president and agency director, instituted the action which 
resulted in receivership for the company. Pinkett had formerly 
been agency director for the Standard Life Insurance and resigned 
when the Standard Life was taken over by the Southern Insurance 
Company. His resignation was in protest against the manner in 
which the deal between the Standard Life and the Southern was 
carried out. As agency director for the National Benefit it had 
been his duty to present the company to the public. Because of this 
many policyholders and agents looked to him for an explanation 
of the rumors concerning the financial status of the company. This 
and the desire to clear himself of responsibility for the condition of 
the company probably prompted his action in instituting the suit 
against the company. In his “Bill for Receivership and Dissolution” 
filed September 10, 1931, or the case of John Randolph Pinkett 
versus The National Benefit Life Insurance Company,1 a clear ac­
count of the financial condition is given. He alleged:
That plaintiff [John R. Pinkett] has been employed by 
or connected with the defendant corporation since Feb­
ruary 10, 1925; his employment being Agency Director, 
Ordinary Department, and thereafter, on February 26,
1931; he became Third Vice-President and Manager of 
Agencies in charge of the entire field forces, being then 
elected a member of the Board of Directors and a member 
of the Executive Committee.
That up to said time, the employment of plaintiff 
was such that he had no knowledge of what was being 
done by the officers and executives of the company and he 
had no means of ascertaining and was therefore without 
any suspicion as to any improprieties or misconduct on 
the part of any officer or employee of the company, 
having full faith in the integrity of all, and believing 
that said company was in all respects financially sound 
and that its investments were made with care and caution.
1 Petition for Receivership and Dissolution, Equity No. 53,391, D. C. Supreme 
Court, John R. Pinkett v. National Benefit Life Insurance Company.
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That some few months after the elevation or ad­
vancement of plaintiff, that is, in June, 1931, plaintiff 
obtained information and knowledge of facts and cir­
cumstances in connection with the conduct of the com­
pany, its chai'acter of investments, and its methods of 
doing business, which aroused him and disturbed him to 
the extent that he sought the advice of his personal counsel 
as to his duty, his obligations to the policyholders, and his 
rights as an officer and director of said Company. That 
upon the advice of said counsel, he continued observing 
the affairs of the company and sought to avoid doing any­
thing that would disturb or affect the financial standing 
of the company, but at all times being concerned and 
becoming more and more concerned as to what was being 
done, and to what was the real financial status of the 
Company.
That the plaintiff learned others were becoming dis­
turbed and that others were seeking to ascertain what 
was the real situation, what was the financial status of 
the Company, what was the condition of the assets of 
the Company, the investments, etc., with the final result 
that plaintiff became so disturbed that he would have 
insisted upon some legal action, except for the fact that 
the officers of said company signified a willingness to 
thrash out the differences and to give the full facts, all 
resulting finally in the plaintiff’s tendering his resignation 
and seeking to sever his connection with said Company, 
which said resignation was tendered on June 17, 1931. 
That at said time, the President of said Company, the 
First Vice-President and Chairman of the Board, the 
Second Vice-President and Comptroller, the Fourth Vice- 
President and Medical Director, and the Treasurer, all 
resigned; and the present officers of said Company were 
elevated in their place and stead. Upon invitation from 
said newly elected officers your plaintiff permitted them 
to re-elect him as an officer of said company in the ca­
pacity of Second Vice-President and Manager of Agencies, 
which position he now holds and has held since that date. 
This position was accepted by plaintiff after he had ad­
vised with the Commissioner of Insurance of the District 
of Columbia, and had requested of said Commissioner of 
Insurance that an examination be made at once into the 
affairs of said Company, and further after he was advised
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by the present President of said Company that they, like 
your plaintiff, were desirous of having, and would request 
an authorization of the authorities of the several states 
where the company was doing business, to make a full 
examination and investigation into the financial status 
and affairs of the company, its investments, the conduct 
of the former officers, and to furnish the present officers 
(including your plaintiff) with a full analysis and state­
ment as to the financial condition of the company and all 
of its obligations and the condition of all of its assets 
and investments.
That since the election of the new Board, your 
plaintiff has been diligently examining and looking into 
the affairs of the company, its investments, its capital, its 
outstanding obligations, its general financial status, and 
has advised from day to day with representatives of the 
several Insurance Departments which are now making 
an examination of, and who have for some time been 
examining into the affairs of said company, with the 
result that the folowing facts have been developed and 
admitted to be facts by the present officers of said com­
pany, or most of the present officers, all of which facts, 
however, existed and were in fact in existence at the time 
of the election of the present Board of Directors and 
Officers of said Company, that is to say:
1. That there is at the present time outstanding, due and 
unpaid to policyholders for death, sick and accident 
claims, a sum in excess of $100,000.
2. That there is now due, outstanding and unpaid to 
policyholders by way of surrender values and policy loans 
a sum totaling about $150,000. All represented by de­
mands and claims of said policyholders upon the Com­
pany.
3. That in 1927, one R. H. Rutherford, S. W. Rutherford, 
and Mortimer F. Smith, who were at that time in charge 
of said Company as President, Secretary and General 
Manager, and Assistant Secretary, of the defendant 
corporation, entered into a certain agreement whereby 
and under the terms of which, they undertook to pur­
chase 9,000 shares of capital stock of the defendant 
corporation, which said 9,000 shares of capital stock 
[were], as represented by them, then in the treasury of
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corporation and unsold. The consideration to be paid the 
Company by the said parties for said stock being $50 
per share, less $7.50 per share, to cover selling expenses 
which was supplemented by a further agreement by an 
adidtional charge of $2.50 per share, or a total of $10.00 
per share, which entitled the company under the terms 
of said purchase and sale to $360,000 in cash.
4. That there was then issued on the books of the com­
pany certificates representing 9,000 shares of stock, 
which certificates were signed by the said R. H. Ruther­
ford, and S. W. Rutherford, as President and Secretary 
of said defendant corporation, or by others designated 
by them for said purpose, and said stock was delivered 
to, or taken by the said R. H. Rutherford, S. W. Ruther­
ford, and Mortimer F. Smith, and placed in a bank or 
trust company as security for an alleged loan of $382,500, 
which said loan, however, was guaranteed by the de­
fendant corporation, and for which said loan not a single 
cent was ever paid into the treasury of the defendant 
corporation by the said R. H. Rutherford, S. W. Ruther­
ford, and Mortimer F. Smith, or by any other person 
for or on their behalf, although the said R. H. Rutherford,
5. W. Rutherford, and Mortimer F. Smith claim to have 
paid into the treasury of the company $103,500 in the 
Potomac Joint Stock Land Bank bonds, $29,000 worth of 
miscellaneous mortgages which have been shown since to 
have no appreciable value.
5. That plaintiff is advised that there was a certain note 
executed by the said R. H. Rutherford, S. W. Rutherford, 
and Mortimer F. Smith at the Guardian Trust Company 
of Cleveland, Ohio, under the date of December 27, 1929 
in the sum of $250,000 payable in 365 days, and renewed 
in December 1930, for another period of 365 days, with 
interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum, payable 
monthly; and that plaintiff is advised and upon such 
advice states that in fact the said makers thereof under­
took to obligate the Company by a guaranty or endorse­
ment of some nature, the payment of the full sum of said 
$250,000 with interest; and plaintiff is advised that this 
$250,000 represents the same obligation, above referred 
to, originally in the sum of $382,500. That interest on 
said note is overdue and unpaid.
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6. That plaintiff is advised and informed, and upon such 
advice and information states that there has been sold 
to various agents and representatives of the Company 
and to other persons, a number of shares of stock, which 
sales were made or undertaken to be made by the said 
R. H. Rutherford, S. W. Rutherford, and Mortimer F. 
Smith and that there has been paid to the said R. H. 
Rutherford, S. W. Rutherford, and Mortimer F. Smith 
by the prospective shareholders a very considerable sum 
of money, which sum of money was from time to time 
deposited in a local bank of the District of Columbia to 
the credit of R. H. Rutherford, S. W. Rutherford, and 
Mortimer F. Smith. That plaintiff is advised that there 
is in said bank to the credit of said account at this time a 
small sum of money and about $93,000 in promissory 
notes. That the makers of said notes, and the various 
and sundry persons who executed and signed agree­
ments to purchase various and sundry shares of stock, or 
many of them are now demanding that the defendant 
corporation pay to them the money paid to the said R. H. 
Rutherford, S. W. Rutherford, and Mortimer F. Smith, 
upon the ground that these certain parties were officers 
of the defendant corporation and the defendant corpora­
tion is therefore liable for their acts and should return to 
them the money paid, which sum so paid aggregate in 
excess of $100,000; that at least one suit has been insti­
tuted, and, it is believed that many more suits will be 
instituted within the next ten days unless some action is 
taken by the court on this petition.
7. That the said former officers of said company, or some 
of them entered into a speculative stock and bond account 
with Stein Bros, and Boyce which account was opened on 
October 31, 1927 and which account shows a loss to the 
Company of $462,355.20.2
After the forced resignation of the Rutherfords and the election 
of John T. Risher and his regime, Pinkett was re-elected an officer 
and director because his stand and views were shared by some of 
the new officers. This fact, namely, that the principal officers of 
the Company were in accord with the plaintiff in an action against 3
3 ibid.
96
the Company indicated that no defense of the suit would be made. 
Thus, other interested parties entered the suit as intervenors.
At the time Pinkett’s petition was filed the license of the com­
pany was being revoked in several states, receivership action was 
being rumored in others, and in Georgia an action for receivership 
was actually pending and the assets of the Company in that state 
were being held by the authorities. In view of this and the allega­
tions set forth in Pinkett’s bill, which later proved to be substantially 
correct, Pinkett asked the court for the appointment of a receiver 
and the dissolution of the Company. This bill precipitated litiga­
tion which has not as yet terminated. Meanwhile the remaining 
assets of the company have all but completely disappeared and no 
distribution to stockholders, policyholders, or ordinary creditors 
has been as yet made.
The first intervening petition to be filed was that of Charles 
B. Lee, a director and former treasurer of the Company. Lee 
charged that the appointment of a receiver would be inimical to the 
interests of policyholders, stockholders, and creditors and that the 
bill of complaint was not filed in good faith. He averred that 
Pinkett filed the bill in collusion with the new president of the com­
pany, John T. Risher, who, it was alleged, prepared the answer to 
the bill before it was filed.3 This intervening petition was the first 
of many that were filed. The intervening petitions give some indi­
cation of the factionalism in a controversy which was so involved 
that it was impossible to organize any single group with the same 
general interest. The directors, stockholders, policyholders were 
divided into several cliques, each fighting the other. It appears that 
the directors were first split into two camps. When Pinkett brought 
his action the Rutherfords, of course, were opposed to it. Louis C. 
Washington and Charles B. Lee, Treasurer and Comptroller, re­
spectively, both rather large stockholders, and although officers and 
directors of the company, had no intimate acquaintance with its 
affairs. At first they were inclined to join the Rutherfords. How­
ever, after many criminal and civil suits were brought against the 
Rutherfords, the Rutherfords did not take an active part in opposing 
Pinkett’s suit. This left their camp without leadership. Washing­
ton and Lee afterwards appear to have acted at times independently 
and at times in unison. Risher and Pinkett continued vigorously to 
press for the appointment of a receiver. But in his attempt to con­
trol the affairs of the Company, Risher sought to stave off the 
appointment of receivers in several states until a decision was 
rendered in this case. 3
3 Affidavit of Charles B. Lee.
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The affidavit of Louis C. Washington, filed shortly after the 
Pinkett petition, revealed a matter which caused concern. It was 
considered important by the clique to obtain the appointment of a 
receiver friendly to it. Each wanted to be permitted to exercise 
some control over the Company, or at least be connected with it. 
The Washington affidavit stated:
. . . That pursuant to the call of the President, a
meeting of the Executive Committee of the Board of 
Directors of the National Benefit Life Insurance Com­
pany was held at 4 p. m., Thursday, September 10, 1931. 
The President, John T. Risher, in calling the committee to 
order, stated that the purpose of the meeting was to 
inform the comittee that Mr. John R. Pinkett, one of the 
members of said committee and Second Vice-President of 
The National Benefit Life Insurance Company, had filed 
suit in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, 
praying for a receivership and dissolution of the Com­
pany. Mr. Risher stated that he, Mr. Pinkett, W. Gwynne 
Gardiner, the five colored lawyers for the Company and 
Insurance Commissioner Davis, had been in conference 
for several days over the subject of a receivership, and 
over the best thing to do, and the best way to go about 
securing the appointment of a receiver; that Mr. Davis 
had secured permission from the District Commissioners 
to act as receiver, provided he would serve without com­
pensation. That all the lawyers for the stockholders of 
the Company had trained their guns upon him (Risher) 
and wanted to put him out, ‘but they are going to find me
hard as h------ to get rid of’ ; that he realized he might be
subject to criticism for conducting such negotiations with­
out knowledge and consent of other members of the 
Board and Executive Committee, but nevertheless, he 
and Mr. Pinkett had decided the course which they had 
followed was for the best interest of all concerned; that 
due to much unfavorable publicity during the last pre­
ceding weeks, he feared that some person unfriendly to 
the present administration might seek a receivership and 
in that event a receiver unfriendly to the existing admin­
istration might be appointed and ‘somebody on the out­
side might beat them to it’ . He recommended that the 
Executive Committee adopt a resolution recommending 
the appointment of Commissioner Davis as receiver and
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recommending to the meeting of the Board of Directors 
which would be called for the following day, Friday, 
September 11, that the company’s attorneys be instructed 
to concur in the allegations set forth in Mr. Pinkett’s bill 
and consent to the receivership. This the Executive Com­
mittee refused to do.4
From this point on, factionalism increased. Personal attacks 
were frequent in the succeeding petitions. Charles B. Lee in his 
intervening petition upon the question of appointment of a receiver 
gives some indication of the personal bitterness which had developed 
in the controversy. He made a severe attack on Risher in an 
attempt to dislodge him as president of the company and vigorously 
opposed the appointment of any person suggested by Risher or 
Pinkett as receiver. He charged that Risher had been derelict in 
his duty to the company both as agent in the transaction involving 
the purchase of the Masonic Temple and as president. He men­
tioned the $25,000 commission received by Risher from the Masonic 
organization and an additional $10,000 received from the National 
Benefit with the implication that the money received by Risher was 
not in accord with the services rendered and that the $10,000 was 
not received in due course of business. The petition continued:
Your petitioner further avers that it is the duty of 
the directors of defendant corporation, and if a receiver 
be appointed, it will be the duty of said receiver, to investi­
gate all the matters hereinbefore related concerning said 
John T. Risher, and if it should appear proper, to demand 
and compel an accounting by and from him, the said 
John T. Risher.
But the matter which apparently was of even greater concern to 
Lee, was the selection of a person for receiver, if receivership was 
not to be avoided.
Your petitioner [he stated] further respectfully rep­
resents to this Honorable Court and respectfully urges 
that no receiver should be appointed from or among, or 
upon the recommendation of any officer, director, stock­
holder, or any person interested in said corporation, nor 
from any present or former attorney or attorneys of said 
defendant corporation or of any of its officers, directors,
‘ Affidavit of Louis B. Washington.
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or stockholders, but that a receiver, if one be appointed, 
should be selected by this Court without any recommenda­
tion or suggestion whatsoever by or from any officer, 
director, or other person interested in the affairs of said 
defendant corporation or any former or present attorneys 
for said defendant corporation or any of its officers, 
directors, stockholders, or other interested persons.
Your petitioner further respectfully urges that this 
Court should not appoint any person recommended by said 
Risher and said Pinkett and/or their attorneys, and espe­
cially should not appoint the person heretofore recom­
mended by them, namely, Herbert L. Davis, esq. . . .
Lee’s complaint appears to have carried considerable weight 
with the court and helped to shape the opinion on which later its 
ruling was based. The opinion of Deputy Superintendent Bryan 
of the Insurance Department as reported in the petition is identical 
to that which the court expressed later. The petition stated:
That petitioner’s attorney asked said Deputy Super­
intendent Bryan whether, in his opinion, the capital stock 
of said company was impaired, and if so, whether or not 
said company could be saved from utter failure and could be 
rehabilitated under proper management, and said Deputy 
Superintendent Bryan replied to your petitioner’s attorney 
that it was his opinion at the present time, especially on ac­
count of the filing of suit for receivership in the state of 
Georgia and the cancellation of the license of said defend­
ant corporation in a number of states, it seemed advisable 
that a temporary receiver be appointed; that it was his 
firm belief that if a properly qualified receiver be ap­
pointed, the company could be saved and rehabilitated and 
resume a successful and profitable business.
While taking a stand similar to that of Charles B. Lee, with 
reference to the selection of a receiver, Louis C. Washington indi­
cates in his petition that many negotiations were carried on among 
interested parties over the question. Each party was interested in 
perpetuating his relationship with the company. But unable to 
secure the appointment of a receiver which would make this possible, 
they preferred to have an entirely impartial one appointed. Above 
all, no party desired an appointment backed by another faction. Ac­
cording to Washington’s petition:
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On Wednesday, September 16, 1931, one R. R. Church 
(against whom petitioner makes no reflections whatever), 
acting as representative of said John T. Risher and as 
‘go-between’ between petitioner and said Risher, proposed 
to petitioner that he agree to the appointment of said 
Risher as receiver under an agreement that Risher as 
receiver would retain the present personnel of the com­
pany (of whom petitioner is one) ; petitioner declined the 
proposal, Mr. Church went away for further discussion 
with Risher, and shortly thereafter returned and proposed 
that said Risher and Dr. W. G. Lofton should be appointed 
receivers with the agreement that the present personnel 
of the company would be retained. This proposal the 
petitioner also declined. Whereupon, Mr. Church said 
substantially, “Wouldn’t you like to see yourself in there 
as co-receiver? You and Risher could not be co-receivers 
on account of the equity suit. How would you react to the 
suggestion that all of the lawyers for the defendant and 
Risher recommend your appointment to the court as re­
ceiver, provided that if the court did not appoint you, 
your attorneys would recommend the appointment of 
Risher?” Petitioner replied that he would not even con­
sider such a proposition nor have anything to do with any 
proposal which continued John T. Risher’s connection 
with the management of the affairs of the company in 
any manner whatever.
Wherefore, petitioner prays that if the court appoints 
a receiver the court will select no one who has been recom­
mended by any of the parties to the cause and that the 
court will appoint some disinterested person in no way 
connected or associated with any of the parties, stock­
holders, or officers of the said corporation.5
The intervening petition of Dr. William A. Warfield, former 
director and medical director of the company, expresses the same 
attitude upon the appointment of a receiver and the activities of 
Risher. Risher’s affidavit in reply to these petitions points out that 
the intervening petitions are not in reply to the bill of complaint 
and do not attempt to answer the question should a receiver be 
appointed, but were personal attacks on him, although he was not a 
party of record in the suit. Immediately following Risher’s affi­
davit Pinkett filed an “ Amended and Supplemental Bill of Complaint
‘ ibid.
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for Receivership and Dissolution” . All the while personal enmity 
had been growing. And in this “ Amended and Supplemental Bill” , 
Pinkett attacked those who had made aspersions concerning his and 
Risher’s character and activities. He stated:
The plaintiff, upon information and belief, avers that 
various and sundry of the former officers and directors 
of this corporation who are responsible for the present 
insolvency of the corporation, as set forth in the original 
bill of complaint, have interested themselves in this suit 
and by various affidavits, so-called intervening petitions 
and correspondence of their counsel with the court, made 
certain representations concerning the appointment of a 
receiver. For the purpose of identifying these parties to 
the court, the plaintiff says that: William A. Warfield,
S. W. Rutherford and R. H. Rutherford are charged in the 
bill of complaint filed in Equity No. 53097, The National 
Benefit Life Insurance Company vs. Robert H. Rutherford, 
et al, a suit to cancel stock, for injunction, accounting and 
other relief, with an illegal and fraudulent scheme and 
conspiracy to defraud the defendant corporation in the 
various matters recited in said bill of complaint. Similar 
charges of participation in a fraudulent scheme to mis­
apply the funds of the defendant corporation are in said 
bill of complaint made against Charles B. Lee. In said 
bill of complaint it is also charged that while Louis C. 
Washington was acting as a director of the defendant cor­
poration funds of said corporation were by vote of the 
Board of Directors misapplied and dividends were de­
clared by them as directors and improperly paid to them­
selves and other stockholders in impairment of capital.
. . . The plaintiff respectfully informs the court that 
neither he nor the policyholders whom he represents de­
sires to have any receiver appointed by this court who 
has been nominated by the parties who are standing 
under undenied charges of wrecking the company or nomi­
nated by any person associated with them and not a party 
to this suit.6
On September 24, 1931, the court with Chief Justice Alfred A. 
Wheat presiding, handed down the following decision:
‘ Amended and Supplemental Bill of Complaint for Receivership and Disso­
lution.
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It is adjudged, ordered, and decreed that Daniel C. 
Roper be, and hereby is, appointed Receiver pendente lite 
of and for the defendant, The National Benefit Life Insur­
ance Company . . .  to carry on the business of said cor­
poration as a going concern . . .  to employ or dispense 
with any of the present officers . . .  to report to the court 
with respect to the condition of said corporation and the 
practicability of rehabilitating and restoring it to a safe 
and sound condition.7
This marked the end of the first stage of litigation. While no 
faction could declare a decisive victory, succeeding events indicated 
defeat for Washington and Lee. Not only did the presiding judge 
order their petition struck from the records, but subsequently Roper 
caused them to sever connections with the company. About this same 
time the American Security and Trust Co. foreclosed on its mortgage 
of $125,000 on the Balfour Apartments, Sixteenth and U Streets, 
N. W., Washington, D. C., one of the company’s dubious real estate 
transactions.8
On November 10, 1931, the receiver, Daniel C. Roper, filed his 
report on plan of reorganization. In the preliminary statement of
7 Decree, Equity No. 53,391, D. C. Supreme Court, John R. Pinkett v. National 
Benefit Life Insurance Company.
8 The National Benefit acquired this property about July 13, 1928 and held 
it without the consent of the Insurance Department. It had been ordered to 
dispose of it even if such necessitated a loss. In the previously quoted letter of 
Dawson to the trustees, Dawson said: “ For instance, the Balfour Apartments 
was and has been a big bone of contention with the Insurance Departments. 
The building has been mismanaged from start to finish; it was never suitable 
for what we claim was the company’s main purpose of purchase, and its actual 
value is now most uncertain. The right of the management so to invest the 
policyholders’ funds has been continually questioned by the Insurance Depart­
ment, and at one time they threatened to take charge of the company’s affairs. 
Well, I stalled the situation off promising the Insurance Department positively 
that the company would sell the property and take a loss, if need be, to which the 
President and Mr. Smith agreed, and so by reversing the procedure I got after 
so substantial a citizen as William Montgomery, President of Acacia Mutual and 
put up the plea that ‘For the benefit of the white race, Father and myself’ who 
had served his company for over a quarter of a century he personally should 
come to the front and purchase the Balfour Apartments. . . . During the boom 
we got an appraisal of $262,000 and by pleading with Mr. Montgomery I induced 
him to offer $265,000 which was acceptable to the President ana Mr. Smith, but 
they said they would have to talk it over with the General Secretary [S. W. 
Rutherford]. Later I was blandly informed that the General Secretary thought 
the property fully worth $350,000, but the company might be willing to accept 
$275,000 which would be a compromise between his offhand offer without inspec­
tion of $265,000 and the $350,000 and you all know that since then the company 
even though it has been agreeable to carry a first mortgage of $190,000 the 
equities offered above the mortgage have not exceeded $25,000 to $50,000, at most, 
that is, a sale of from $215,000 to $240,000 and mind you this only in trades— 
acquisition of other real estate. What we can now realize in cash above a first 
mortgage of, say, $190,000 I would just like to have any of you tell me.”
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the report Roper reviewed the company’s affairs during the receiv­
ership and just prior to it. He stated that the company had in 
force approximately $60,000,000 of insurance divided into ordinary 
and industrial with average policies of less than $1,000 and about 
$150, respectively. The insurance was represented by a great va­
riety of different policy forms in each case. The legal reserve as 
determined by his actuary was $6,063,503.98, impaired to the extent 
of $2,828,380.35. This was the situation despite the fact that in the 
statement of condition of the company attested to and filed with the 
Insurance Department of the District of Columbia as of December 
31, 1930, the assets were stated as $5,599,678.61, the legal reserve, 
$5,212,739.73, the capital, $250,000, and the surplus, $136,938.88. 
Roper further stated that the Department of Justice was investigat­
ing certain questionable transactions with a view of instituting 
criminal action if necessary.
As to the plan of reorganization Roper reported that he had 
been advised by actuary and counsel that the following were the 
methods by which an insolvent life insurance company might be 
reorganized, namely:
(1) By reducing the amount of insurance and premiums pro­
portionately ;
(2) By reducing the amount of insurance, premiums remain­
ing the same;
(3) By increasing the premiums, insurance remaining the same;
(4) By combining one or more of the above methods;
(5) By reinsuring all policies in another existing company;
(6) By the imposition of a lien against only the amount of in­
surance under the policy or a lien against the reserve by taking a 
loan, with interest, on the security of the policy; or
(7) By organizing a new mutual life insurance company to take 
over the National Benefit policies on some equitable basis.
Each of the first six methods had objections which made them 
impracticable in the case of The National Benefit. This, the receiver 
said, left them with but one method of dealing with the problem:
To organize a mutual life insurance company and invite 
National Benefit policyholders into it on a basis found to 
be equitable. . . .  In the event that the stockholders do 
not make good the impairment now existing [which, of 
course, could scarcely be expected] and the court should 
be of the opinion that the formation of a mutual company 
would be to the best interest of the old policyholders,
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then in that event, the procedure by which the interest 
of the policyholders would be fully protected in the new 
company might be as follows: Let the policyholders of the 
old company coming into the new company assign to the 
new company whatever of interest they may be found to 
be entitled to in the assets of the old company; due credit 
would be given to each policy transferred into the new 
company at an amount arrived at through an equitable 
dividend formula. This method would guarantee to 
the old policyholders who transferred to the new company 
the highest possible value under their contracts obtain­
able for their interest in the assets of the old company 
and would prevent needless sacrifice of their interest.
At the same time this procedure would not embarrass the 
interest of persons coming into the new company as new 
policyholders.9
While the court was considering the report of Roper, Wash­
ington and Lee made another attempt to oust Risher and Pinkett. 
Details of the Masonic Temple transaction were recited in an affidavit 
in an attempt to show that Risher had betrayed the trust of The 
National Benefit. Washington and Lee were opposed to Pinkett and 
Risher because the latter having very small stockholdings, represented 
interest of the policyholders. Risher and Pinkett held out for 
mutualization. The Rutherfords and Washington and Lee had filed 
answers to Pinkett’s bill of complaint denying that the company was 
insolvent. Moreover, control of the company whether mutualized or 
not was an important factor. The story of the Masonic Temple as 
told by Washington and Lee is a maze of plots and counterplots 
involving officers of the company, attorneys, brokers, and finance 
and construction companies. So involved was it that it is doubtful 
if all of its intricacies will ever be known. However, many of the 
allegations made by Washington and Lee in their affidavits were 
not disputed, while some of them were supported by substantial evi­
dence. The attitude and purpose of Washington was revealed in a 
sentence taken from their “ Petition for Directions to the Receiver” 
filed in conjunction with their affidavit. The sentence reads: “ Ever 
since his [Risher’s] incumbency in the office of president and long 
prior thereto, he and the plaintiff, John Randolph Pinkett, combined, 
conspired and agreed to obtain control of the management and af­
fairs of the said corporation and to so dominate, manage, and operate 
the same so as to bring about this appointment of a receiver for said
9 John R. Pinkett v. National Benefit, op. cit., Report of Receiver.
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corporation, deprive the stockholders of the control thereof through 
officers elected by them, deprive the stockholders of their interest in 
the said corporation, dispose of the assets of the corporation to their 
own advantage, either by a sale thereof, or by mutualizing the com­
pany and perpetuating themselves in control thereof, or in some 
other manner” .10 *
As large stockholders in the company, Washington and Lee were 
interested in dislodging Pinkett and Risher from their positions of 
authority and sought to show that the capital of the company was 
not impaired. They were, of course, opposed to mutualization be­
cause it would wipe out the stockholders’ interest. Furthermore, 
Risher and Pinkett were drawing substantial compensation from the 
company and would doubtless continue as officers if the company 
were mutualized. The bitter opposition of Washington and Lee to 
Risher was perhaps motivated by his connection with the construc­
tion of the Masonic Temple building as the headquarters of the 
Masonic Order.
The details of the Masonic Temple transaction before the Na­
tional Benefit became involved in it were summarized as follows: 
“ For several years prior to 1926, the attempt had been made to 
complete the New Masonic Temple at Tenth and U Streets, N. W., by 
a building corporation of the same name which had sold stock to 
member lodges and individual Masons to the extent of approximately 
$300,000. In the year 1925 upon request of the Trustees of the Grand 
Lodge (Acacia) F. A. A. M., all stockholders assigned their stock to 
the said Trustees for dissolution of the corporation. The court 
appointed Herbert L. Davis (now insurance commissioner) Special 
Master in Chancery for the dissolution and William L. Houston (of 
the firm of Houston and Houston, Attorneys at Law) and one Wolf, 
now deceased, were made receivers for the corporation in dissolution. 
The building was sold at public auction for $99,000, of which the 
trustees of the Grand Lodge received approximately $46,000 in cash. 
After futile attempts on the part of the Grand Lodge officers to 
complete the building, they were approached by John T. Risher who 
proposed to secure the necessary money to complete the building at 
a maximum cost of $450,000, for a commission of $25,000 payable in 
advance” .10 An agreement containing these stipulations was entered 
into on April 12, 1929. On April 23, 1929, acting on the advice of 
Risher, the lodge conveyed the building to Mortimer F. Smith11 and 
entered into an agreement with Smith for the completion of the 
building. According to the agreement the building was to be com-
” ibid.
"Affidavit Louis C. Washington.
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pleted at a cost of $450,000 to be amortized at the rate of $25,000 
per year; in addition the lodge was to pay rent to Smith of $2,000 
per month. Risher was appointed agent for both parties. Shortly 
afterwards the National Benefit conveyed to Smith its home office 
building, 609 F Street, N. W., and 1924 13th Street, N. W., and 1209 
U Street, N. W. Immediately Smith deeded these properties to the 
G. G. Loehler Construction Co., the builders of the Masonic Temple, 
and the National Benefit lent the construction company $70,000 on 
them. “These properties,” state the affidavit, “were given to the con­
struction company to pay off an indebtedness of $53,000 to secure the 
payment of which the Loehler Construction Company held $103,000 of 
second trust notes which they had peddled at 50% discount. The full 
face value of the notes was charged against the cost of the building. 
The $70,000 loan was to furnish the cash necessary to complete the 
building” .12
At this point a contract was sought between the Masons and the 
National Benefit instead of Mortimer F. Smith. The law firm of 
Houston and Houston was first employed to draw up the contract and 
were paid a retainer of $3,000. Their contract was unsatisfactory 
and the firm of Collins and Collins was then employed and paid a 
retainer of $5,000. The last contract proved satisfactory to the 
National Benefit, but the officers of the Masons refused to sign it. 
Risher was then given $10,000 to “work with”  in getting the con­
tract signed. In July, 1931, Risher had succeeded in getting the con­
tract signed.
By a deed dated June 30, 1930, but not recorded until December 
29, 1930, the Masonic Temple was conveyed from Smith to the Na­
tional Benefit. In January, 1931, the National Benefit threatened to 
evict the Masons. The Masons sought the advice of Risher, who re­
ferred them to the law firm of Howard and Hayes. As a result, upon 
the payment of a $500 fee a bill to be filed in the Supreme Court of 
the District of Columbia was prepared. The National Benefit em­
ployed Houston and Houston to defend the suit. The suit never en­
tered court.
In the meantime, the property at 1209 U Street had been con­
veyed successively from the Loehler Construction Company to Gary 
and Risher, Incorporated, Risher’s brokerage firm; to Alonzo Collins, 
reputedly an employee of the firm; to Anna Louise Risher, wife of 
Risher.13
A mere recital of the recorded facts in connection with the Ma-
”  ibid.
13ibid. The deed citations are: 8-4-30, Liber 6472, Folio 345, Docket 92; 
10-8-30, Liber 6491, Folio 67, Docket 158; 6-12-31, Liber 6566, Folio 213, Docket 
214, respectively.
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sonic Temple gives little indication of the motivation for many of the 
acts and the ramifications of the deal. It is necessary further to 
examine the transaction^ In the fir'st place, although the temple was 
to be completed at a total cost of not more than $450,000— according 
to the contract between the Masons and Risher— Risher’s first report 
reveals the impossibility of accomplishing this. His report made 
sometime after October 1, 1929, in part states:
To the Board of Trustees of the Most Worshipful 
Acacia Grand Lodge, F. A. A. M.
Gentlemen:
On April 12, 1929, your board employed Messrs. Gary 
and Risher for the purpose of relieving its condition and 
financial embarrassment, liquidate its indebtedness and to 
arrange for the completion of its uncompleted structure at 
Tenth and U Streets, N. W.
The agreement entered into at that time gave us, as 
your fiscal agents, full and unrestricted power to do any 
and all things necessary to bring about the desired results.
The only restrictions to be placed upon us by said agree­
ment with you were, first, that the total for the 
completion of the temple and liquidation of its indebted­
ness, would be four hundred and fifty thousand ($450,000) 
dollars, and, second, that ample safeguard be thrown 
around the structure to the end that the Masonic Fra­
ternity would have sole and exclusive use of the Fraternity 
Floors of the building, so long as it carried its share of the 
obligation. But notwithstanding broad and sweeping 
powers granted us as your fiscal agents to solve your 
financial difficulties, there had never been an instance 
where any act was committed by us, without first coming 
to you and receiving your specific authority in such 
instance.
One of the first steps necessary to give us an accurate 
knowledge of the indebtedness against your property, was 
to procure from the Columbia Title Company an abstract 
of the record appearing upon your property. To our utter 
surprise and amazement we found that the property was 
encumbered by trusts and liens to the extent of $834,200, 
consisting of the following items:
1. Mechanic’s lien, filed October 18th, 1927, by 
Sumner and Todd, in the sum of $14,200;
2. A deed of trust recorded February 27, 1928, to 
secure Joseph Sanders and Henry A. Berliner in the
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sum of two hundred and twenty thousand ($220,000) 
dollars;
3. A deed of trust recorded February 27, 1928, to se­
cure William H. Jackson, in the sum of 8150,000; and
4. A deed of trust recorded July 16, 1928; to se­
cure Joseph Chiavone and Frank T. Fuller, in the sum 
of $450,000.
In addition to the above obligations, we found that 
the taxes, special assessments, plus the penalties, aggre­
gating approximately three thousand ($3,000) dollars 
was due. We further found that the interest and curtail­
ment provided in the deed of trust to secure Messrs. 
Sanders and Berliner was over a year in arrears, which 
sum represented approximately $14,500 at the time you 
entered into the contract with Mr. Gary and myself. In 
addition to this, we found that the G. G. Leohler Construc­
tion Company claimed that you owed them the following 
sums:
1. For monies advanced in the payment of first 
trust interest, $7,829.64;
2. To principal paid on first trust, $5,000;
3. To payment to Chiavone and Fuller for trustee 
fees, $2,200;
4. For printing cei'tain bonds, $814.11;
5. For payment on taxes $237.30, and $464.82;
6. Fire insurance, $413.35;
7. For damages suffered by contractor through the 
Grand Lodge, necessitating delays and extra expense, 
bonds, commissions pledged on second trust notes, etc., 
amounting to $13,432; and
8. To extras agreed upon and ordered by Grand 
Master Ford, $3,000. Balance due for completion of 
building $15,000, making a total claim of Mr. Leohler, 
$257,653.23.
It will be recalled that our authority was limited 
to the extent of $450,000 in settling the indebtedness of 
the Grand Lodge and complete the Temple, but upon the 
discovery of the condition just enumerated, and the exact 
financial status of the proposition, it was necessary to 
begin a series of negotiations for the purpose of keeping 
all these items within the authorized amount of $450,000, 
and still have sufficient funds available to complete the
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structure in accordance with the then existant plans and 
specifications.
After numerous conferences with all the parties con­
cerned, covering a period of weeks, we were successful in 
bringing about a satisfactory adjustment in every case 
except one involving the $450,000 bond issue, and it looked 
for some considerable time that success or failure in our 
endeavor hung solely upon the adjustment of this item. 
Upon a very thorough and careful investigation, we dis­
covered that a Mr. Dewey had obtained possession of a 
block of these bonds, representing a large amount of 
money, ostensibly for the purpose of arranging a loan and 
to use said bonds for collateral and to enable the Grand 
Lodge to meet certain pressing obligations. It developed, 
however, that he was unsuccessful in obtaining the desired 
loan, after a considerable lapse of time he returned all of 
the bonds to the Depository, which was the International 
Exchange Bank, with the exception of bonds totalling 
$22,750 which he had sold. We then discovered that with 
the exception of this amount of $22,750, and an item of 
$2,200 owed the trustee for identifying these bonds, there 
were no other liens or obligations against the issue. We 
came back to the Trustees and explained the situation to 
them, and received the authority to increase the author­
ized indebtedness $22,750, the sum necessary to make 
up the difference in the bond transaction, and making a 
total authorized indebtedness of the sum of $472,750. The 
$2,200 item owed Messrs. Chiavone and Fuller we made 
the G. G. Loehler construction company pay that, and the 
Grand Master, Assistant Grand Secretary, Mr. Gary and 
myself, after procuring the release of this transaction, 
stood in the office of Mr. Chiavone and destroyed all these 
bonds and interest coupons.
Our investigation disclosed the fact that Mr. Dewey 
has in his possession what appears to be full authority, 
backed by written instructions and agreements with the 
Grand Lodge for all of his transactions and it is our 
opinion, and the opinion of counsel consulted in this 
matter, that the Grand Lodge could never recover one 
dime from this transaction, nor could they hold Mr. Dewey 
for any irregularities.
Shortly after your contract was made with Mr. 
Gary and myself, we interested Mr. Mortimer F. Smith
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in our proposition, the result of which was that the prop­
erty of the Grand Lodge was conveyed to Mr. Smith, in 
fee simple, subject to an equity of redemption, encouched 
in a certain agreement executed on the 23rd of April,
1929. It was with the funds furnished by Mr. Smith that 
the indebtedness was liquidated and a contract made to 
complete the building in accordance with the then existant 
plans and specifications. For the purpose of safeguarding 
his security in this project, it became necessary for Mr. 
Smith to consult experts along business lines, who had 
not heretofore been connected with this project, and as 
a result of which, the services of Mr. Albert I. Cassell, 
one of the best equipped architects in the country, regard­
less of race, was engaged by Mr. Smith. After making a 
very careful survey, it was the opinion of Mr. Cassell 
that the completion of the building in accordance with the 
plans and specifications that we had been following would 
be a serious mistake, and that the building would be so 
thoroughly lacking in certain requirements that were 
absolutely necessary, that the income would never justify 
the investment to the extent which Mr. Smith had already 
entailed. He was then directed to draw plans and specifi­
cations which would bring the building up to the accepted 
standards of the owner, which could be safely counted 
upon to produce sufficient revenue to carry its obliga­
tions. Mr. Cassell has finally completed his drawing, and 
is receiving bids to cover the same, which approximates 
the sum of $53,000 . . .14
It appears that the numerous burdens on the Temple caused 
Smith and the National Benefit to advance much more money than 
was originally thought necessary. The cost of the Temple advanced 
very quickly from $450,000 to $560,000. Records fail to reveal 
whether Smith was at first acting on his own behalf and later— 
when the transaction became larger than was contemplated— on be­
half of the National Benefit. It is, however, reasonable to assume 
that early in the transaction funds of the National Benefit were used. 
Moreover, it is known from the time the National Benefit interested 
itself in the venture its object was to obtain the building for use as a 
home office building. In Risher’s report he said that Mr. Smith was 
willing to finance these changes. Risher stated: “ With reference to 
the estimate of approximately $53,000 [ultimately this figure was
14 ibid.
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much larger] for necessary additional work, we have invited Mr. 
Cassell to appear here tonight and make his own explanation, but 
whatever the Trustees do in this connection, it must be borne in mind 
that it was never contemplated by Mr. Smith to go beyond the figures 
involved in his contract, but since he is anxious to go as far as pos­
sible in the interest of the Grand Lodge to have a building that will 
meet the requirements of modern times and at the same time produce 
adequate revenue, he has been magnanimous enough to undertake the 
task of raising the necessary cash to do this work. He has asked us, 
however, to request the Trustees to advance the sum of ten thousand 
dollars which will be stretched out to cover what they would be ex­
pected to pay monthly. We urgently recommend that this be im­
mediately done . . 15
Up to this time nothing concerning the Masonic Temple trans­
action appeared on the books of the National Benefit. Dawson’s cor­
respondence indicates that the company entered the transaction with­
out his knowledge. In February, 1930, when Dawson learned that 
the company had become deeply involved in the deal, having deeded 
away three properties and having lent $70,000 on them, he wrote 
to Smith as follows:
As I advised you over the phone today, in view of the 
questions Examiner McDermott has asked me, it would 
appear that I have not been fully informed in regard to 
all matters leading up to the present status of affairs from 
the National Benefit’s standpoint.
Frankly, Mr. Smith, as I told you today, I am startled 
at the proportions to which the above transaction has 
assumed and it is indeed very embarassing to me, to say 
the least. However, before making any specific comment 
or recommendation to the company, and certainly prior to 
my conference with Examiner McDermott on Saturday 
of this week, I wish you would answer fully, at length and 
in writing, the following questions:
1. Give exact date of first negotiations relating to any 
phase of the Masonic Temple Deal;
2. Give names of all parties present at first interview 
or discussion and the interest represented by each respect­
ively;
3. Give the exact dates of one or more subsequent 
interviews prior to the signing of any papers, options or
18 ibid.
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agreements and names of the parties present at such inter­
views ;
4. Give date of first written instrument signed in 
connection with any phase of the deal and the names of the 
parties who signed same, indicating the interest each rep­
resented ;
5. Give dates of any and all written instruments sub­
sequently signed in connection with any phase of the deal 
and the names of the parties who signed the same, indicat­
ing the interest each represented;
6. Describe fully both by figures and explanatory 
notes, as nearly as possible, the exact financial status of 
the Masonic Temple proposition, immediately preceding 
the signing of the first instrument and/or the making of 
the first payment in connection with any phase of the 
transaction which was later consummated;
7. Describe and outline both by figures and explana­
tory notes, what was to be undertaken by the respective 
parties (name them) to the deal:
a. By M. F. Smith,
b. By National Benefit,
c. By holder of first and underlying mortgage,
d. By contractor or contractors,
e. By Masonic Lodge as a corporate body or any 
other such organization,
f. By any other parties affected by or involved in 
the deal,
g. By brokers or agents through whom negotiations, 
both preliminary or otherwise, were carried on;
8. Who held the fee title to the property at the be- 
gining of the negotiations,
9. Give dates of any subsequent changes in title, the 
parties affected, and the reason for such change or 
changes;
10. Who held fee title December 31, 1929 ?
11. Has there been any change in title since Decem­
ber 31, 1929?
12. Give full details including dates, names, amounts 
and nature or purpose of each disbursement made in con­
nection with each and every phase of the transaction:
a. By National Benefit,
b. By M. F. Smith,
c. Indicate amounts first advanced by M. F. Smith
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which were later paid by National Benefit in re­
imbursement to Mr. Smith or to other parties, 
banks, or corporations who had advanced funds 
to meet obligations assumed in the transaction;
13. Give exact financial status of the proposition as 
of December 31, 1929;
a. As regards M. F. Smith,
b. As regards National Benefit,
c. As regards the holder or holders of any first or 
prior liens,
d. As regards amount due or to become due on any 
completed or uncompleted contracts or to any 
other parties,
14. Same as question 13, but as of February 17,1930;
15. Supply typewritten or photostatic copy of each 
and every document executed by any of the parties to the 
deal;
16. Give full details relating to tenants and leases in 
force as of December 31, 1929, with a brief prospectus of 
rentals collectible in 1930; and
17. Give statement of rentals collected and expenses 
paid in connection with the Masonic Temple operations 
since M. F. Smith became owner in fee simple.
You understand, of course, that irrespective of any 
negotiations you may now have in hand, or their ultimate 
outcome, I will need, in writing, the information called for 
in these questions, in complete detail, prior to my confer­
ence with Examiner McDermott on Saturday next. . . The 
preparation of this data . . .  in view of the exigencies exist­
ing . . . would appear absolutely essential.18
The answers to Dawson’s questions would have been interesting. 
However, we have searched in vain for Smith’s reply. It is very 
doubtful if anyone connected with the transactions could have answer­
ed these questions. Dawson’s letter, however, seemed to have caused 
the abrogation of the contract between Smith and the Lodge followed 
by one between the Lodge and the National Benefit. Considerable 
difficulty was encountered in getting the lodge to agree to the terms 
of the new contract. During the negotiations, Dawson wrote a letter 
to the Rutherfords, Smith, and Lee admonishing them of the serious­
ness of the Masonic Temple transaction and, likewise, of the Whitelaw 
and Balfour Apartment House deals. He stated:
15 ibid.
Regardless of the possible consequences which the 
threatened Masonic Temple litigation might have precipi­
tated and may even yet do, unless a satisfactory settlement 
is effected, permit me to call your attention as voting 
trustees that the one great embarassing feature is that the 
National Benefit Life Insurance Company does own the 
Masonic Temple, which property was acquired not only 
contrary to the advice of this office, but counter to the 
directions of the various insurance departments engaged 
upon the last examination, also in direct violation to the 
instructions annually given the management by the Board 
of Directors.
You are all familiar with the seriousness of the 
charges alleged by the Grand Lodge and, to speak very 
frankly, the whole transaction from beginning to end has 
many most unsatisfactory and inexplicable angles, to say 
the very least. For instance, much more serious reflec­
tions against the management of the National Benefit than 
charged might be brought out by the attorneys for the 
Grand Lodge if just a cold-blooded statement of the check 
transactions concerned with the Masonic Temple are listed.
It has never been explained to me, nor do I anticipate 
it will be satisfactory to the Insurance Department exam­
iners, why so many Masonic Temple transactions were 
handled through Mortimer F. Smith’s personal account, 
when one of the very first transactions was a company 
matter, the alleged sale of those three National Benefit 
properties totalling $95,000; nor have I been able to fath­
om why the total cost of the building was pyramided from 
a $450,000 proposition, as at that time the National Bene­
fit entered the picture, to an approximate $560,000 cost to 
finish same, irrespective of the inability of the Grand 
Lodge then to finance the completion of even the $450,000 
building.
Off hand I will frankly state, from my cursory ex­
amination recently, the Masonic Temple building looks 
to me to be fully worth the purchase price, but why should 
Washington Masons be furnished with a Rolls-Royce by 
way of a meeting place at the expense of the National Ben­
efit policyholders, and furthermore, why were not the In­
surance Departments or ourselves consulted in regard, first 
to the original purchase price ($450,000) proposition, and, 
second, the dumping of approximately $110,000 additional
of policyholders’ cash when same was so badly needed on 
other company matters.
As a matter of fact, when the proposal was made in 
the Spring of 1928 by the management of the company 
that it take over and complete the Masonic Temple as a 
home office building for the National Benefit, the Execu­
tive Committee was very definitely informed that it was 
too large a transaction and out of all proportion as an 
individual investment for the company. The National 
Benefit was even then under Insurance Department criti­
cism and on account of its real estate holdings, the Balfour 
Apartments in particular, and the management was duly 
notified that there would be a hearing held at the June 
meeting of the National Convention of Insurance Com­
missioners.
Along the last of April or the early part of May, 1929, 
Assistant Secretary Smith called up and said the company 
had an opportunity to sell three of its properties for $95,- 
000 provided the company could make a first trust loan for 
the purchasers on the properties sold of approximately 
70 %. I advised Mr. Smith that although the company was 
restricted in making loans of more than 50% of the ap­
praised value, that inasmuch as this loan would be con­
cerned with the sale of real estate I felt confident the trans­
action would be approved by the Insurance Department.
Along the last of May, 1929, Mr. Smith wrote me a 
letter to be read at the Insurance Department’s hearing, 
to be held at the Edgewater Beach Hotel early in June, 
1929, stating that he had actually sold these properties 
for $95,000 and thereby realized the profit, which letter 
was read to the Commissioners and indicating that the 
management was getting the company out of real estate 
whenever possible, but nevertheless the complaining De­
partments were not satisfied, and only agreed to defer 
their own examination of the company provided the other 
Departments agree to adopt a resolution directing the 
management of the Company not to make any investment 
without my approval, and the management was so duly 
notified in writing and by hearing with Superintendent 
Baldwin, all at the direction of other State Insurance 
Departments.
Needless to say, it is no satisfaction to me personally 
that both myself and the Insurance Departments were kept
in the dark regarding the Masonic Temple transactions 
nor that, even prior, without my knowledge, Rutherford, 
Smith, and Rutherford went to the Guardian Trust Com­
pany and obtained a personal loan to finance their pur­
chase of the Whitelaw Apartment Hotel, thereby jeopar­
dizing a very important company transaction with the 
Guardian, as we quickly found out last fall when our offices 
had to come to the rescue one day and the company was 
put to heavy expenses to straighten out the matter with 
the Guardian. As a matter of fact, the company had been 
put no end of expenses on account of ill-advised 
real estate and colored bank transactions. I recall fully 
the amount of time that I personally had to put in with 
the Examiners concerned with the report of the examina­
tion as of December 31, 1927, not to speak of the time 
consumed in company conferences all of which concerned 
using policyholders’ funds for the benefit of other in­
terests.
Mr. Smith has made the statement that not one cent 
of the company’s money was used in connection with the 
Whitelaw Hotel deal, in spite of the fact that the General 
Secretary a year ago publicly stated that a large sum was 
invested by the company in repairs to the Hotel. I have 
been told by prominent colored citizens of Washington that 
the company did make a heavy investment and recently I 
have been advised that on or about December, 1928, there 
was a check drawn to the order of Rutherford, Smith, and 
Rutherford, for over-subscription of capital stock in the 
amount of $6,500, which was written off to Profit and Loss, 
although the company records- do not indicate any over­
subscription of stock. Perhaps it is just a coincidence 
that $6,500 was equal in exact amount to the down pay­
ment on the Whitelaw Hotel, which I merely mention, not 
that I personally question the items, but to call your at­
tention to the inferences that are likely to be drawn by 
the Insurance Department Examiners who surely will 
check back to the last report to point out that dabbling 
in real estate by the management has its terrors.
Now I am not going to dwell on the way the manage­
ment has involved itself in connection with certain checks 
company officers drew upon the Citizens Trust Company 
cencerned with the Masonic Temple transaction, nor other 
irregular transactions subject to official and critical re­
view and adverse comment by Insurance Department Ex­
aminers. . .
In addition to all else, let me call to your attention that 
Assistant Secretary Smith has not turned over to Ex­
aminer McDermott all of his personal account checks re­
lating to Masonic Temple transactions, and that each and 
everyone of you is involved in his proving what was done 
with policyholders’ funds.
Again I do not for a moment question same, but it 
would not surprise me at all if the Insurance Department 
Examiners engaged upon the coming examination demand 
that he show cancelled checks for his entire personal ac­
count from the time the company entered the Masonic 
Temple deal, and “ What a lovely time will be had by all,” 
if he can not produce each and every check.
One of the big bones of contention with the Grand 
Lodge is that the cost of the Masonic Temple has been 
pyramided by the National Benefit from a $450,000 prop­
osition to a $560,000 proposition all at the instigation of 
the General Secretary, as the attorneys claimed, for the 
personal benefit of a friend of his who profited thereby.
Now, of course, I personally know that these are not 
the facts at all. The purpose of the General Secretary 
was to put the necessary finishing touches on the building 
in order to make it appear worth the money, whether it 
was a $450,000 or a $560,000, and all of you know the 
arguments I put forth on behalf of the National Benefit 
at the joint meeting of company officials, Grand Lodge 
officers, counsel for both sides and McDermott and Risher.
But here is the unfortunate situation, neither Mor­
timer F. Smith, President R. H. Rutherford, nor the Gen­
eral Secretary consulted me or sought my advice, let alone 
approval, in regard to the Masonic Temple transaction 
until they had approximately $250,000 of the policy­
holders’ funds stuck into the proposition, in addition to a 
company liability of over $200,000 to Sanders, and further­
more while I was laboring under the belief that it was 
a $450,000 proposition, as were members of the Board 
other than the management, the company went right ahead 
and contracted for approximately $110,000 additional in­
vestment of the policyholders’ funds without my approval 
or in any way seeking my advice on the matter, utterly 
ignoring the directions of the Board of Directors and in
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absolute violation of the Insurance Department’s instruc­
tions that all proposed investment should be submitted for 
my approval.
The policyholders have already paid many thousands 
of dollars additional expense on account of lawyer’s fees 
and the time I have had to devote to the matter in an en­
deavor to ward off developments which might precipitate 
a receivership for the company, not to speak of the bonus 
of $30,000 to be paid the Federal Mortgage people and 
lawyers’ fees yet to come, which all told may cost the 
policyholders a full $50,000 loss.
As I stated before, it is no personal satisfaction to me 
to have the management not only on the Masonic Temple 
transaction but on the other transactions violate and ut­
terly disregard Insurance Department instructions and 
their own pledges and promises. . . .17
In order to complete the negotiations in connection with the new 
contract between the National Benefit and the Masons, which in 
addition to making the National Benefit a party to the contract con­
tained substantial changes in stipulations, Risher was assigned the 
task of getting the contract signed. The Masons at first refused to 
sign. But after the National Benefit gave Risher $10,000 to “work 
.with” he was successful in procuring the signatures of the Masonic 
officers. Dawson said that the company was fortunate in getting 
Risher to use his influence to get the contract signed. The contract 
was dated June 30,1930. By a deed of the same date but filed Decem­
ber 29, 1930, title of the Temple was transferred from Smith to the 
National Benefit.
Though relations between the Masons and the National Benefit 
had become strained, open conflict did not occur until the National 
Benefit attempted to enforce the new contract. On January 17,1931, 
R. H. Rutherford wrote to the Grand Lodge claiming that they were 
$14,000 in arrears in their rent and demanding payment not later 
than January 3, 1931, and threatening to institute suit to dispossess 
the lodge if the money was not paid. Risher, it appears, had assured 
the Masons upon securing their signatures to the new contract that 
the new contract would not be enforced and that the contract 
was for the purpose of exhibiting to the Insurance Department. 
Rutherford’s letter was probably a surprise to both Risher and
17 Letter of A. B. Dawson to Voting Trustees.
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the Masons. However, it indicated the National Benefit’s real 
intent in interesting itself in the deal. The Masons immediately 
sought counsel of Risher. Risher’s reaction is described in the 
affidavit of the Grandmaster and Chairman of the Board of Trustees 
of Free and Accepted Masons. The lodge “ disputed the correctness 
of the claim and by correspondence sought an interview with said 
Rutherford which at first was refused and later affiants obtained 
an interview with him but without definite or satisfactory results. 
John T. Risher was at the time the fiscal agent of the National Bene­
fit Life Insurance Company, and affiants called upon him and con­
ferred with said Risher before the expiration of the month of January, 
1931. Said Risher: ‘If you will employ the attorneys whom I name, 
I will give them information which will bring the Rutherfords to 
their knees; I will not give it to any other attorneys because of my 
confidential relationship to the National Benefit Life Insurance Com­
pany.’ Said Risher named Howard and Hayes and as a result of 
said conversation affiants employed Howard and Hayes paying them 
a retainer fee of $500.” 18 Thereafter a bill entitled “ Bill to Rescind 
Contract, for an Accounting and Other Purposes”  was prepared in 
the name of the Masonic Lodge naming the National Benefit as de­
fendant.
This suit between the Masons and the National Benefit, which 
was never filed, gives some indication of the off-stage play that went 
on in the drama of the National Benefit. After the bill for this suit 
was prepared there were a series of conferences at the Willard Hotel 
in Washington, D. C., February 5th, 6th, and 7th, 1931, attended by 
John T. Risher, Alfred B. Dawson, P. J. McDermott, the Rutherfords 
and Smith, Howard and Hayes, Charles H. Houston of the law firm 
of Houston and Houston, and Frank D. McKinney and Ernest Dicker- 
son, officers of the Masons. At the conclusion of the last conference, 
Attorney Howard is reported to have said to the Masonic officers, 
“ This bill will never be filed and somebody will be calling you up 
before the night is over.” 19
The bill under discussion contained allegations which would have 
doubtless brought about an investigation of the National Benefit and 
a receivership. It recited details of questionable transactions and 
intimated that the capital of the company was impaired. Though the 
suit was successfully compromised and large sums of money paid by 
the National Benefit, the Masons received nothing but the tacit as­
surance that the new contract would not be enforced.
18 Affidavit of Washington and Lee, Exhibit 11.
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Fiddling While Rome Burned
The case of the National Benefit proceeded exceedingly slow. The 
presiding Judge, Mr. O’Donognue, in commenting on the progress of 
the case said: “ It seems that Rome is burning while Nero is fiddling.” 
While the lawyers argued, the assets and business of the company 
wasted away. In the latter part of February, 1932, prior to the 
appointment of permanent receivers, Judge O’Donoghue gave the 
following opinion:
The court is of the opinion that the company is insolvent.
There is evidence here that the company cannot pay its 
debts, cannot pay the death benefits, and cannot pay the 
loans to the insured that they are entitled to receive, and 
cannot pay the surrender values on their policies. Now, 
the extent of the insolvency is a matter of accountancy.
That being the case, while it may be ultimately found that 
the company may be in better shape when we come to a 
final accounting than it is now, the court is not at this time 
going to say that the stockholders having rights may not 
possibly receive some dividends on their stock. Therefore, 
the court overrules the motion that the intervening peti­
tions be dismissed. The receivership must be continued.
A receivership is not an ultimate remedy for equity. It is 
merely an ancillary remedy. There must be some ground 
for coming into equity other than just the mere receiver- 
_ship; otherwise the proceedings would fail. The only 
ground set forth specifically in this bill is dissolution, and 
they pray for such other relief as the court may grant. It 
is not the duty of a receiver to rehabilitate a company or 
to reorganize a company, nor in the case of an insurance 
company, to mutualize it. The receiver is to continue the 
operation of the company in status quo as far as possible, 
pending the outcome of the litigation. Therefore it is up 
to the parties interested, either the stockholders or officers 
of the company, or the policyholders to take such steps as 
any or all of them may be able to take to rehabilitate the 
company. This court cannot do that. If some such plan 
is not undertaken by the stockholders or by the company 
or by the officers of the company or by the policyholders, 
then there is no other course for this court to pursue than 
that of dissolution of this corporation. The court is not 
unmindful of the fact that there are persons interested in 
this litigation many of whom have put all of their little
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savings into this company in order to insure them some­
thing in a day of stress or in a time of need. Therefore, 
the court is going to endeavor, as far as possible, to give 
these people and those that are interested in them every 
reasonable practicable chance to save that which they 
may have in this company. The court could at this time 
let the company be dissolved and the assets be distributed 
to the various parties in interest as their various holdings 
may appear but the court is not going to do that, because 
sitting as a Court of Equity and Justice, it thinks in fair­
ness to those nearly 200,000 people interested in the case, 
the court should take the chance, even though this chance 
fails, of continuing this receivership for a reasonable 
period of time until an accurate accounting of the condi­
tion of the company of its assets and liabilities may be 
ascertained, before any such step is taken.. .  If the parties 
are able during the period of time that the actuarial ac­
countant is working on the affairs of the company to form­
ulate some practical plan whereby this company may be 
saved, they will then be able to submit any such prop­
osition to the court immediately after the detailed and 
complete report of the actuarial accountant is filed. If 
the parties interested in this concern cannot get together 
and formulate some plan within that period of several 
months, or a settlement as indicated, then there will be 
no other course for the court to pursue but that of dis­
solution.20
On February 29, 1932, the court appointed Frank B. Bryan, Jr., 
and Gilbert A. Clark as permanent receivers. Roper, objecting to 
the appointment of a co-receiver, had resigned. Shortly afterward 
the major interest in the National Benefit litigation shifted from the 
case of Pinkett versus the National Benefit to the case of the Shaw- 
Walker Company versus the National Benefit. It was in this suit 
that the legality of the appointment and acts of Clark and Bryan were 
seriously questioned. One of the allegations made against them was 
that they allowed the equity of the National Benefit in the Masonic 
Temple building to be extinguished through foreclosure which, it was 
alleged, could have been avoided.
Shaw-Walker vs. National Benefit 
In the case of the Shaw-Walker Company versus the National 
Benefit Life Insurance Company, the Shaw-Walker Company, a judg-
20 Quoted by The Afro-American, February 27, 1932. For a story of the 
litigation as reported by tne press, see Appendix D.
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ment creditor of the National Benefit, sought relief in equity. They 
sought removal of the receivers, Clark and Bryan, and a winding-up 
of the business, contending that the National Benefit fund was being 
dissipated without any distribution to preferred creditors. Some in- 
tervenors entered the suit. Foremost among these was Leah B. Wil­
son, a policyholder in the Standard Life and later in the National Ben­
efit. She charged that the receivers had been conducting a modified 
insurance business without a reserve as required by law and that the 
money received from this business was being dissipated. The court 
ruled that the Shaw-Walker case superseded the Pinkett case and that 
the appointment of Bryan and Clark was done without proper author­
ity. The judge accordingly signed an order removing Bryan and 
Clark and naming Risher receiver. Bryan and Clark appeal the deci­
sion. Pending the decision of the Court of Appeals Bryan and Clark 
were receiver in name but were restrained from negotiating any busi­
ness other than routine matters for the National Benefit.
During the long period of litigation to which the National Benefit 
was subjected, the assets of the company were reduced from three to 
considerably less than a million dollars. All hope of rehabilitation 
soon disappeared. To date no dividends have been paid policyholders 
nor stockholders nor have general creditors been paid. The real 
losers in the whole affair have been the policyholders whose response 





The failure of the National Benefit is to be explained in part by 
the internal weaknesses of the Company and in part by the general 
economic and social environment in which it functioned. The aim 
of the present chapter is to give a brief review of the causes of failure 
found in the operations of the company itself and then to describe 
the part played by broad economic and social forces in the downfall 
of the enterprise.
Among the factors connected specifically with the Company itself, 
the following stand out: (1) Unwise expansion; (2) Excessive oper­
ating costs; (3) Reinsurance of the Standard Life Insurance Com­
pany; (4) Manipulation of capital stock; (5) Lack of a sound under­
writing policy; (6) Lack of a sound investment policy; and (7) Lack 
of prudent management.
The National Benefit’s policy of expansion led to a situation in 
which a company with considerably less than $400,000 in capital and 
surplus was underwriting more than $70,000,000 of insurance (See 
Tables VIII and IX) and operating in 28 states (See Appendix F ). 
The wide area over which the Company operated increased its opera­
tion costs tremendously. Its agency costs as illustrated by the West 
Virginia District were in many cases entirely out of proportion to 
the amount of insurance written. Operating costs were further in­
creased by excessive payments for actuarial and investment services 
and the expense of numerous official examinations. Moreover, poor 
organization generally added its toll to the operating expenses which 
the company had to bear. Another manifestation of its mistaken 
policy of expansion was the reinsurance of the Standard Life Insur­
ance Company. Though this move was prompted by something more 
than the desire to expand, it was a direct outgrowth of the “ big busi­
ness”  notions of the management. ,
The manipulation of the capital stock and the resulting involve­
ment of the management and the company in irregular transactions 
were not only costly in terms of interest charges and fees for legal 
and investment advice, but also diverted the attention of the manage­
ment from other pressing affairs of the company. While the com­
pany’s lack of a sound underwriting policy is revealed in the ineffi­
cient supervision over claims and the failure to investigate mortality 
experience; its lack of a sound investment policy is evidenced by mar­
ginal trading in securities, its relations with the Citizens Trust Com­
pany, its subsidiary, and its dealing in real estate.
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The foregoing specific causes of failure may be reduced to the 
following categories: first, incompetence, negligence, and lack of in­
tegrity on the part of the management; second, the failure to develop 
and follow a sound underwriting policy; third, the failure to develop 
and follow a sound investment policy; and, finally, the malicious com­
petition for control of the company and the advantages which control 
afforded.
The career of the founder, Samuel W. Rutherford, is typical of 
the successful small-scale business man who is unable to adjust him­
self to growth of the institution he helped to create. Rutherford, who 
dominated the company up to the end, represented that type of man­
agement which fails to keep pace with the growth of the business. 
This situation has been described by Foulke: “As a business grows, 
it invariably becomes a little more sluggish, slightly more bureau­
cratic, a trifle more difficult to handle, a little harder to keep in a 
healthy financial shape. So, if policies which are successful for a 
small business are not at times modified as an enterprise grows in 
size—that is, unless the management grows in its breadth of practical 
knowledge—a reaction is bound to come.” 1 The reaction came in the 
case of the National Benefit in the form of unsound underwriting and 
investment policies, and in the unfortunate competition and rivalry 
among officers, employees, and other interested parties, many of whom 
came to regard the company, in the words of Dawson, “ as a Christ­
mas tree” . Yet, to attribute the failure of the National Benefit largely 
to incompetence and dishonesty is to give a decidedly one-sided and 
misleading explanation of what happened. Even if the management 
had been far more competent and far more honest than was actually 
the case, the final result might not have been much different in view 
of conditions over which the company had no control. The specific 
history of the National Benefit, to be understood and evaluated prop­
erly, must be viewed in terms of the broad setting in which this and 
other forms of Negro business enterprise are placed. It is often 
alleged that the primary cause of failure for Negro business ventures 
is found in the personal factors of ignorance and dishonesty. With­
out denying the existence of both among Negro business men, two 
points may in all fairness be made: first, the inability of the Negro 
business man to cope successfully with his problem should be judged 
in the light of the unusually difficult character of those problems; 
second, unethical practices are by no means monopolized by the Negro 
business man. It is interesting to note that the Armstrong insurance 
investigation of 1905 revealed a far more serious lack of business
1 Roy A. Foulke, Behind the Scenes of Business, Dunn and Bradstreet, New 
York, 1937, p. 23.
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integrity than any disclosure in connection with the National Benefit 
or the Standard Life. “ The 1905 [Armstrong] investigation dis­
closed, among other things, the following outstanding abuses in the 
private insurance business: (1) nepotism, (2) excessive wages for 
high officers as against starvation wages for the hordes of clerks and 
agents, (3) extravagant costs of writing insurance, (4) an excessive 
rate of lapses, and (5) control of legislation and public opinion by 
the expenditure of large sums for lobbying. Outside of the last, light 
upon which could be shed only by another government investigation, 
all the other evils are not only being perpetuated today, but their 
extravagance and wastefulness are more appalling than ever before.” * 2 
“ They [the companies being investigated by the Armstrong Com­
mittee] used their affiliations with the banks to manipulate their 
funds to meet the annual statements of operation required by the 
insurance departments of the states and countries in which they oper­
ated. While not permitted to own stocks they still kept them as con­
cealed assets by disguising entries made in the books of account.”  3 
Negro business enterprise shares the difficulties which all small 
concerns encounter in the current American scene. That the trend 
of American business, at least in many important lines, is towards 
concentration and integration is a fact too well established for ex­
tended comment here.4 The entry of a new firm into the business 
system without sponsorship by some influential interest has become 
increasingly difficult. The field of life insurance is one in which the 
competitive power of large companies is of particular importance. 
As an indication of the degree of concentration in the insurance bus­
iness itself, one may cite certain evidence presented to the Monopoly 
Committee. For the 308 legal reserve life insurance companies in 
the United States, 54.4 per cent of the aggregate assets were con­
trolled at the close of 1937 by the five largest companies; 80.6 per 
cent of these assets were controlled by the sixteen largest companies; 
and 87.2 per cent by the twenty-five largest companies. Of the 308 
companies, 283 controlled only 12.8 per cent of the aggregate assets.5 
It is important to note in this connection [hat the real degree of com­
petitive power of the large companies is by no means full indicated 
by their legal size. For the large legal units of business are often 
linked together by means of such extra-legal ties as interlocking 
directorates. One concrete example of the increased power thus ac­
2 Abraham Epstein, “ The Insurance Racket”, The American Mercury, Vol. 
XXI, September, 1930, p. 2.
2 Terrence O’Donnell, History of Life Insurance, American Conservation Co., 
Chicago, 1936, p. 580.
4 See Berle and Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property, New 
York, 1933, for a full discussion of the modern corporate system.
4 Temporary National Economic Committee, op. cit., p. 14.
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cruing to large companies is cited below in connection with the prob­
lem of insurance investments.
Aside from the limitations imposed upon small business gen­
erally, Negro business suffers in particular from the inadequacy of 
its capital resources and from the handicap of its strictly racial mar­
ket. As to the first, economic segregation prevents the Negro from 
tapping even those sources of capital available to the small white 
business man, and forces him to rely largely upon the accumulations 
of his own race. Yet, the Negro population has little to offer in this 
respect. A people held in slavery during the period in which the 
natural resources of the country were being appropriated and subject 
since Emancipation to heavy economic proscriptions can scarcely be 
expected to control large funds of capital upon which potential en­
trepreneurs of the race may draw.
The Negro business man is not only dependent upon the relatively 
low savings of the Negro masses for capital; he is also limited to the 
Negro community for a market. Moreover, the Negro community is 
not his exclusively to exploit. While Negro business cannot extend 
beyond the limits of the black ghetto, large-scale monopolistic enter­
prises find few obstacles to entry in the Negro market. There are, 
to be sure, types of Negro business which are protected and thrive 
because of segregation. In past years when white insurance com­
panies refused to write policies for Negroes, insurance belonged to 
this category. Such a situation, in fact, was directly responsible for 
the early growth of Negro insurance companies. Today, however, 
that is not the case. In the field of industrial insurance, by far the 
most important type among Negroes, the larger white insurance 
companies enter freely into the Negro market.
The dependence of the National Benefit upon this segregated 
market is clearly reflected in the history of the company. The sound 
development of the company as contrasted with its later geographic 
expansion and capital inflation took place during the wave of pros­
perity of the World War period and immediately after. This pros­
perity had been felt in the Negro community by«an increased demand 
for Negro wage-earners and the resulting higher wages. During the 
World War and in late 1922 and early 1923 there was a strong de­
mand for Negro industrial labor.* 6 It was on the basis of this pros­
perity of the Negro wage-earner that development of the company 
was perforce based. The falling off of demand for Negro labor in 
industrial centers beginning in late 1923, in a period of only mild 
agricultural prosperity, had an immediate effect upon the business of
'E d w a r d  E . L ew is, “ T he Southern  N eg ro  and the A m erica n  L ab or  S u pp ly” ,
Political Science Q uarterly, V ol. X L V II I , N o. 2, June, 1933.
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the company, and resulted in a high lapse rate. It was at this time 
that the company, to keep a reasonable amount of insurance on its 
books, embarked upon its program of geographic expansion, the un­
fortunate effects of which in increasing the costs of operation have 
already been traced.
Economic exclusion also has a direct effect upon the investment 
opportunities of a Negro insurance company. This is a consequence 
of the growth of the “private-placement”  method of security issue. 
A  corporation wishing to raise capital engages the services of an in­
vestment banker, “ who manages the details of preparing the issue, 
determining the set-up, arranging for the necessary preliminary 
financing and finally the production of certificates and for the distri­
bution of them to investors.”  7 Instead of offering these securities 
directly to the public, the investment houses often place them with a 
“preferred list” of investors at favorable prices, the latter in turn 
either holding the securities for investment purposes or selling to the 
public at substantial profits. The importance of the practice is in­
dicated by the fact that “ the volume of securities so purchased had 
increased from $100,000,000 in 1934, to over $700,000,000 in 1938. 
The growth of the practice is demonstrated by the fact that in 1938, 
thirty-seven per cent of the dollar amount of total new issues were 
purchased privately.” 8 Large insurance companies and to a less ex­
tent smaller white companies are able through interlocking relation­
ships of one sort or another9 to participate in this system of security 
distribution, and as a result to obtain preferred investments at large 
discounts. As a matter of fact, the large insurance companies 
sometimes deal directly with the issuing corporation. For example, 
the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company recently bought an entire 
bond issue ($5,000,000 par value) of the Potomac Electric Power 
Company of Washington, D. C., at a price which, while undisclosed, 
was presumably very favorable. The acquisition of investments by
’ John  T . F lynn , S ecu rity  Speculation, H arcourt, B race & Co., N ew  Y ork , 
1934, p . 25. «
8 T em p ora ry  N ation a l E conom ic Com m ittee, op. cit., p. 29.
9 A n  exam ple o f  in terlock ing  relationsh ips, w hich  is n ot a t all unusual, is 
in  the case o f  the M utual L ife  Insurance C om pany o f  N ew  Y ork . T hrough  
com m on officers the com pany w as affiliated w ith  an industria l com p a n y ; th rough  
one o r  m ore com m on d irectors it w as affiliated w ith  22 banks and insurance 
com panies, 55 industria l com panies, 1 l i fe  insurance com pany, 6 casu a lty  and 
su rety  com panies, 25 m arine insurance com panies, 3 m ercan tile  com panies, 1 
publish ing com pany, 9 rea l estate com panies, 29 ra ilroa d  com panies, 1 steam ship 
com pany, 1 a ir  tran sp ortation  com pany, 8 u tility  com panies, and 15 m iscellaneous 
com pan ies ; and th rough  com m on officers and d irectors it  w as affiliated w ith  8 
banks and tru st com panies, 2 industria l com panies, 2 m ercantile  com panies, 1 
u tility  com pany, 8 real estate  com panies, 15 ra ilroad  com panies, 1 steam ship 
com pany, and 2 m iscellaneous com panies, ibid., p. 176.
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insurance companies as a whole with or without the intermediation of 
investment houses amounted in the years from 1934 to 1987 to from 
70 per cent to 94 per cent of all private placements.10
Negro insurance companies enjoy no such preferential invest­
ment position since they are excluded from the system of interlock­
ing relationships just described. They occupy the position of the 
small investor, with a consequent smaller investment yield than that 
of their more favored competitors. The heavy real estate investment 
of the National Benefit represented in no small part an attempt 
to meet this investment disadvantage, although it has been shown 
in earlier parts of the study that the cure was quite as bad as the 
disease.
The failure of the National Benefit epitomizes the position of 
Negro business and finance in general. The competitive power of 
large concerns on the one hand and the limited market available to 
Negro business on the other confine the entrepreneurs of the race 
to those fields which do not lend themselves readily to concentration 
and which tend to offer a protected market in the Negro commu­
nity. This should not be construed to mean that there will not be 
some Negro enterprises which will be able to defy the general ten­
dency for a time and attain a rather large size. But, in general, 
any people without masses of accumulated wealth cannot force an 
entrance into the capitalist class. Nor is it to be expected that the 
segregated pattern of American life will not be reflected in business, 
for such is seen in the confining of the Negro merchant to a segre­
gated portion of the market. Negro business enterprise, just as the 
business enterprise of any property-less group, will be limited to 
enterprises which can be promoted and financed by the small savings 
of Negro wage-earners and which are not subject to the severe 
competition of large centralized or monopolistic enterprises.
Appendix A
The following is a list of the larger Neg^o insurance societies 
operating in 1907:
1. Afro-American Industrial Insurance Company....-Jacksonville,Fla.
2. American Beneficial Insurance Company.................Richmond, Va.
3. American Life and Benefit Insurance Company.......Durham, N. C.
4. Atlanta Mutual Insurance Company...... ......................Atlanta, Ga.
5. Benevolent Aid and Relief Association.......................... Baltimore, Md.
6. Benevolent Aid and Relief Association.......................... Annapolis, Md.
7. Benevolent and Relief Association............ .................Guthrie, Okla.
10 ibid.
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8. Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company...............Durham, N. C.
9. Children’s Aid Society............................................. Cincinnati, Ohio
10. Consumers Cooperative Fraternity............................... Norfolk, Va.
11. Cooperative Insurance Company............................... Hannibal, Mo.
12. Cordele Mutual and Fire Insurance Co.......................... Cordele, Ga.
13. Cosmopolitan Beneficial Association.......................St. Paul, Minn.
14. Fidelity Mercantile Fraternity.....................................Norfolk, Va.
15. Georgia Southern Home Aid Insurance Company.....Augusta, Ga.
16. Grand United Order of True Reformers.................Richmond, Va.
17. Guarantee Aid and Relief Society.............................Savannah, Ga.
18. Guarantee Relief Association.......................................Augusta, Ga.
19. Hand in Hand Fraternity...................................Washington, D. C.
20. Home Protective Association.....................................  ?
21. Independent Benevolent Order............................................ Georgia
22. Independent Order of St. Luke.................................Richmond, Va.
23. Industrial Savings Society..................................... Wilmington, Del.
24. Keystone Aid Society............................................. Philadelphia, Pa.
25. Lincoln Benefit Association.........................................Raleigh, N. C.
Appendix A (Continued)
26. Long Island Industrial Association.........................Brooklyn, N Y.
27. Metropolitan Mutual Benefit Association.............Charleston, S. C.
28. Mutual Benefit Society............................................... Baltimore, Md.
29. Mutual Improvement Society............................. Washington, D. C.
30. Mutual Insurance Company  ..................................... Athens, Ga.
31. Mutual Reliable Aid Society...................................Philadelphia, Pa.
32. National Benefit- Association............................... Washington, D. C.
33. National Benefit Insurance Company................. Jacksonville, Fla.
34. Northern Aid Society............................................. Philadelphia, Pa.
35. North Carolina Mutual & Provident Association.....Durham, N. C.
38. People’s Mutual Aid Association.........................Little Rock, Ark.
37. People’s Mutual Aid Association......................... Muskogee, Okla.
38. People’s Mutual Aid Asociation................................... Iienela, Ark.
39. People’s Beneficial and Fraternal Co....* ................. Baltimore, Md.
40. Piedmont Life Insurance Company.....................Greensboro, N. C.
41. Pimbas Mutual Aid Society.......................................Baltimore, Md.
42. Progressive Benefit Association.............................Charleston, S. C.
43. Reliable Aid and Improvement Society.................Philadelphia, Pa.
44. Richmond Beneficial Insurance Company.................Richmond, Va.
45. Savannah Mutual and Fire Insurance Company.....Savannah, Ga.
46. St. James Beneficial Society..................................... Baltimore, Md.
47. Southern Mutual Insurance Company.........................Augusta, Ga.
48. Star of Zion Relief and Accident Corporation.........'....Boydton, Va.
130
49. Standard Beneficial and Relief Company...............Baltimore, Md.
50. The Alpha Insurance Company............................ Washington, D. C.
51. The Home Insurance Company.............................. Charleston, S. C.
52. The Pilgrim Health Insurance Company................... Augusta, Ga.
53. The Royal Mutual Aid Beneficial Association.....Wilmington, Del.
54. Toilers Mutual Insurance Company...................... Greensboro, N. C.
55. Toilers Mutual Life Insurance Co..............................Tarboro, N. C.
56. Union Central Relief................................................... Florence, Ala.
57. Union Mutual Aid Association............................. Jacksonville, Fla.
58. Union Mutual Insurance Company............................... Atlanta, Ga.
59. United Aid Benevolent Association.......................New York, N. Y.
60. United States Life Insurance Company................ Charleston, S. C.
61. United Aid and Benevolent Association............. Jersey City, N. J.
62. United Brotherhood Fraternity..................................... Norfolk, Va.
63. United Aid Insurance Company.................................Richmond, Va.
64. Virginia Beneficial Insurance Company.......................Norfolk, Va.
“ Economic Cooperation Among Negroes,”
Atlanta University Publications, No. 12 ,1907, p. 99. 
A ppen d ix  B
Correspondence relative to Case XI, page —  (Cornelius Cook).
November 19th, 1925
Dr. William Wallace 
Shreveport, La.
Dear Doctor:
We are returning to you the medical certificate of Cornelius 
Cook and wish to call your attention to the fact that you failed to fill 
in answers to questions four and five of your Special Report, and 
you also failed to state how you rate the applicant or whether or not 
you would recommend him for insurance.
We also wish to advise that we have not received a specimen of 
urine. Kindly advise if you are certain that you sent a specimen 
to this office.
Appreciating an early reply and wishing you continued success, 
we are
Very truly yours,
C. C. Carter, Jr.,
Medical Director.
CCC/LPD
Copy Wm. L. G. Abney
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November 19th, 1925
Dr. William Wallace 
Shreveport, La.
Dear Doctor:
Enclosed you will find the medical certificate of Cornelius Cook, 
and we wish to call your attention to the fact that you failed to 
answer all questions. Kindly complete and return to us at once.
We are very anxious to issue this policy and trust that you will 
favor us with an immediate reply.
Very truly yours,








Some days ago we returned to you the medical certificate for 
Cornelius Cook, because you had failed to answer all questions. Up 
to this date we do not find that same has been returned to us. We 
are very anxious to clear this matter but cannot do so until we have 
received the blank properly filled out. Kindly give this matter your 
immediate attention.
Very truly yours,
C. C. Carter, Jr.,
Medical Director.
*  *  *  *  *
CCC:EGG
Then, Mr. W. L. G. Abney comes along, being, or having been very 
anxious to get the insurance through, writes:
December 11th, 1925.
Dr. C. C. Carter, Jr.,
Medical Director, *■
Standard Life Insurance Co.
Dear Sir:
I am taking the liberty to write you about C .C. Cook who 
applied for $5,000.00. I had a letter from you telling me that the
dn aifl. qoo^—Apradoad uoi^noqddn oq  ^ yy 0} paynj puq mq
with the Dr. and he reported that he had met the requirements. 
Please let me know if he has not.
Best wishes,
W m. L. G. Abney.
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Appendix C
Consolidated Statements of 28 Negro Life Insurance Companies
In the Proceedings * of the National Negro Insurance Associa­
tion for 1938 Esther O. Tibbs, Actuary for the Afro-American Life 
Insurance Company consolidated the statements of several com­
panies which were members of the Association. It is interesting to 
note how her comments indicate that the pattern of Negro business 
in the field of insurance differs from that of white insurance com­
panies. She wrote: “ It is conceded by the majority of authorities 
that the investments of insurance companies should be in the fol­
lowing order: Bonds, Mortgages, and Real Estate with the following 
proportions less policy loans, 57%, 23%, and 11% respectively. Now 
turning to our own companies we find Bonds 35%, Mortgages 17%, 
and Real Estate 30% of the assets. . . . The aggregate net rate 
earned on assets for our companies was 3.3%. The contractual rate 
[in order to maintain reserves] for the same companies was 3.6%” .* 
This, of course, is due to the position of Negro Insurance companies 
on the periphery of economic life—the effect of exclusion and the 
resulting lack of interlocking or consolidating relationships.
She compared the consolidated statements of 28 Negro insurance 
companies— 10 mutual and 18 stock—with that of one white com­
pany comparable in size to the aggregate of the 28 Negro companies 
and found that the one white company was in far better competitive 
position than was possible for any of the Negro companies. For 
an example, the Negro companies paid on account of home office 
salaries and medical and inspection fees more than three times as 
much as the one white company which was doing a comparable 
amount of business. Yet it is a well-known fact that the officers, 
employees, and agents of white companies receive more in salaries 
and commissions than do those of Negro companies. In the case 
of the National Benefit the wages of the masses of employees, ac­
cording to a former officer ranged from $35 to*'$90 a month, with 
an average of about $65. The reason that the expense for Negro 
companies in this respect was greater than that of the white com­
pany was because of the small unit size of the former and the lack 
of concentration and integration. In the case of the Negro com­
panies the money spent was far less productive.
The consolidated statements are as follows:
* P r o c e e d in g s , National Negro Life Insurance Association, 1938, Esther O.
Tibbs, p. 54.
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Health and Accident 4,087,679.95





Ordinary ................. $ 611,211.76
Industrial.................  1,391,953.44
Health and Accident 359,743.86 
Sick and Disability.. 1,756,753.09 
Commissions to Agents 3,249,784.24 
Home Office Expense.... 509,294.48
Dividends to Share­
holders ................. 66,424.65
Officers and Home O.
Employees Salaries 978,774.49 





Taxes on Real Estate.... 100,570.69








* P r o c e e d in g s , National Negro Life Insurance Association, 1938, Esther O.
Tibbs, p. 54.
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Loading ...........................  1,021,367
Dividends to Stockholders 64,882 
Dividends to Policy­
holders .........................  1,339
Investments .....................  62,720
Increase in Surplus .... .... 118,833
1,269,141 1,269,141
BALANCE SHEET ITEMS *
Book Value of Real
Estate.......................  5,487,565.56
Mortgage Loans on Real
Estate .......................  3,120,305.31
Policy Loans.................  1,722,902.08
Book Value of Bonds.... 6,425,540.01 
Book Value of Stocks.... 934,900.20 
Non-Admitted Assets.. 1,307,773.60 
Total Admitted Assets 20,125,870.37
Net Reserve.................  14,719,178.64
Capital Paid In.............  1,477,584.00
Surplus .......................  2,855,315.15
* Proceedings, National Negro Life Insurance Association, 1938, Esther O. 
Tibbs, p. 54.
EXHIBIT OF POLICIES *
O R D IN A R Y  IN D . and H . A . T O T A L
N um ber A m oun t N um ber A m oun t N um ber A m oun t
In  F orce  1 2 -3 1 -3 7 ...............................  121,529 $67,906,561 1,537,026 $704,620,777 1,658,555 $272,527,788
Issued D u rin g  1937 ..........................  28,411 16,129,516 1,173,203 163,716,840 1,201,614 179,846,356
L apse D u rin g  1937 ............................. 21,285 11,242,549 1,113,942 145,955,614 1,135,227 157,198,163
T erm inated  b y  D e a t h ........................ 1,066 632,563 16,783 1,947,928 17,849 2,580,491




The story of the collapse of the National Benefit Life Insurance 
Company as carried by the Washington press is indicated below. 
The headlines suggest some of the important incidents as well as give 
a chronology of the litigation. The articles and their references 
are as follows:
The Washington Tribune, Washington, D. C.
June 19, 1931 “National Benefit Changes Officers, Rutherfords
June 26, 1931
Out”
“ Examination of National Benefit Now Under Way” 
“ 9,000 Shares of Stock Will Be Cleared Up”
“ S. W. Rutherford Refuses to Talk of Future Plans” 
“ Mortimer Smith and Rutherfords Sued on Note”
July 10, 1931 “ Rutherfords and Smith Sued for Fraudulent Mis­
management”
Sept. 18, 1931 “ National Benefit Receivership to Be Appointed”
April 1, 1932 “ Court Refuses to Stop Meeting of Stockholders”
March 11, 1939 Editorial: “The National Benefit Receivership” 
“ Justice Gordon Names Risher National Benefit
Receiver”
“ National Benefit Repudiates Two Attorneys, Las­
key and Brooke”
April 1, 1939 “$375 Per Month for Attending to Mail”
The Afro-American, Washington, D. C.
June 27, 1931 “ National Benefit Directors Control”
July 4, 1931
“Bank Accounts of Rutherfords and Smith At­
tached”
“ Probe Rutherford’s Activity With 9,000 Share 
Trust”
July 18, 1931
“ To Protect All Policyholders, Says Risher” 
“ $100,000 Assets of Rutherfords Are Attached” 
“ Court Is Asked to Compel Itutherfords and Smith 
to Account for Alleged Frauds”
“ National Benefit Suit Exposes? Alleged Frauds”
July 25, 1931 “ Did Standard Life Gobble Up National Benefit?” 
“ National Benefit Suit Drags as Lawyers Confer”
Sept. 19, 1931 
Oct. 10, 1931
“ $500,000 Lost in Stock Market”
“National Benefit Feud Ousts Paul Crane” 
“ Maryland Lifts Ban on National Benefit” 
“Receiver Named for National Benefit in Maryland”
Nov. 14, 1931 “ National Benefit’s Deficit Is Enormous Sum of 
$2,828,380”
Nov. 28, 1931 “ National Benefit Ax Hits 70 Employees”
“ Receiver Recommended That Company Be Mu­
tualized at Once”
Jan. 30, 1932 “ Smith on Stand Tells of Half Million Deal”
Feb. 13, 1932 “Risher, New National Benefit Director, Had Only 2 
Shares of Stock”
Feb. 27, 1932 “Court Orders Officers Ousted as Rutherfords Win 4 
Weeks Fight”
“ Pinkett on Stand Says He Didn’t Know of National 
Benefit Investments”
“ Attorney Urges Court to Cut Trial Short”
“ Perry Howard and O’Brien Defend Risher and 
Pinkett”
“ Rutherford Group Lawyers Contend Risherites 
Sought to Wreck National Benefit”
March 5, 1932 “ Final Decree in National Benefit Case Debated” 
March 26,1932 “ Rutherford Is Hopeful of National Benefit Re­
vival”
April 2, 1932 “ National Benefit Receivers Are Granted More Au­
thority by Court”
“ Court Hopes for Practical Plan to Save National 
Benefit”
June 4, 1932 “ Ex-President of National Benefit Indicted for 
$450,000 Plot”
“ Rutherfords and Smith Sued by Boswell”
June 25, 1932 “ National Benefit Will Pay 253 Death Claims”
July 16, 1932 “ National Benefit Receivers Want $25,000 Fidelity 
Bonds”
Jan. 14, 1933 “ Multitude of Errors in National Benefit Accounts”
“Shrinkage in Realty Caused National Benefit 
Losses”
May 14, 1933 “Risher, Smith and Gary $450,000 Trial Halted”  
June 3, 1933 “ Newest Suit Would Dissolve National Benefit” 
Nov. 19, 1938 “ National Benefit Receivership Illegal”
March 11,1939 “ Suit Charges 90 Per Cept of National Benefit As­
sets Gone”
March 18,1939 Editorial: “ How Was It Possible?”
March 25,1939 “National Benefit Receiver Says Public Is Confused” 
April 1, 1939 “ Court Suspends Ouster Order in National Benefit” 
The Washington World, Washington, D. C.
July 10, 1931 “Rutherford-Smith-Rutherford Snydicate Charged 
With Serious Juggling of Stock and Funds”
The Washington Star, Washington, D. C.
July 9, 1931 ‘$6,000,000 Insurance Accounting Is Asked”
Nov. 21, 1938 “ Insurance Company May Get New Receiver”
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Appendix E
Security Holdings of the National Benefit Life Insurance Company as of September 9, 1931*
COoo
Item Par Book Market




























Palls Church School District, Fairfax County, Va.—5%, 1945...................................
Beaumont, Texas—5% Public Park Bonds, 1965..........................................................
Beaumont, Texas—5% School Bonds, 1950....................................................................
Beaumont, Texas—5% Street and Highway Bonds, 1950...........................................
Beaumont, Texas—5% Sewer Bonds, 1965......................................................................
Beaumont, Texas—5% Street Improvement and Repairs, 1955.................................
Beaumont, Texas—5% Street and Highway Bonds, 1965.............................................
Danville, Va.—School and City Hall Bonds, 4% % , 1939-40-41...................................
Federal Security and Mortgage Co.—5% Collateral Trust Bonds, 1939-1949...........
Charleston County, S. C.—5%% Road Bonds, 1941......................................................
Charleston County, S. C.—5%% Road Bonds, 1943......................................................
Spartenburg, S. C.— 4%%  Street Improvement Bonds, 1946.......................................
Norfolk, Va.—4%% Public Improvement Bonds, 1947.................................................
U. S. 4th L. L.—4% % , 1933............................................................................................
Bayway Terminal Co.—6%%, 1946.................................................................................
Havana Electric Railway—5%% Gold Debenture, 1951...............................................
Interboro Rapid Transit Co.—5% Refunding Bonds, 1966...........................................
St. Louis and Santa Fe Railway— 4%% Consolidating Mortgage Bonds, 1978.......
United Porto Rican Sugar Notes—6%%, 1937, Series A .............................................
Department of Cundinamarca Extension—6% % Sinking Fund Gold Bonds, 1959.... 
Roosevelt Water Conservation District, Arizona—2nd Lien 6% Gold Bonds, 1940....
Shubert Theatre Corporation—6% Gold Debenture, 1942...........................................
79 Madison Ave. Building, N. Y. C.—6% 1st, 1932-1940.............................................
Terminal Hydro Electric Co.—%Vz% 1st Mortgage, 1953.............................................
Department of Antioquia, Col.—7%, 1957......................................................................
Georgia, Florida and Alabama Railroad Co.—1st Refunding 6% Gold Bonds, 1952 




























“Based, on Schedules in Fackler and Breiby. Report on Condition, Appendix D.
Security Holdings o f the National Benefit Life Insurance Company as o f  September 9, 1931* (Continued)
Item Par Book Market
No. Bonds Value Value Value
28. Federal Security and Mortgage Co.—Collateral Trust 6%% Gold Bonds, 1935-1938 7,000 7,000.00 3,850.00
29. Potomac Joint Stock Land Bank—5%, 1954.................................................................. 50,000 51,750.00 23,080.00
30. Saks Realty Corporation—6% Serial Gold Bonds, 1946............................................... 2,000 1,978.60 560.00
31. Allied Packers—1st Mortgage and Collateral Trust Sinking Fund Bonds, 1939....... 1,000 1,000.00 302.50
32. Associated Dyeing and Printing Corporation—6% Notes, 1938................................. 5,000 4,987.50 1,100.00
33. City Water Power Co., Austin, Texas—1st Mortgage 5% Sinking Fund Gold 
Bonds, 1939 ......................................................................................................................... 3,000 None None
34. Detroit International Bridge Co.—7% Sinking Fund Gold Bonds, 1952.................... 15,000 14,975.00 150.00
35. Illinois Kentucky Bridge Co.—7% 1st Mortgage Sinking Fund Gold Bonds, 1946.... 10,000 •9,975.00 100.00
36. New Orleans Pontchartrain Bridge Co.—7% 1st Mortgage Sinking Fund Gold 
Bonds, 1946 ....................................................................................................................... 5,000 4,992.50 200.00
37. New Orleans Pontchartrain Bridge Co.—7% Gold Debenture Bonds, 1941............... 5,000 4,892.50 50.00
38. Norfolk and Portsmouth Bridge Co.—6% % 1st Mortgage Sinking Fund Gold 
Bonds, 1947 ....................................................................................................................... 5,000 4,875.00 2,450.00
39. Norfolk and Portsmouth Bridge Co.—7% Sinking Fund Gold Debenture Bonds, 
1942 .................................................................................................................................... 5,000 4,875.00 250.00
40. Old Point Comfort Corp,j—6 %% 1st Sinking Fund Gold Bonds................................. 10,500 9,975.00 525.00
41. Pittsburgh Terminal Warehouse and Transfer Co.—1st Refunding 5% Gold Bonds, 
1936 .................................................................................................................................... 1,000 1,010.00 70.00
42. Moline Plow Co.—Series F, 7% Gold Notes, 1923........................................................ 2,000 1,340.25 None
43. Colorado, Wyoming and Eastern Railway Co.—6% General Mortgage Bonds, 1944 5,000 None None
44. Delaware, Jackson and Chicago Railway Co.—5% Consolidated Mortgage Gold 
Bonds, 1937 ....................................................................................................................... 5,000 3,750.00 100.00
45. Gary, Conn. Rwy Co.—1st Mortgage 5% Gold Bonds, 1921....................................... 2,500 None None
46. Michigan Railroad Co.—6% 1st Mortgage Gold Bonds, 1924................................... 2,000 None 100.00
47. Raleigh and Charleston Railroad Co.—4% 1st Mortgage Gold Bonds, 1956.............. 1,000 800.00 10.00
48. Seaboard Airline—Series A, 6% 1st Consolidated Gold Bonds, 1945.......................... 1,000 995.00 20.00
49. Union Traction Co. of Ind.—General Mortgage Gold Bonds, 1932.......................... 1,000 None 200.00
50. Drainage Dist. 17, Miss. County, Ark.—5% Gold Bonds, 1928................................... 1,000 982.70 80.00
51. Franklin County, Ark.—5% Road Improvement Dist. N o. 1, 1938............................ 1,000 970.40 400.00
‘ Based on Schedules in Fackler and Breiby. Report on Condition, Appendix D.
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52. U. S. 1st L. L. 3%%, 1947........................................................................... ................  50 50.00 50.10
53. U. S. 4th L. L. 4%%, 1933-38....................................................................... ................  50 50.00 51.05
54. Servil Corp.—5% 1st Mortgage Gold Bonds, 1948..................................... ................  520 520.00 225.00
Total Bonds...................... ................ $392,620 $377,567.62 $146,421.50
Item Par Book Market
No. Stocks Value Value Value
55. Allied Packers—10 Shares Pfd........................................................................ 1,000.00 None
56. Rudolph Karstadt—60 Shares......................................................................... None 15.00
57. Anglo-Chilian Consolidated Nitrate Corp.—60 Shares Common................ None 7.50
58. Citizens Trust Co., Atlanta—1128 Shares Common................................... ................  112,800 252,000.00 28,200.00
59. Colorado, Wyoming and Eastern Rwy. Co., Voting Trust Certificate—247 Shares
Com m on ............................................................................................................................................................  24,700
60. Law rence Barnum  Co.— 10 Shares P fd ..............................................................................................................
61. M oline P low  Co.— T rustees’ C ertificate fo r  C om m on S tock ..................................................................
62. M oline P low  Co.— T rustees’ Certificate fo r_P fd . S tock ..............................................................................
63. N itrate  Corp. o f  Chile— 140 Shares Series B .................................................................................  N one
64. O ld P oin t C om port Corp.— 100 Shares C om m on..........................................................................................
65. U nited A rtis t  T heatre C ircuit— 50 Shares C om m on...................................................................................









Total Stocks $137,500 $265,180.00 $28,875.00
Total, $530,120 $642,747.62 $175,296.50
•Based on Schedules in Fackler and Breiby, Report of Condition, Appendix D.
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Certain of the securities owned by the National Benefit were 
deposited with state insurance authorities in accordance with the 
laws of some of the states in which the National Benefit operated and, 
therefore, were not immediately available to the company for 
hypothecation or sale. Securities so deposited represented the cream 
of the security holdings of the National Benefit. For, only govern­
ment, state, county, municipal or other approved securities were 
acceptable. In the schedule of security holdings of the National 
Benefit given above items 1 to 9, inclusive, were deposited with the 
Superintendent of Insurance of the District of Columbia; items 10 
to 12, inclusive, with the Insurance Commissioner of North Caro­
lina; and items 13 and 14 with the State Treasurer of Virginia. 
Certain other of the securities listed were held as collateral against 
loans made to the company. Items 15 to 20, inclusive, and the 
company’s own certified check for $9,000 were held by the Union 
Trust Company of Baltimore as collateral against a balance due 
them of $19,076.61. The depositing of the $9,000 certified check as 
collateral meant that the National Benefit owed only a net of 
$10,076.61. Yet the balance due according to the books of the Union 
Trust Company was $19,076.61, and it is reasonable to assume that 
interest was charged on that amount. The transaction was handled 
in this way, most likely, to enable the Union Trust Company to get a 
bonus on the deal. On October 28, 1931, items 17, 18 and 20 were 
sold at the stated market prices and the proceeds together with the 
certified check were applied to settle the company’s indebtedness.
Stein Bros, and Boyce of Baltimore were stock brokers with 
whom the company had an account. Fackler and Breiby state that 
the account was used for two purposes: to speculate on margin and 
to borrow money on securities. The cost of borrowing money 
through Stein Bros, and Boyce went as high as 10 per cent a month 
in 1929. The brokerage firm seems to have been accommodating 
in other respects. C. B. Rollins, a representative of the firm, was 
a party to one of the fictitious transactions in which the National 
Benefit was involved. t
Items 21 to 30 inclusive, 55 and 56 were held by Stein Bros, and 
Boyce against a debit balance of $15,221.68. On October 30 and 
December 23, 1931, Potomac Joint Stock Land Bank bonds (included 
in item 29) with a par value of $36,000 were sold for $14,150 to 
restore margin. The total securities held by Stein Bros, and Boyce 
prior to this sale had a par value of $113,000, a book value of $113,- 
648.60 and a market value of $34,875-00.
The only securities in the possession of the company were items 
31 to 54, inclusive, and 56 to 66, inclusive. These securities had a
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par value of $225,120.00, a book value of $335,195.85 and a market 
value of $35,293.65.
It is quite in accord with the principles of financial management 
to value bonds amply secured and not in default on the basis of 
amortization value. This is especially true in the case of an insur­
ance company whose security holdings, presumably, are for invest­
ment rather than speculation. This method of valuation implies 
that the securities in the ordinary course will not be sold but will 
be held until redeemed and that it is reasonable to believe that the 
issuing corporation will not default in the payment of interest or 
principal. The actuaries valuing the bonds in connection with the 
receivership found that with only six exceptions the only bonds 
which were amply secured and not in default were those deposited 
with state insurance authorities. The securities deposited with in­
surance authorities had a par value of $142,000, a book value of 
$145,963.17, a market value of $102,861.60 and an amortized value 
of $145,212.00. Bonds amply secured and not in default other than 
those deposited with state insurance authorities were items 28, 29 and 
30 with an amortized value of $60,706.00 held by Stein Bros, and 
Boyce; and items 52, 53 and 54 with an amortized value of $620 
which were in the possession of the company.
The only stocks held by the company which were paying divi­
dends were the 320 shares of Real Estate Mortgage and Guaranty 
Corporation stock (item 66). Item 58 shows that 1,128 shares of 
stock of the Citizens Trust Company of Atlanta was held by the 
National Benefit. The Citizens Trust Company was the National 
Benefit’s subsidiary. The National Benefit owned nearly the entire 
amount of its outstanding stock. Of 1,200 shares outstanding the 
National Benefit owned in its own name 1,108 and possessed certifi­
cates for 20 other shares not in its name but to which it claimed 
ownership. The stock of the Citizens Trust Company had a par 
value of $100 per share. The National Benefit carried this stock 
on its books at $252,000 an excess of $139,200 over par value. How­
ever, in valuing this stock actuaries for the ^ receivers said that there 
was no market for the stock but that it had been given a market value 
of $25 per share arrived at on the basis of the statement of the 
trust company. This made the market value of the National Bene­
fit’s holdings $28,200.00, or $224,000 less than the figure at which 
it was carried on the books of the National Benefit.
On a whole the other stocks held by the National Benefit were 
purely speculative stocks. The 10 shares of Allied Packers preferred 
(item 55) though carried at a book value of $1,000.00 was found to 
be entirely worthless. Items 56, 57 and 60 to 64, inclusive, were
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also worthless but had been recently written off by the company. 
Despite this the book value of stock, owned was $467,451.12 more 
than market value.
In addition to stocks many bonds held by the National Benefit 
were highly speculative in character. The United Porto Rican 
Sugar notes (item 19) held by the National Benefit were part of an 
issue of $3,500,000.00 originally offered at par by Stein Bros, and 
Boyce in 1927. These bonds were rated by Poor’s Investment Service 
as a better speculative grade (Poor’s Industrials— 1921, p. 287). 
They were originally offered at par and rose to 106 in 1928. This 
rise most likely was due to market manipulation to “make a market” 
for the original sale of the bonds. Since the bonds were marketed 
by Stein Bros, and Boyce, who were brokers for the National Benefit, 
and since a Julian S. Stein was one of the directors of the issuing 
corporation, it is not unlikely that Stein Bros, and Boyce had an 
especial interest in marketing these bonds and, consequently, in 
selling some of them to the National Benefit. After 1928 the bonds 
sank rapidly. The price range in 1930 was 89 *4 to 66. On Sep­
tember 9, 1931, the bonds were valued at one-tenth of their par 
value.
Item 23 shows the holdings of bonds of the 79 Madison Avenue 
Corporation. These bonds were secured by the first mortgage on a 
16 story office and mercantile building at 79 Madison Avenue, New 
York City. Their speculative character is indicated by the fluctua­
tions in the price during 1930. Their price fluctuated between a 
high of 81 and a low of 57 in 1930 (Poor’s Fiscal Manual— 1931, 
p. 926). On September 9, 1931, they were appraised at 15.
The holdings in Bayway Terminal Company bonds (item 15) 
were carried on the books at $5,050 and they were appraised on 
September 9,1931, at $750. Information concerning this company as 
well as this issue of bonds is surprisingly scant. It is known, how­
ever, that in September, 1926, $3,000,000 in these bonds were origi­
nally offered at par. On December 31, 1930, this company had out­
standing $2,771,120 in long term notes about Which no details are 
available. (See Poor’s Industrials— 1931, p. 459).
The Pittsburgh Terminal Warehouse and Transfer bonds were 
other speculative bonds held by the National Benefit (item 41). The 
investment opinion concerning these bonds is that they were specula­
tive (Poor’s Industrials— 1931, p. 870). Their price reached a high 
of 92 in 1928 and ranged from a high of 32 down to bid price in
1930. In 1928 the earnings of the company were $0.37 per share. 
Earnings fell in 1929 to $0.04 per share.
The Seaboard Airline was one of the railroads burdened with
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a large funded debt. $828 per mile of system was required to pay 
interest on its funded debt (Moody’s Steam Railroads— 1931). On 
December 23, 1930, it was put into a receivership. On March 1, 
1931, it defaulted in the payment of interest on some of its bonds. 
When it entered receivership the National Benefit was caught hold­
ing some of its bonds (item 48). These bonds with a par value of 
$1,000 were appraised at $20 on September 9, 1931. The Seaboard 
Airline controlled the Georgia, Florida, and Alabama Railroad. 
When the Seaboard Airline went into receivership such, of course, 
had an adverse affect upon the bonds of the Georgia, Florida, and 
Alabama Railroad. Item 26 shows the status of the National Bene­
fit holdings in these latter bonds.
Not all of the National Benefit’s securities were “ cats and dogs” , 
however. Saks Realty Corporation bonds (item 30), though given 
a low appraisal in 1931, had been considered a good grade of invest­
ment security. The crash of 1929, of course, had some effect upon 
it. Its price, however, was 82^  throughout the year of 1930 (Poor’s 
Industrials— 1931, p. 1784). It was one of the bonds amply secured 




The Annual Statement for the year ended December 31, 1930 on 
the Condition of Affairs of the National Benefit Life Insurance Com­
pany submitted to the Insurance Commissioner of Maryland (An­
nual Statements, Volume 14, 1930) contained in addition to facts 
already cited, certain other pertinent statements. The officers, on 
December 31, 1930, according to the report were:
R. H. Rutherford, President,
S. W. Rutherford, Secretary,
R. H. Rutherford, Treasurer, and
Dr. Wm. A. Warfield, V. President.
The actuaries were Miles M. Dawson and Son. The report, however, 
did not contain the signature of the actuary as was required. This 
fact in addition to the fact that the schedule of compensation and 
payment made to officers, directors, and employees who had received 
during the year more than $5,000 from the company was not com­
pleted could not be explained by the officials of the insurance depart­
ment of Maryland. The schedule referred to contained merely the 
names and no amounts.
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According to the report the directors were:
J. H. Braxton 
I. S. Burke
R. H. Rutherford
S. W. Rutherford 
Louis Washington
C. B. Lee 
M. S. Hayes 
Wm. A. Warfield 
M. F. Smith 
Wm. E. Newman
The report said further that the company was operating in the fol­
lowing states:
1. Ala. 11. Kan. 20. Ohio.
2. Ark. 12. Ky. 21. Okla.
3. Cal. 13. La. 22. Pa.
4. Del. 14. Md. 23. R. I.
5. D. C. 15. Mich. 24. S. C.
6. Fla. 16. Miss. 25. Tenn.
7. Ga. 17. Mo. 26. Texas
8. 111. 18. Neb. 27. Va.
9. Ind. 
10. Iowa
19. U. C. 28. W. Va.
The report said that the Masonic Temple had been acquired “ to 
protect a collateral loan made to the Grand Lodge F. A. A. M.”  and 
that the cost to the company had been $569,457.49 and the book value 
was $422,007.09. As to the company’s speculation on margin the 
report said that $593,600 (book value) in bonds and stocks were in 
the possession of Stein Bros, and Boyce as collateral “ on account of 
bonds purchased on the deferred payment plan” .
Following are certain statements also a part of the report for 
the year 1930.
STATEMENT OF INCOME AND DISBURSEMENTS 
Amount of Ledger Assets
of previous year.............  $6,082,308.29
Income
First year’s premium on
original policies ...........  $ * 125,950.19
Renewal premiums...........  $ 965,753.74
Surrender values applied to 
pay renewal premiums.. 1,979,622.75 2,945,376.49
Total premium income 3,071,326.68
Gross interest on mort­
gage loans .....................  35,896.43
Gross interest on collateral 
loans 15,270.46
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Gross interest on Bonds
and Dividends on Stocks 49,680.65
Gross interest on premium
notes, policy loans or
liens ............................... 85,558.39
Gross interest on deposits
in trust companies and
banks ............................. 9,760.04
Interest on surrender
value loans ................... 8,896.79
Gross rent from company
property......................... 56,780.55
261,843.31





Gross profit on sale of R.E. 4,133.23
Gross profit on sale of
Bonds ............................. 1,998.99
6,132.22
Gross increase in ledger
asset by adjustment..... 57,550.20






Death claims .....................  701,237.63
Matured endowments.......  23,680.25
Sick claims .......................  288,691.67
Payments made to policy­
holders during the year 6,334.70
$9,606,836.28
Net amount paid for 
losses and matured
endowments .............  1,019,944.25
Premium notes and policy 
liens voided by lapse. 5,824.97
Surrender values paid in 
cash or applied in liqui-
dation of notes or loans 
Paid for claims on sup-
1,003,053.31
plementary contracts .... 
Expense of investigation 
and settlement of policy
1,266.64
claims ............................. 9,451.41
Dividend to stockholders.... 
Commissions to agents:
19,535.64
First year’s premium.... 60,507.81
Renewal premiums ..... 29,445.80
89,953.61
Industrial .....................
Compensation to managers 
and agents not paid by
359,501.58
commission ................... 54,230.01
Agency supervision ......... 44,809.95
Branch office expense....... 452,565.09
Medical examiners’ fees.... 
Salaries and all other com­
pensation to officers, di­






and expense ................... 44,438.30
Advertising ....................... 3,590.30
Printing and Stationery.... 21,957.69
Telephone, postage, etc....




Legal expense ................... 12,332.62
Repairs and expenses....... 55,863.45
Taxes on Real Estate....... 7,999.80
Taxes, licenses and fees.... 77,886.00
Misc. expense ................... 46,844.82




Interest on surrender 
value loans ............ 8,896.79
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Borrowed money repaid.... 104,435.75
Interest on borrowed
money ...........................  21,797.87
Agents’ debit balances
charged off ...................  23.38
Gross loss of sale of real
estate .............................  2,134.35
Gross loss of sale of bonds 11,592.50







Book value of Real Estate Less $507,500
incumbrances .........................................  1,540,129.17
Mortgage loans on Real Estate................. 549,560.77
Collateral loans...........................................  79,300.00
Policy loans.................................................  633,245.11
Premium notes ...........................................  61,336.70
Book value of Bonds...................................  822,846.77
Book value of Stocks...................................  262,000.00
----------------  1,084,846.77
Deposits in Trust Companies and Banks 256,827.99
Bills Receivable .........................................  38,998.18










Interest due and accrued .........................  76,849.38
Market value of Real Estate over book
value .........................................................  70,444.63




Furniture and Fixtures ........
Impairment Liens....................
Impairment Liens Contingent 
Auto equipment ......................
Industrial premiums due...........................  52,529.84
Cash surrender value of officers’ insurance 8,891.85
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6,050,032.57
Non-admitted assets...................................  450,353.96
5,599,678.61
LIABILITIES, SURPLUS AND OTHER FUNDS
Reserve (Life) ......................   4,744,950.00
Disability Reserve ...............................................................  19,297.00
Reserve on account supplementary contracts...................  3,975.14
Claims due and unpaid (including claims resisted).......  63,066.53
Gross premiums paid in advance........................................  3,825.70
Accruals .................................................................................  17,218.56
Reserve for taxes .................................................................  54,947.00
Borrowed money...................................................................  31,076.61
Unpaid dividends to stockholders.......................................  4,362.39
Contingent liens, 1930 .........................................................  14,477.56
Deferred payments on bonds...............................................  241,664.34
Miscellaneous ................................................    13,878.90
5,212,739.73
Capital ...................................................................  250,000.00
Surplus ...................................................................  136,938.88
5,599,678.61
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Dividends to stockholders ................. 20,000.00
Special funds ....................................... 21,072.00
Profit and Loss ...................................
Real Estate ......................................... .......  61,683.00
23.00
Stocks and Bonds ...............................





Miscellaneous ....................................... .......  63,267.00 296,231.00
Net increase in surplus .....................
459,661.00
26,407.00
459,661.00
